No. 47

SURVEY

A JOURNAL of SOVIET and EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES

TEN YEARS AFTER



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SURVEY

A Journal of Soviet and East European Studies

No. 47 **April 1963**

Editor: Walter Z. Laqueur **Associate Editor: Leopold Labedz**

Death and Damnation of a Hero ..... *H. T. Willetts* 3

The Dynamics of Destalinisation ..... *Herbert Ritvo* 13

Questionnaire—Ten Years After **24–104**

Reflections on the Cult of Stalin ..... *Georg Lukacs* 105

The Liberman Proposals ..... *Alec Nove* 112

On National Democracy

I. Its function in communist policy ..... *Richard Lowenthal* 119

II. Evolution of a concept ..... *J. M. van der Kroef* 134

Conversations with Trotsky ..... *Fritz Sternberg* 146

Views and Reviews:

The Shock of Recognition ..... *Burton Rubin* 160

Interpreting Neo-Realism ..... *Eugene Kamenka* 171

Positions of Strength ..... *A. R.* 174

Our Contributors 11

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DEATH AND DAMNATION OF A HERO

H. T. Willetts

TEN years have passed since *Pravda* announced that the heart of Lenin's comrade-in-arms, the genius who continued his work, the wise leader and teacher of the Soviet people, had stopped beating. Seven years ago Khrushchev informed the Party that Lenin had tried to curb the growing power of his 'too rough' comrade before he became dangerous, that the late dictator had been a genius only in his own megalomaniac imagination, that his leadership had been erratic, cruel, and tragically costly, and that much of his teaching was perverse and pernicious. Less than eighteen months ago the disciple whose head on countless plaques and medallions had worn Lenin's profile as an aureole was removed from his master's side in the shrine on Red Square and ignominiously hidden in the ground.

If we took at face value what was written about Stalin immediately after his death and what is written now, we might suppose that the Soviet people had suffered a revulsion of feeling which has no parallel in history. In 1953 'the people . . . with unprecedented energy is building a great monument to its leader. That monument is communism' (*Pravda*, 8 March 1953). In October 1961 the Party celebrated the adoption of its programme for the building of communism by putting the ex-leader's remains out of sight. In 1953, Soviet man, 'whatever his work, and in whatever remote region of the Soviet land he lives', was said to have 'felt Stalin's care, his love, his guiding hand'. In 1962, in Solzhenitsyn's story, 'One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich', Soviet men engaged in very unpleasant work in a very remote area speak of Stalin in these terms: 'Grandpa Whiskers will take pity on you! He wouldn't believe his own brother, let alone you, you mugs!' The poets, ten years ago, saw him as radiant, limitless, immortal—'our sun, a living ocean bounded by no shores . . . our thought, our right hand, our breath' (Grishashvili). 'You rose every morning like the sun over our country. The people saw Lenin reincarnate in you' (Gafur Gulyam). 'Stalin is dead, Stalin is with us for ever, Stalin is life and life has no end' (Gribachev). A few years later, Tvardovsky could see him as remote from the people and its concerns, 'shut off, alive, from life, behind the Kremlin wall', and as an 'Oriental', cold and ruthless. Gribachev, in 1953, wished that 'we could have put our hearts into his breast, so that he could have gone on building for ten thousand years, and lived with posterity under communism'. In 1962 Yevtushenko imagined, with dread, that something still stirred in the coffin hurried out of the Mausoleum, something yearning not to build but to punish. 'If every step I took . . . were not directed to strengthening and improving the

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position of the working class I should consider my life without purpose', said Stalin once, and his words were widely quoted after his death. In 1962 Khrushchev informed us that Stalin had despised working people. As for his 'faith that never faltered in the radiant communist future', according to Khrushchev again, he liked to tell his entourage that 'the imperialists will strangle you when I have gone'.

VERY soon after Stalin's death public mourning was at an end, and the long process of re-evaluation began. It has passed through three phases, which might be called those of deflation, dismantling, and destruction. There were many interacting reasons for this progressively harsh reassessment. From the first, as Mr Bertram Wolfe has pointed out in his penetrating study, *Khrushchev and Stalin's Ghost*, it was necessary to ensure that Stalin's image should not hopelessly dwarf his successors. It was also obviously thought undesirable, by most of the collective leadership, that one of their number should obtain a concentration of power such as Stalin enjoyed, to the peril of the rest. Hence the early theoretical articles on the role of individuals in history, without specific mention of Stalin, and the attempts, with which Dr Myron Rush deals in his interesting but not always convincing book on *The Rise of Khrushchev*, to put secretaries of the Central Committee, including by implication the late and any would-be future General Secretary, in their proper subordinate place. The process of deflation was clearly observable in *Pravda* on the first anniversary of Stalin's death. He had become only '*one* of Lenin's closest assistants', had fought to realise Lenin's behests 'together with other pupils of Lenin', and although he was still 'inseparably linked' with the great wartime victories, these were now attributed primarily to 'the mighty Soviet state, the wise leadership of the Communist party, and the unsparing heroism of the Soviet people'.

Quite apart from the need to show that Stalin was not indispensable, the leaders had pressing practical reasons for deflating him. They undoubtedly realised how unpopular at home, and how unattractive abroad, he had made the regime, and they quickly set about correcting some of his worst mistakes, particularly in agriculture and in foreign policy. The changes which they made were implicit criticisms of their late master, even though they did not mention him. The early amnesties and rehabilitations, intended in part to reassure the Soviet people that Stalinist terror was at an end, in part as a pledge between the leaders themselves that they would not use Stalinist methods in the contest for power among themselves, were a tacit indictment of him whom Fadeyev, in 1953, had called 'the great humanist'. There was powerful pressure for 'destalinisation' in many fields of economic and cultural life. Managers, scientists, and artists were impatient of the deadening ideological inhibitions, the crippling organisational restraints, inflicted on them by the man who in obituary notices was extolled as the champion of technological progress ('old machines, he said, must give place to new,

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and new ones to the newest'), as the 'coryphaeus' of sciences natural and social ('he discovered several biological laws himself'—Lysenko), as a discriminating and inspiring patron of the theatre ('it was a real holiday to see him applauding with a kindly smile . . . how much his wise, uplifting advice gave to each of us', wrote the actress Tarasova), as the guarantor of literary freedom and independence (V. Yermilov). . . .

In this first stage criticism was usually implicit, and at times Stalin's authority was still invoked: notably in support of Khrushchev, both on the priority of heavy industry (*Pravda*, 5 March 1955) and in his policy of active coexistence (*Pravda*, 21 December 1955). Quiet deflation ended, and demonstrative dismantling began, at the twentieth CPSU congress in February 1956. Some few disparaging remarks were made in open congress, but the main attack of course was made in Khrushchev's secret speech. The adjective must be understood in a purely technical sense. There can seldom have been a secret which was so thoroughly and methodically noised abroad by its authors. Within weeks, Party and Komsomol groups, and the collectives of institutions up and down the country, had attended a solemn reading of the speech. It seems more than likely that the copy which the US State Department obtained and published in translation was deliberately leaked through a foreign communist party: in any case its authenticity was implicitly admitted when *Pravda* published an article by Eugene Dennis clearly inspired by this version. Foreign commentators have offered many ingenious speculations as to why Khrushchev made the speech at all, and why he chose this particular time.

Part of the truth is surely to be found in the straightforward and generous explanation: that Khrushchev and his supporters wanted to dramatise the break with the past, to administer what Ulbricht, who knows with what misgivings, called 'a healthy shock', to reinvigorate the whole communist movement and especially to stimulate initiative in the Soviet Union. But there can be little doubt that the content and timing of the speech were partly determined by the power struggle within the Presidium. If Stalin had triumphed as the 'continuer' of Lenin, Khrushchev made his bid for supremacy as the discontinuer of Stalin. Significant in this connection were his treatment of a Stalinist crime (the Leningrad case), of which Malenkov was the main beneficiary, and was widely believed to have been the instigator, his discrimination, when explaining why Stalin's excesses had gone unchecked, between those members of the Politburo who had and those who had not known all the facts about the repressions, and his skilfully sketched contrast between his own role and that of Malenkov during the war. The consolidation and maintenance of Khrushchev's position, rather than the need to eliminate residual Stalinism, determined after June 1957 the tempo of dismantling.

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FOR the general public, Stalin's merits and faults were weighed in the decision of the Central Committee on 'Overcoming the Personality Cult and its Consequences'. It is argued that the cult arose in the specific circumstances of a backward agrarian country ruined by war and civil war, encircled by hostile capitalist states, and under constant threat of invasion. Difficulties at home and abroad imposed the need for iron discipline, constantly heightened vigilance, and 'some temporary restriction of democracy'. In these years Stalin fought for the socialist transformation of the USSR. His services were great, and particularly important was his leadership in the struggle against Trotskyists, right-wing deviationists, bourgeois nationalists, and the threat of foreign intervention. These services earned him great authority and popularity. Unfortunately, as time went by all successes were ascribed to him alone and a cult of his personality grew up. This development was facilitated by the faults in his character to which Lenin had drawn attention. He began to consider himself infallible and encouraged people to glorify him. The cult, particularly in his later years, did great harm to Soviet society and hampered the development of the creative initiative of the masses, but, contrary to the lying inventions of enemies of socialism, could not and did not change the democratic and profoundly popular character of the Soviet order.

This statement is still the basis of summary official judgments of Stalin. But, especially in the past three or four years, the ideologists have continued to shade the portrait so that the dark patches look blacker than ever and the bright spots too are becoming dim and dingy. Dismantling was essentially a separation of the positive from the negative Stalin, but the latest development is to show that the negative components in his career are much more serious than was originally admitted, and the positive components much less significant. Collation of the first (1959) and second (1962) editions of the *History of the CPSU*, which replaced the Stalinist *Short Course*, gives a useful insight into this process. (Some of the amendments and additions in the new version were anticipated, piecemeal, before its appearance.)

If we consider, for instance, one key question concerning Stalin's conduct in 1917, the *Short Course* stated flatly that at the 6th congress Stalin was 'vigorously opposed to Lenin's appearing for trial', which would have meant his 'physical destruction'. The *History* (1959) records that the congress decided against Lenin's appearance, and says nothing about Stalin's position. In the *History* (1962), we find that 'some delegates—Stalin, Manuilsky, Volodarsky—expressed themselves in favour of . . . Lenin's appearance for trial if guarantees of his safety were given', and that Stalin 'incorrectly assessed the political situation' in that 'he regarded an honest bourgeois trial of Bolsheviks as a possibility'. This, of course, besides being a rather unconvincing proof of Stalin's shortsightedness, is a change in the direction of historical accuracy, like many other additions in the new *History*: as, for instance,

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the specific mention that Bukharin (accused at his trial in 1938 of plotting to assassinate Lenin in 1918) in fact rejected the invitation of the Left SRs to join in overthrowing Lenin's government after Brest-Litovsk, or the reference to the support which several prominent (and nowadays highly respectable) Party members gave to the Left Communists against Lenin. But the new detail about Stalin is plainly intended to be highly damaging.

More significant, as a modification of the earlier version of Stalin's positive period, is the treatment of collectivisation in the *History* (1962). Here, to put it briefly, the tendency is to give the Party at large, and certain of its leaders other than Stalin, credit for the positive achievements of collectivisation, and to blame Stalin for the disasters caused by its hasty and clumsy execution. Thus, in 1959 we read that 'some Party organisations, carried away by the first successes, infringed the Central Committee decision of 5 January 1930 on the pace of collectivisation'. In 1962 we learn that 'this precipitation was not accidental. At the end of December 1929 . . . Stalin called for the acceleration of collectivisation. He set at nought what Lenin and Engels had said about the impermissibility of excessive haste.' A further criticism, not anticipated in the earlier version, is that, after as many as 15 per cent of the peasants had been 'de-kulakised', and 15–20 per cent disfranchised in some areas, Stalin still did not respond to appeals from local party groups for clarification of the question as to how much of the peasant's property was to be socialised. He 'underestimated the strength of the peasant's attachment to his small private enterprise'. His 'unwillingness to listen to the sensible suggestions of local party officials' was 'the source of many mistakes at the beginning of collectivisation'. Finally, in the first edition of the *History*, Stalin's famous article, 'Dizziness from Success', was said to have 'clarified the policy of the Party and oriented Party cadres towards the correction of mistakes'. In the second edition the story is very different. Stalin was commissioned to write the article by the Politburo, but did not submit it for approval. It had a dual significance. On the one hand it helped to conciliate the mass of the middle peasants. But Stalin 'put all the blame for mistakes on local officials,' making 'sweeping accusations of mad behaviour against them' although the 'whipping up' of the tempo of collectivisation had 'come from above, from Stalin'. 'The content and tone of the article came as a surprise to the Party', and caused 'a certain confusion' amongst the rank and file. When a mass exodus from the collective farms began, 'the Party organs could hardly cope with the situation which had arisen in the countryside'.

A THIRD striking change in the new edition, one which, it is true, has been an obvious possibility ever since the 20th congress but which is nonetheless extremely ominous for the future of Stalin's official reputation, is to be found in the treatment of Kirov's murder.

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To make the difference in the implications of the two versions clear it is necessary to quote at some length. In the 1959 edition we read that:

> Even after the cleansing [the screening and mass expulsion of Party members in 1933–34] there remained in the Party double-dealing and hostile elements, who were not fully exposed and isolated. On 1 December 1934 . . . S. M. Kirov was villainously murdered. The murderer, detained on the spot, was full of enmity and hatred towards the leading figures of the Party . . . [and] had associated with certain former participants of the Zinoviev anti-Party group. He was a member of the Party, held a Party card, and hiding behind it committed his crime. The murder of Kirov showed that a Party card could be used to cover foul anti-Soviet actions. It was necessary to protect the Party against alien elements.

This was essentially a Stalinist version. In the *History* (1962) the background to the murder, the tentative identification of the forces behind the murderer, and the conclusion drawn are all different. The writer leads up to the murder not with a reference to the unsatisfactory screening of the Party members but with an account of the growth of the personality cult. The 'abnormal situation' which the cult had created in the Party, we now learn, 'alarmed some communists and especially the old Leninist cadres. Many delegates at the congress [the 17th, in January–February 1934] above all those of them who were acquainted with Lenin's testament thought that the time had come to transfer Stalin from the post of General Secretary to other work.' (This is the nearest thing so far to a confirmation of the speculation advanced by many foreign students of the USSR that an attempt was made to replace Stalin by Kirov.) 'The Party and the whole Soviet people were legitimately proud of their successes. The Soviet people greeted the decision of the congress on the second five-year plan with great enthusiasm. Overcoming many difficulties, the Soviet people were moving forward . . . firmly and confidently. But in December their joy was dimmed by a grievous event . . . Kirov . . . was villainously murdered'. The description of the murderer in this version includes no mention of associations with the Zinoviev faction. Instead, we read that this was a crime 'planned in advance, the circumstances of which, as Khrushchev told the 22nd congress, are still being investigated'. And, shortly afterwards, follows the statement that 'Stalin made use of the assassination as an excuse' to persecute 'all those who did not please him'. 'This was the beginning of mass repressions and the grossest breaches of socialist legality'.

IN this third phase of re-assessment, Soviet historians and ideologists are providing us with a great deal of very useful information about the history of their country. But we are bound, while accepting as entirely credible their revelations as to Stalin's mistakes and abuses, to ask whether they are not, in some respects, underestimating him. It is

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absurd, for instance, to imply, as the new history does in various places, that Stalin's role at certain of the crucial Party meetings in the construction period was on a level with that of other leaders who were in fact merely his henchmen and mouthpieces. We may wonder, too, whether his contribution to the Soviet war effort is not excessively belittled in recent contributions to Soviet military history—certainly in most respects a great improvement on earlier work in this field—where he figures primarily as the pig-headed author of terribly costly strategic blunders, from which the generals vainly strove to dissuade him. But much more important than this question of injustice to Stalin himself, is the distortion of historical truth in the emergent version of the origins of Stalinism and the relationship between Stalinism and the Soviet system as a whole at a certain stage of its development. The difference between Soviet and most non-Soviet (including some Marxist) scholars on this point is that the former regard the 'personality cult' as an unfortunate accident, while the latter regard it as a logical and probably inevitable stage in the organic development of the Communist Party. For the Soviet scholar, and the orthodox foreign communist, the Party and Stalin coexisted. Stalin influenced and damaged the Party, but never wholly absorbed and perverted it. The rest of us cannot help thinking—to paraphrase Mayakovsky——that for nearly a quarter of a century Stalin was the Party and the Party was Stalin. We are not, I think, creating our own 'cult of the personality': for the whole point about 'Stalin', or rather the complex of policies and methods to which we attach his name, is that—as not only Lukacs but even the drafters of the June 1956 decision hint—they were the creation of the Party as a whole, reacting as a monolithic party was bound to react to the situation created by a revolution in the name of socialism in a backward country. On their side, the Soviet scholars might be said to be creating a revised personality cult: the difference is that whereas formerly all victories were explained by the merits of one man, now all defeats, all errors, and all crimes are explained by his defects.

Soviet scholars are unlikely to explore Lukac's hint that the cult should be studied as a mechanism for the maintenance of power—the power, of course, not only of Stalin within the Party, but of the Party within the country. They have not even paid attention to the observation of a bold Soviet writer that what needs to be studied is not a cult but a 'hierarchy of cults': or, in other words, the social and political structure and functioning of the Party as a whole in the Stalin period. These are delicate and painful questions. It would be necessary to take the investigation back to a time when Stalin was scarcely heard of, and when Plekhanov, Rosa Luxemburg, and others had already pointed to the danger that a party of the Leninist type would degenerate into a bureaucratic dictatorship. It would be necessary to discuss objectively the disputes within the Party in the twenties and the means by which Stalin triumphed over his rivals. It would be necessary to revaluate, as

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mercilessly as Stalin's own career has been examined, the behaviour of many Stalinist party chiefs who are now represented as immaculate martyrs, and of some who served his darkest purposes and are still sharing the power he bequeathed.

Soviet scholars are likely to find even less attractive than the objective study of the mechanisms of power Lukacs' other demand: that they should measure the extent by which Stalin's despotic actions exceeded the objective needs of the situation. Is it in any case possible to estimate the minimum effective dose of violence in a revolutionary situation like the drive for mass collectivisation? Can we say what lesser measure of arbitrary terror would have preserved within the Party that 'iron discipline' which all communists considered necessary in the dangerous years after 1933? We can call in question the policy of collectivisation, or the concept of the monolithic party: but to realise either in practice, the 'excesses' for which Stalin and a sufficient number of his supporters were prepared were probably no more than adequate.

Soviet scholars are engaged not in replacing the Stalin myth by an objective historical analysis but in elaborating a new myth, according to which the Party preserved its ideals untarnished and its morale unimpaired, and hewed close to the humane and democratic Leninist line throughout its history, in spite of the hampering and distorting influence of Stalin. It is a politically convenient myth: the Party must disown much of its past if it is to establish that genuine working partnership with the people which it evidently regards as essential and possible at the present stage. It is also a myth which touches reality at many more points than Stalinist history did, since it embodies many of the facts about the abuses of the past although it wrongly analyses them. Above all, it is a healthier myth, since it acknowledges and condemns 'Stalin's' crimes, and so makes a repetition of them less likely. But it remains a myth. Stalin was neither god nor devil. He was a harsh, vindictive, narrow-minded, power-loving politician. His boldness and ruthlessness were the qualities which recommended him to the majority in the Party which enthusiastically followed him. He was idolised and invested with terrifying power by those who expected to share it securely with him. Some of them paid for their infatuation with their lives. Others are among those who have inherited his power and are making better use of it. We must reconcile ourselves to the fact that they can admit only their former leader's and teacher's guilt, and not the ultimate responsibility of the system they serve, and of some of their number, for the unspeakable sufferings of the Soviet peoples in the twenty-five years of Stalin's reign.

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Our Contributors

F. R. ALLEMANN is the editor of *Der Monat*, Berlin, and author of *Bonn ist nicht Weimar*.

DANIEL BELL, Professor of Sociology at Columbia University, is the author of *The End of Ideology*.

ABRAM BERGSON, Professor of Economics at Harvard, is author of *The Real National Income of Soviet Russia, The Structure of Soviet Wages*, etc.

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, Professor of Government and Director of the Research Institute on Communist Affairs, Columbia University, is the author of *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict*.

VICTOR ERLICH is Professor of Russian Literature at the Russian Institute of the University of Washington.

WILLIAM E. GRIFFITH is Lecturer in Political Science and Research Associate of the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

GREGORY GROSSMAN is Professor of Economics in the University of California and author of *Soviet Statistics of Physical Output*, etc.

NAUM JASNY, doyen of economists in the Soviet field, is the author of *The Socialised Agriculture of the USSR, The Soviet Economy during the Plan Era, The Soviet Price System* and many other works.

GEORGE L. KLINE lectures on philosophy at Bryn Mawr; he is the author of *Spinoza in Soviet Philosophy*, etc.

JUSTUS M. VAN DER KROEF is Associate Professor of Political Science in the University of Bridgeport, Conn. and author of *Indonesia in the Modern World*, etc.

WOLFGANG LEONHARD has written *Child of the Revolution, The Kremlin Since Stalin*, etc.

RICHARD LOWENTHAL is Professor of International Relations at the Free University of Berlin.

CHRISTOPHER MAYHEW is Member of Parliament for Woolwich East, Chairman of the GB-USSR Association, and author of *Co-Existence Plus*.

ALEC NOVE is Reader in Russian Social and Economic Studies in the University of London, and author of *The Soviet Economy*.

RICHARD PIPES, Professor of Russian History at Harvard, is the author of *The Formation of the Soviet Union*, 1917–23, etc.

HERBERT RITVO is a Fellow of the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

T. H. R. RIGBY is Professor of Russian Studies at the Australian National University, Canberra.

HENRY L. ROBERTS, Director of the Russian Research Institute of Columbia University, is the author of *Russia and America: Dangers and Prospects*.

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BURTON RUBIN, previously Lecturer in Russian Literature at Amherst, is at present in Europe.

LEONARD SCHAPIRO is Reader at the L.S.E. and is the author of *The Origins of Communist Autocracy, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, etc.

FRITZ STERNBERG is the author of *Capitalism and Socialism on Trial: The End of a Revolution, The Military and Industrial Revolutions of Our Time*, etc.

PETER WILES, Professor of Economics at Brandeis University, is author of *The Political Economy of Communism*, etc.

H. T. WILLETTS is Research Fellow of St. Antony's College, Oxford.

THE HON. C. M. WOODHOUSE is Member of Parliament for Oxford and author of *Apple of Discord, British Foreign Policy Since the Second World War*, etc.

EUGENE ZALESKI, of the Sorbonne, is author of *Planification de la croissance . . . en URSS*, etc.

ALFRED ZAUBERMAN works at the L.S.E. on the Eastern and Central European economies. He is the author of *Industrial Development in Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Poland, 1937–56, The Soviet Debate on the Law of Value and Price*, etc.

Summary : **"THE REVIEW"**

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THE DYNAMICS OF DESTALINISATION

Herbert Ritvo

THE most significant post-Stalin change in the Soviet Union, it is generally agreed, has been the cessation of the indiscriminate use of terror and compulsion, and the shift to persuasion and to a more equitable use of incentives as the major motivating forces to insure an acceptable degree of conformity to official policy. Except to the 'dogmatists' among Western students of Soviet affairs, this basic modification in the employment of the time-tested instruments of coercion, now in effect for a decade, has provided sufficient evidence to cast considerable doubt on their thesis that a totalitarian party-state cannot relax its all-encompassing control apparatus without *inevitably* endangering the system. Since the past ten years have, on the other hand, not provided even the slightest indication of the creation of an institutional framework which could guarantee the prevention of arbitrary intervention by the party leadership into police and judicial matters, there are equal grounds for considering premature and unproven Western 'revisionist' claims that political democratisation *inevitably* follows from the industrialisation and urbanisation of Soviet society. The disparity between these two theories of the evolutionary possibilities of the communist dictatorship derives directly from differing evaluations of the nature and role of the totalitarian party—and its leader—in shaping economic and political development. For the first, the totalitarian leader and his ruling party are inseparable as the indispensable integrating factor in an increasingly atomised society; by the latter the system of absolutist party rule is already considered superfluous and in sharp contradiction to the demands of a modern industrial society which generates social forces pressing the regime towards further reforms.

The essence of destalinisation is Khrushchev's restoration to the party of its original place of priority in the Leninist system of party-state rule, made possible as a consequence of the defeat of Beria and the police. (It is not 'liberalisation' of all spheres of Soviet life, but primarily a condemnation of Stalin's crimes against 'loyal' party members and their rehabilitation, as well as a revision of some of his doctrines.) Only by his absolute control and skilful manipulation of the party apparatus had Stalin been able to change the original Leninist institutional relationships between the party, state, police, and military bureaucracies, and to subordinate Soviet society as a whole, as well as the individual instruments of power, to his own person and, through delegated authority, to *his* police. But the speed with which the party (i.e. the collective leadership in June 1953) was able to reduce the police apparatus, after liquidating its leaders, to its proper level in the institutional hierarchy, demonstrated

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that two decades of Stalinist deviation had not destroyed the validity and viability of the Leninist conception and mechanism of party-state rule. Only in accordance with Stalin's whims and needs could the police play their designated role in periods of purge or relaxation; and, as the fates of Yagoda and Yezhov remind us, no police chief in Soviet history has ever held anything more than transferred and transient authority. Thus, despite their early show of strength—or rather because of it—Beria and his collaborators could maintain themselves only for 'a hundred days' as an independent force; their speedy and permanent end proves that when separated from the party, the only real source of power in the Soviet Union, the police, like Antaeus lifted from the earth, are without strength.

Any attempt to evaluate the effect of social forces and their influences in Soviet society today must be placed in the context of the Leninist system of party-state rule. Much more research is necessary (and relevant data are still not available), before one can speak with any degree of assurance of the growing strength of these social forces in a modern industrial society in which a totalitarian regime has not neglected to take advantage of technological advance to facilitate even greater mobilisation of the population in its service. The question of the efficacy of these forces can only move from theory to reality when they are able organisationally to present a challenge to the total political monopoly of the party: or at least when 'independent' representatives of these groups have been allocated more than an advisory share in policy-making. On the basis of the first five years of Khrushchev's unchallenged rule, there is no indication that this totalitarian leader, any more than his predecessor, will relinquish any of the decisive powers now concentrated in his hands, not to other members of the party apparatus, nor to the administrative heads of the other bureaucracies, and still less to representatives of amorphous social groups. As the leader of the party-state Khrushchev has so far chosen to combine the traditional instruments of persuasion, control, and coercion to move Soviet society towards communism, in a different way from that used by Stalin to build socialism in his police-state. This choice, however, is not the result of irresistible pressures of social forces, nor of the irreversible imperatives of continued industrialisation. It depends on more subjective factors, since even so crucial a decision can be wilfully reversed at any time by the political leadership, as one of the highest law enforcement officers frankly admitted to Professor Berman a few years ago: 'If it is necessary we will introduce the old methods again, but I do not believe it will be'.

The *major* elements of destalinisation can be traced to the personal initiative of Khrushchev, and the limitations to these planned reforms, once put into effect, have been determined primarily by the party leader. It is obvious, of course, as Mikoyan reminded Mrs Nixon, 'that not even Khrushchev had enough hands to handle everything and needed others to help him'; and it is equally obvious that Khrushchev's desire for power

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is not an abstraction but has been the driving force of his determination to achieve the social goals reflected in the new programme of the CPSU.

THERE is ample documentation for the persistent opposition at the top of the party hierarchy to the policies of the First Secretary between 1953 and 1957. The removals from the Presidium in May 1960 and the personnel changes at the 22nd congress suggest, at the very least, the continuation of significant differences of opinion among his closest supporters, although, except for Belyaev's failure in Kazakhstan, none of the issues involved can be identified. (It might be added that ignorance of internal party controversy has increased proportionately to Khrushchev's consolidation of one-man rule.) The implementation of the reform measures has been obstructed, passively more often than actively, through all the bureaucracies, except perhaps in the decapitated police; popular reaction has varied from enthusiastic approval to sullen conformity. At all times, nevertheless, in his use of the party as a 'manipulative system' Khrushchev has sought to take into account the common needs of Soviet society as a whole; and certainly no one in the Soviet Union today has been more aware of the highly differentiated and even contradictory aspirations of the social groupings of that still changing society.

In an atmosphere of sharply reduced police terror and broadly expanded freedom of expression, these requirements and expectations are now more readily recognisable than in the past; the extent to which they have been fulfilled or ignored thus far is evidence that the modified limits of coercion required and liberties tolerated have produced an equilibrium acceptable to the leader of the ruling party and to the majority of the people. Yet it is a balance that can be easily disturbed, consciously or unconsciously; it can be upset by an ill-considered acceleration of the pace of transition to communism, or by an ill-advised deceleration of the progress towards the satisfaction of material and intellectual needs. Those who manipulate the levers of power in the Soviet Union know that only by moving a diminishing coercive 'force' a greater distance from the fulcrum of power can new increments be added to the 'weights' of freedom. The unrestricted ability to manipulate the former ensures the ultimate decision to determine the latter.

WITHIN a few weeks after the death of Stalin it had become obvious that a fundamental revaluation of his role in Soviet history had been undertaken. There was no immediate criticism, of course, but the nearly complete disappearance of the name which had monopolised the press for a quarter of a century conveyed a message that could hardly be misinterpreted. This first post-Stalin 'conspiracy of silence' was soon placed in the context of the future struggle against the 'cult of the personality' when the May 1953 issue of *Kommunist* described the new standard euphemism for Stalin as 'exceedingly harmful' for the party and as a

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'vestige of idealistic theories'. By the time the *Theses* for the 50th anniversary of the CPSU had been published in *Pravda* (16 July 1953), Stalin's activities in a half century of combined revolutionary and party-state leadership had been reduced to four routine references, three times by name and once as part of the doctrinal classics of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin. Lenin, in comparison, was mentioned frequently and reverently, often four or five times in a single paragraph. Clearly a compromise document, which had required considerable time to prepare, the theses reflected a majority, and perhaps unanimous, decision on the necessity for a revision of Stalin's record, as well as the inability to agree on the timing and the content of the criticism and condemnation.

Not until the 20th Party congress was there any published evidence that the plenary central committee session of 10 July 1953 had disclosed unspecified gross violations of the principles of party leadership 'caused by the cult of the personality' (A. Aristov, *Pravda*, 17 February 1956). What was at issue within four months of the dictator's death were not only the crimes of Stalin and Beria, but the manner and timing of their disclosure, and the degree of involvement of all the others, including Khrushchev. In the words of the Italian communist, Senator Terracini:

> Responsibility in fact extends beyond Stalin to the whole of the old ruling group of the Stalin epoch. . . . It was absurd to believe that the monstrous process of degeneration suddenly unveiled at the 20th Congress could have had one sole author and actor. . . . Hence the inevitable, even if unformulated, question whether other denunciations might not be forthcoming in the future, even going so far as to sweep away Comrade Khrushchev himself. It must be added that Comrade Khrushchev was also one of the leading group around Stalin who shared all the responsibility. But Comrade Khrushchev is also the comrade who, from inside the group, understood the necessity of smashing [the cult of the personality], denouncing it, and rejecting its repellent heritage. What is more, he resolutely and courageously faced the perilous, deadly struggle provoked by his timely proposals for a renovation of the old system. This is his merit, for which he has the right to the gratitude of all revolutionary militants (*L'Unita*, 12 November 1961).

Terracini thus grants full absolution to Khrushchev for his confession of the past and promises for the future.

Whether future Soviet generations will also grant Khrushchev absolution for his confession only time can tell. Historians, at some later date, will no doubt have more material about the motivations behind Khrushchev's startling decision to use such shock tactics as the secret speech on the sensitive issue of the 'personality cult'. Only through such therapy could a new course begin, was Khrushchev's response to the arguments of Thorez and Togliatti that 'another method' might have been used (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 24 March 1956). In retrospect, after the second and unexpected destalinisation at the 22nd congress, it is necessary to stress, as Conquest has done, 'that every time there has been

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any genuine anti-Stalinism gaining influence, Khrushchev has gone out of his way to emphasise Stalin's " positive " role ' (*Problems of Communism*, January-February 1962, p. 16).

In one of his most impressive interviews, Khrushchev was able to discuss his two predecessors as follows:

> When it comes to determining how a particular problem should be solved, even the individual traits of leaders are important. Yes, even that is of definite importance. We had V. I. Lenin—the great theorist, leader, and creator of our party and our state. It would be wasting words to talk about how deeply he was dedicated to communism. He was one of the great architects of scientific communism. And we had Stalin. Does anyone doubt that Stalin was a communist, that he was dedicated to communism? If there is such a person, he must be quite without understanding. Stalin was dedicated to communism with his whole being; everything he did was for communism. And still Lenin wrote . . . that he was too rude and capricious and might abuse his power. . . . Stalin really did commit unpardonable abuses of power. And it is for this that we have condemned him (*Pravda*, 27 April 1962).

Soviet readers, as well as Western, will involuntarily continue this chain of thought and consider how ' important ' the ' individual traits ' of the present leader have been in solving the ' particular problem ' of the ' cult of the personality ', and all the others of the past ten years.

For the man who firmly grasped the issue and dared to face the consequences of the desacralisation of a quarter of a century of Soviet history, the risks were enormous, and the reward, in terms of power, commensurate—after his victory over the opponents. In his Sisyphean task of destroying the myth of a demigod and leaving untouched his major works, of denouncing the terror and maintaining the system which created it, of exploiting the universal desire throughout Soviet society for relaxation and intensifying the mobilisation of the masses for participation in public organisation, the First Secretary has at all times controlled the timing, the rate, and the depth of exposure and exploration into the past; he has thus been able to determine all the variables in the equations of destalinisation according to his estimate of his own needs, the divergent attitudes among his subordinates in the party and state, and the conflicting opinions in the various sectors of the population. The task of resolving the dilemma of Stalin remains unfinished, and it will probably be accelerated rather than braked. In the more than five years between the secret speech of 1956 and the public revelations of 1961, Khrushchev kept 1934 as the dividing line to permit the rehabilitation of Stalin's former followers without prejudicing the charges against his ideological opponents. Beyond the borders Gomulka has pushed the starting date of Stalin's deviant behaviour back a few years to the start of collectivisation, and Secchia in Italy has come even closer to the source of the original Leninist sin, the ban on factions at the 10th congress in 1921.

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IT has been suggested here that there may have been an early agreement on the general problem of criticising Stalin and condemning his crimes. There would, indeed, be no greater contradiction in absolving one or more members of the present 'anti-party group' than there is in pardoning Khrushchev and Mikoyan for their share of the responsibility. Exactly when the issue of complicity in Beria's or Stalin's crimes became critical for the now-defeated opposition cannot be determined from official sources.

Criminal charges, however, played a relatively minor part in the propaganda campaign following the mid-1957 defeat of the anti-party group; not until the 21st congress was the emphasis shifted from 'obstructionism' to 'violations of socialist legality'. At the 22nd congress, however, Khrushchev, Furtseva, and Shelepin stressed particularly that a Presidium debate on the 'full rehabilitation of Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Uborevich . . . led directly to the desperate actions undertaken by the opposition' (see particularly Ye. Furtseva, *Pravda*, 22 October 1961). Another indication is found in Ponomarev's remarks on the preparation of the new history of the CPSU: 'Kaganovich and Molotov, in spite of the resolutions of the 20th congress, wanted to have everything that had happened in the past—also in 1937-38—to be recognised as correct' (*Pravda*, 26 October 1961).

In October 1961 Khrushchev brought the two related themes together for the first time: the attack on Stalin at the 20th congress, and the denunciation of the anti-party group at the 21st for their co-responsibility in his crimes. By the end of the 22nd congress Molotov and Kaganovich had been denounced severely for crimes extending back to 1934, and Malenkov for purges at late as 1952. On this issue, as in the case of Stalin's person, there may also be other voices urging more or less haste; but despite these conflicting views, reflected in the divided opinions on expulsion of the anti-party group, the guide throughout the investigation of this sector of a sombre past has also been Khrushchev. There are, to date, no identifiable forces which can push him faster towards the Kirov case than he has chosen to advance. To this Pandora's box, as to so much else, only he holds the key.

THE post-Beria subordination of the police to the party was the first major institutional landmark on the road to destalinisation. It signified not only the re-establishment of the fundamental Leninist organisational principle of a ruling party; it also meant the renunciation of the Stalinist terror machine as the decisive instrument of social control and as an important factor of economic development, physically and psychologically.

There is still no conclusive evidence concerning Beria's policies with respect to the slave labour system and other aspects of his programme, domestic or foreign. Like some other police chiefs in the satellite states later (Zaisser and Wollweber in the DDR, Barak in Czechoslovakia, Rajk

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and Kadar in Hungary) he was to be accused of advocating deviational, i.e. 'liberal,' policies at home (nationalities and agriculture) and seeking to establish ties with 'enemies' abroad (British Intelligence — 1919, Yugoslavia — 1953). His real crime, as well as that of the East European functionaries, was organisational: the threat to the party leadership implicit in his attempt 'to place the Ministry of Internal Affairs over the Communist Party and the Government of the Soviet Union' (*Pravda*, 10 July 1953).

This was certainly a sufficiently serious charge without the thoroughly Stalinist embellishments added subsequently. Moreover, all of the Khrushchev-inspired versions of the liquidation of Beria agree that he met a sudden end at a meeting of the Presidium in June some time before the announcement of his arrest, and not at the trial in December 1953. The decision to get rid of him, in any case, must have been one of the few unanimous votes taken by Stalin's successors. Khrushchev's role in the actual elimination of Beria is uncertain; subsequent developments, however, show clearly how he immediately exploited his position as secretary by assigning party functionaries who had served under him to all sectors of the bureaucratic machines, party, state, *and* police. Two of Khrushchev's immediate subordinates were sent directly into the central police apparatus; both were from the Moscow party organisation.[1]

Although the personalities involved in this critical operation of bringing the police under the personal control of the First Secretary through his statutory command of cadres remain unknown, the general principle has been described,[2] but the consequences of total subordination of the police apparatus to the party leadership at all times has all too frequently been evaded and ignored. As a major element of Khrushchev's destalinisation Soviet propagandists and scholars have sought to create the impression that the crimes of the terror era were due entirely to the elimination of party control over the police. Thus, the 're-establishment of Leninist norms' by the collective leadership became the euphemism for the 'resumption' of party control of the police. With the emergence of Khrushchev as the head of the party-state machine the intensification of party guidance has become identical with the increased personal power of the new leader over the men whom he has selected to operate the security machine.

No section of the state machine has been more stable than the political police since the purge of Beria and his supporters. At the centre the changes have been honourable reassignment (Serov) or promotion (Shelepin); in the republics, four officials (Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, and Latvia) have served for the entire period. In the five Central Asian republics there has been one change in the Uzbek SSR and two changes

[1] K. Lunev became Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs in 1953, was a judge at the trial of Beria, and Deputy Chairman of the KGB in 1959; V. Ustinov was assigned to 'leading work in the Committee for State Security in 1953' (*Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya*, No. 51, p. 301); the KGB was not officially formed until April 1954.

[2] cf. *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, 1959, no. 8, p. 24.

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in the others, but no members of the minority nationalities have yet been named; Moldavia and Azerbaidzhan have also had two changes and the three remaining republics (Estonia, Belorussia, Lithuania) only one. In not a single instance have charges of any kind been raised against those replaced or transferred 'outside the republic'. The shifts of police leadership are, therefore, signs that this machine, like all others in the service of the party's leader, is undergoing the periodic overhaul which checks loyalty to the new master no less than efficiency. As the party stalwarts from Moscow to Vladivostok join in the chorus of adulation for Khrushchev, despite his modest references to collective leadership at the 22nd congress, the First Secretary's warnings of the dangers of 'making everything dependent on the wilfulness of one man' become more relevant than ever. So certain is he of his position with respect to his 'loyal Chekists' that in April 1962 he had the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet deprive 700 police officials of their awards for the wartime deportation of the Chechen and Ingush. From the heavily bemedalled uniforms of most KGB functionaries, like Serov, who directed this operation, the absence of one medal will not be noticed. As a reminder of the decline in power and prestige of the police, nonetheless, it has more than symbolic significance.

The mechanics of Khrushchev's penetration of the police with party functionaries are easier to document than it is to demonstrate how and why those in charge of this lever of power, which was able to dominate Moscow on the death of Stalin, surrendered so easily with the arrest of its leader. Whatever benefits accrued to the military for their part in this process during the rise of Marshal Zhukov proved ephemeral; and the transfer of the former KGB chief to the General Staff suggests that the security police still have a considerable role to play in the armed forces.

At the time of Beria's death there were no references to Khrushchev's special contribution; only after the 20th congress did the flow of expressions of gratitude 'to the central committee and Comrade Khrushchev personally', for restoring party control, begin. For this there is little justification; on the necessity of suppressing Beria and his threat to collective security there could have been no dispute. It is, nonetheless, worthy of note that the infamous Special Sections of the NKVD-MVD were abolished by a decree of the CC and the Council of Ministers on 11 September 1953, immediately following the plenum at which Khrushchev's promotion to First Secretary was announced. Still unpublished, this decree must be considered one of the foundations for the post-Stalin police and legal reform; its association with Khrushchev, however circumstantial, should not be overlooked.

The glacial movement forward in Soviet jurisprudence is, perhaps, better appreciated by those subjected to its provisions than by outside observers. As codification is slowly completed in all fields, evidence of debate between 'liberalisers' and 'dogmatists' is plentiful, with the former thus far more than holding their own. Their continued attacks on

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Vyshinsky, the symbol of Stalinist judicial terror, most clearly reflect the image of Khrushchev's destalinisation initiative in this sector. The Procurator General of the USSR pinpointed Khrushchev's contribution as follows:

> The speech of Comrade N. S. Khrushchev in June 1955 [not published—H.R.] at the All-Union Conference of the leading workers of the procuracy . . . had great significance for the re-establishment of the rights of the procurator and for strengthening their supervision of the courts (R. Rudenko, *Pravda*, 27 May 1962).

Although such belated attributions must be carefully weighed, in the absence of other comparable documentation they remain the major source for identification of the origin and limitations of the post-Stalin judicial reforms.

The criticism from the legal experts pressing for change reached its peak, as in nearly all other areas of Soviet life, in 1956–1957; but the reforms have left the new 'socialist legality' without the institutional safeguards from party intervention on which real justice depends. Among the latent dangers to even the limited advances made are the 'social organisations', para-police and para-judicial, which Khrushchev has sponsored and revived as part of his programme of increased popular participation in government on the road to communism and the 'withering away of the state'. This mobilisation of social forces for a new form of dispensing justice appeared not in response to the needs of the masses, nor as an answer to the requirements of the judiciary, nor in connection with an initiative of the police. Only within the framework of Khrushchev's theories on the development of communist self-administration is this breach in the thin legal walls protecting the individual against the state explicable; that this innovation requires reinforcement from the state is shown by a stiffening of penalties for any attack on the *druzhinniki* and the extension of the death sentence for attempts on their lives (Decree of Supreme Soviet, 15 February 1962).

READING once more the records of the 22nd congress, one cannot fail to be impressed by the differences between the way in which policy matters in the Soviet Union are determined, and the models constructed in the West to describe this operation. Few of us would have dared in July 1953 to suggest that Beria had been 'shot' or 'strangled' at a Presidium meeting, and a psychoanalyst, not a political scientist, would be better qualified to explain why Khrushchev in September 1956 compelled an Italian communist delegation to sit through a three-hour recording of the 'Beria trial' only a few days after his enactment of the 'strangulation' (E. Reale, *Corriere della Sera*, 17 January 1962). If doubt is cast on the validity of the various versions of this story from secondary sources, always with Khrushchev as the originator, how can one reconcile the reality of the relationships between the Central Committee and Presidium, as described by Ignatov and Shelepin, with the

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descriptions of the increasing role of the CC so prevalent only a few years ago and now beginning to reappear? Could any of us have imagined in 1957 that Bulganin was able to order the Kremlin guard to be augmented in order to 'prevent anyone from entering the building in which the Presidium of the CC was meeting' (Shelepin, then Chairman of the KGB)? Where in our conceptual framework do we fit Ignatov's outraged statement that 'many [CC members] literally made their way through to the site of the Presidium meeting illegally'? How does one now, years after the event, evaluate the significance of the scolding and insulting of CC members by 'representatives of the anti-party group' in language of such 'vulgarity' that it could not be repeated 'from the high tribune' of the congress? What is to be made of the exchange between the prototype of the coming generation of leaders, Polyansky, and the fading figure of the old Bolshevik, Voroshilov, who shook his fist and shouted: 'You are still young, and we will bring you to your senses'?

These insights into the workings of the Presidium, when it is sharply and nearly evenly divided, supplement the published platitudes of Khrushchev on majority decisions in the Presidium as well as the report of the July 1955 CC plenum. They are a warning against seeking too complicated answers for some of the dramatic events which have taken place in the post-Stalin period.

There are other social and institutional forces which, rather than influencing destalinisation, have themselves been affected by Khrushchev's actions. In responding to the potential challenge posed by Marshal Zhukov's efforts to obtain increased institutional autonomy for the military, i.e. *de facto* independence of party control, the First Secretary in 1957 reacted even more sharply than Stalin did in 1946 when he removed the popular Marshal from the scene. Subsequent events—the practically complete 'packing' of the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff with Khrushchev's wartime associates, the reassignment or retirement of nearly all the military district commanders, the mass demobilisation of officer cadres, and the appointment of a party *apparatchik* to head the Main Political Administration of the Armed Forces — have shown the relative ease with which Khrushchev has been able to implement measures contrary to the interests and privileges of an organised and highly favoured category of the Soviet elite structure. No better illustration of the inability—if not impossibility—of the military to influence destalinisation is available than the active support by the post-Zhukov leadership for the military policies of the First Secretary.

ALTHOUGH the military and the political police bureaucracies have maintained their organisational structures intact while being subjected to increased party supervision, the economic bureaucracy has undergone a series of sweeping reorganisations designed to improve its efficiency and to strengthen direct controls. There can be little doubt that not only the power of the leading representatives of this group but also many of their

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personal privileges, have diminished as a result of Khrushchev's administrative changes and other reforms. As one reads in 1962 the familiar complaints of industrial managers, it becomes only too apparent how little the ' rights of enterprise directors ' have been expanded since the promises of the decree (unpublished) of 9 August 1955. In addition, this sector, more than any other, has felt the impact of the greater severity of the new penal laws of 1961–1962; thus, the reorganisation of management has revealed that the opinions of this part of the bureaucracy could be silenced and ignored in a matter affecting its vital interests; the harshness of the revised penalties for economic crimes has demonstrated that, despite the importance of the technical elite in an industrial society, their prerogatives are limited—not least by an educational system which can now provide a sufficiency of replacements.

In contrast to the organised institutional groups to whom destalinisation has brought more losses of prestige and power than tangible benefits, except for the diminution of the terror, the amorphous categories of peasants and workers, youth and creative intellectuals, have been the major beneficiaries of post-Stalin change; but it would be a mistake to emphasise as destalinisation the rational steps which ended an agricultural policy synonymous with confiscation and stagnation of production, and to overlook the remarkable extension of the socialisation of the countryside; by other means of course, far beyond Stalin's achievements. For nearly a quarter of a century the latter had attacked the stubborn peasantry from the outside; in agriculture, Khrushchev's personal area of specialisation, there is no comparison between the changes wrought at his instigation (virgin lands, expansion of corn, amalgamation, etc.) and the influence exerted by the peasantry—or any other opposing force.

In measuring the dynamics of destalinisation one must, no doubt, take into account the expanded areas of intellectual freedom, the rising educational level and increased technological skills of the urban and rural population, the greater degree of rationality in industrial planning and management, the correctives to the legal codes. Nevertheless, because there is still no evidence that any of these changes have been secured by institutional safeguards protecting them from arbitrary party intervention, the role of the party—and primarily of its leader—remains decisive. For the third time in its history the key to developments in the Soviet Union is held in the hands of a single dynamic personality who must again, it is true, often choose and balance between different and, perhaps, conflicting goals and policies, including destalinisation. In making these decisions Khrushchev, as the unchallenged leader of the totalitarian party-state, is no less independent of the organised institutional bureaucracies and the amorphous social forces than his predecessor.

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QUESTIONNAIRE

March 1963 seems to be an appropriate date at which to pause and re-examine the developments during the decade that has passed since the death of Stalin, and to assess some of the present trends which, in all probability, will have an impact in the years to come. We sent a questionnaire to a number of leading students of world affairs, and to some experts in various fields of Soviet studies, asking for their comments on one or more of the questions. We are gratified by the response, which in a way provided an embarras de richesses; unfortunately we are not able to reproduce all their answers. Our main intention was to provide the framework for a subsequent exchange of views, not to give expression to all and every opinion that may be held by Western observers of the Soviet scene. This, if it were possible at all, would be a project far too ambitious for any periodical.

1. POLITICAL

1. What is your overall assessment of the changes in the Soviet Union since Stalin's death and what changes do you expect in the next decade?
2. Do you foresee a gradual convergence of the social and/or political systems of the West and the Soviet Union?
3. What significance do you attach to the polycentric tendencies in the communist bloc?
4. What are the prospects of 'coexistence' for the sixties?

2. IDEOLOGY AND CULTURE

1. What in your view are the most significant ideological developments in the USSR since Stalin's death?
2. Do you envisage an 'erosion of ideology' in the Soviet Union in the next decade?
3. What do you think have been the most outstanding Soviet cultural achievements since 1953?
4. How can cultural relations with nations in the communist bloc best be promoted in the coming years?

3. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL

1. How do you assess the prospects of Soviet economic growth in the next decade?
2. How do you think the Soviet level of living standards will then compare with that of other industrialised countries?
3. What changes do you expect in the organisation of Soviet agriculture and in the planning system?
4. How do you expect the Soviet social system to be affected by the 'construction of communism'?

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TEN YEARS AFTER

What is your overall assessment of the changes in the Soviet Union since Stalin's death, and what changes do you expect in the next decade?

LEONARD SCHAPIRO: I think one must distinguish two categories of change since Stalin's death: the change in 'political climate', and institutional change. The former has been enormous: the latter, virtually nil—so far as essentials are concerned. To put it another way: the *method* of government has changed enormously, its basic *mechanism* is the same, because no new institutions have taken the place of the old. The basic mechanism of Soviet government, as I understand it, has always been characterised by the fact that ultimately one man can secure complete power of decision-making and assert his will against all others, and against all state institutions. Whether he effects it by terror, as Stalin did, or by control over all jobs, as Khrushchev does, seems to me immaterial. Let me take two examples of recent evolution. No doubt Khrushchev is more careful than Stalin to consult opinion in the party, to consult his colleagues in the Presidium, and to ensure regular meetings of party organs. Yet, in a crisis, as in June 1957 (crisis for him, that is), he had all the *residue* of power available in order to circumvent a majority vote against himself in the Presidium and to manipulate a vote in the Central Committee. In other words: the revived institutions (Central Committee, collective leadership, sounding party opinion and the like) are ultimately powerless against the one man who still controls the apparatus. Again, there have certainly been reforms in the legal sphere—the procurators, for example, are now quite genuinely trying to create some conditions of legality in the country. Yet what happens in practice? If someone—and again it can only be the one man—decides, say, on the method necessary for dealing with corruption, the procurators soon forget about legality when, for example, someone is shot on the basis of retrospective legislation, or if banishment without trial is re-introduced in the form of 'anti-parasite' legislation. To say this is not to ignore all the vast changes in *climate* that have taken place—the open recognition of some of the past horrors, the relative freedom of discussion, the complete freedom of scientific investigation, and so forth. But it would be unwise to ignore the fact that in essence the regime still remains a personal despotism, and is not a modern state in which interest groups are sufficiently influential to *control* the government (granted that they may already now be able occasionally to *influence* it).

I should not expect this situation to change very much during the lifetime of Khrushchev. Assuming that he dies or retires in the course of the next decade, the evolution is unpredictable. I can only reiterate my own view that power is likely to pass to younger men, or a younger man, for whom rationality will count for more than dogma. These younger men

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may, of course, end by wrecking the whole existing machine and lose complete control, because everyone knows that rationalising a despotism is always a dangerous procedure. But if they do not, I can conceive that they may have the flexibility to sacrifice a little of the monopoly which the party apparatus claims (and has claimed for years with almost pathological intensity) for a rather more rational, and therefore more legal and more genuinely institutionalised, system of government.

T. H. RIGBY: I will not attempt to catalogue Soviet political changes since 1953 but focus attention instead on certain questions of interpretation.

While diverging radically in their evaluation of political developments in post-Stalin Russia, most observers would reject as superficial a purely institutional account, in terms of a series of concrete reorganisations and reforms. Clearly some less tangible but powerful and pervasive non-institutional influence has also been at work.

Many would identify the source of this influence with the curbing of terror. There is considerable prima facie evidence for this view: the omnipresent terror obviously had profound effects on personal and official relations in all spheres of activity under Stalin, an influence which has been gradually but decisively dissipated over recent years. Stress on the curbing of terror, moreover, follows logically from the role this phenomenon played in most interpretations of the Soviet system under Stalin. Those scholars who regarded terror as an *essential* feature of the system in the past, tend to relate its removal (or drastic reduction) to a marked strengthening of some other device of domination, such as ideology, or to some more complex redistribution of weight between various supports of the regime (e.g. terror, the leadership cult, and other ritualistic aspects of the ideology are discarded, while economic incentives, the appeal to Soviet patriotism, and the rational content of the ideology are reinforced).

The evaporation of terror can provide an illuminating standpoint from which to view the changed topography of post-Stalin Russia. Nevertheless, it reveals little about the *dynamic* of change, as one can readily verify if one seeks to relate it in cause-effect terms to other major developments since 1953. For it becomes apparent that, whatever impact the curbing of terror has had on all areas of life, it was itself

(a) *facilitated* by certain long-term trends in Soviet society: the moderation of material deprivation, the cumulative effects of decades of indoctrination, the physical disappearance of many of the most embittered ' elements ', and so on, and,

(b) *realised* as a by-product of changing relationships within the supreme leadership: death of the dictator whose dominance the terror was designed to maintain, emergence of an oligarchy anxious to prevent the police apparatus being employed to re-establish personal rule, victory in the succession struggle of a leader committed to *not* restoring the terror and successful in developing a pattern of domination in which overt terror was apparently redundant.

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There are other considerations which also lead discussion of the changed role of terror back to the character and internal relationships of the supreme leadership. For example, it is clear that the impact of terror was not due wholly, or even mainly, to the severity of punishment or the range of punishable offences, but much more to the *unpredictability*, the arbitrariness of repression, to the lack, in the last resort, of *any* limits to its operation and therefore the impossibility of avoiding guilt, no matter how conformist one's behaviour. After all, both before and after the Stalin era the range of indictable 'state crimes' was and is sufficiently broad, and the apparatus of detection sufficiently elaborate, to paralyse all non-conformist and indeed all spontaneous political activity, but one would still not speak of a 'terror' during these periods. Ehrenburg's phrase 'the years of arbitrary rule' (*gody proizvola*) is the most satisfactory summing up of the later Stalin period, and while the terror was the most typical expression of this arbitrariness, it was not its only expression. One thinks, for example, of Stalin's cavalier treatment of the formal organs of party and state, his exclusion of leaders from politbureau sittings as the fancy took him, his transfer of business to informal *ad hoc* committees whose composition he alone decided, by-passing the politbureau and the Presidium and Bureau of the Council of Ministers. One thinks of the pruning of theatre and concert repertoires, or the censoring of architectural styles according to the limitations and vagaries of Stalin's taste. One thinks of Stalin's *ex cathedra* judgments, closing all further discussion, on the most abstruse problems, from economics to linguistics to military theory.

It was the arbitrary power of Stalin, rather than some particular expression of this power such as the terror, which imbued Russian life in the quarter-century ending in 1953 with its distinctive flavour. There is a double stress here: that the power was exercised *arbitrarily*, and that the power was exercised by *Stalin*, and not by somebody else. The tendency of some sovietologists to gloss over or disguise the role of personality in Soviet politics is in part a reaction against the laboured banality of some of our kremlinology, and in part the result of a training in disciplines still struggling to create an agreed body of concepts and therefore impatient of data in their fields seemingly incapable of conceptualisation. This anti-empiricism is on the whole commendable, but if carried to extremes may assume the absurdity of the meteorologist who is fascinated by temperature charts and precipitation graphs, but bored to tears by weather. In any highly centralised polity the character of the supreme leadership—the personality of individual rulers or the relationships within a ruling oligarchy—is a primary determinant not only of the *subject-matter* of politics and administration, but often of the politico-administrative machine itself, or even of the structure of the society within which it functions. If this may be demonstrated from the history of Tsarist Russia, it is all the more obvious in the case of Soviet Russia since 1917. One has only to consider the impact of such Stalin policies as forced collectivisation

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and the *yezhovshchina* to realise how different Soviet 'socialism' might have been if it had been 'built' under different auspices.

The same considerations apply with undiminished force to the period since Stalin's death. Since no leader succeeded immediately in establishing his personal dominance, the leadership quickly crystallised into a form of oligarchy. But oligarchy has a logic of its own. In the present context, while inhibiting radical reform, it made for a rationalisation and regularisation of procedures. As we have noted, it demanded a sharp contraction of police powers. The end of personal rule created problems of legitimation, which were met partly by reviving formal party and government bodies, especially the central committee, and partly by attempts at popularity—the reduction of repression was involved here, too, as well as the raising of consumption levels. Effective oligarchy required that each leader enjoy considerable independence in the sectors under his command, and this fostered a degree of pluralism in intra-bureaucratic politics (Stalin had avoided this by ensuring that the networks of protégés built up by his lieutenants *cut across* the formal divisions between different power structures). Divided counsels in Moscow encouraged an assertion of autonomy within the bloc and called for a reduction of tension in external relations. Rivalries within the oligarchy intensified all these tendencies to a point where they threatened to get out of hand, while at the same time exacerbating disputes over how far and in what form the tendencies should be given expression in concrete policies.

Khrushchev's appointment as First Secretary of the Central Committee gave him an advantage in the succession struggle, but it by no means predetermined his victory. This was in large part due to exceptional personal qualities which enabled him to wrest the maximum political benefit from the circumstances outlined above. If the succession struggle had continued much beyond 1957, it might have entrenched pluralistic and proto-democratic trends. On the other hand, it was by no means excluded that those in command of some power-structure other than the party, such as the army, the political police, or the central government, might have got the upper hand, and this could have led to drastic changes in the character of the system.

Since 1957 Khrushchev has liquidated the institutional effects of the period of oligarchy, without, however, reviving the system of rule employed by Stalin. He has diversified his lines of command, thereby reducing the preponderance of the party machine, which had been overwhelming at the time of his victory. Like Stalin, he has devised measures to keep power among his subordinates divided, but he manages this by the manipulation of *formal* roles and without recourse to terror. The personality of Khrushchev and his attitude towards various issues during the succession struggle have profoundly affected Soviet policies in the last five years.

It is not my intention to present leadership as the sole, or even necessarily the key, determinant of Soviet political processes and policies. Attentive readers will have detected at several points an implicit

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acknowledgment of other determinants (the author has argued the great importance of one such series of determinants elsewhere). Economic, educational, ideological, and other factors may be regarded, from the point of view adopted here, as so many obstacles or opportunities *prejudicing* or *delimiting* the impact of leadership. But my concern here has been to stress the incompleteness of explanations which deny an independent causative role of great importance to the structure of leadership and the personality of leaders. This view, if accepted, renders suspect predictions as to the future development of the Soviet political system which are based on the extrapolation of recent or current trends. One cannot predict the 'accidents' of leadership, and these may prove decisive.

F. R. ALLEMANN: To start with a frank admission: I find it difficult enough to assess the complexities of the present; it seems well-nigh impossible to me to foretell the shape of things to come. This holds true even for fields of study with which I am more familiar than with the developments inside the Soviet Union and its power sphere. To prophesy may seem an easier business for people attached to a determinist view of history. Yet I feel convinced that, though the social forces certainly do not offer an unlimited choice of ways and means to political action, this action is as much determined by individual idiosyncrasies (and by sheer accident) as by social 'laws'. All we can do, therefore, is to project certain already discernible lines of development into the future; we cannot know what sudden and unforeseeable events will change or even break their course.

If I try to find a common denominator for the changes that have occurred in the Soviet Union since Stalin's death, I think that we can understand them as a deliberate attempt at *rationalisation* of the Soviet system. Stalin's special brand of totalitarianism was fundamentally based upon an utterly irrational interpretation of the world—nonetheless irrational for being couched in terms of an extremely rational ideology. As a matter of fact, the deepest of all contradictions afflicting Stalinism must be sought in the incompatibility between the scientific claims of Marxism-Leninism and the quasi-religious claims of a Supreme Leader to omniscience, superhuman wisdom, and total obedience. The byzantine extremes to which autocracy, centralisation and dogmatism were pushed under his reign simply could not be reconciled, in the long run, with the demands of a modern technical society that can only be mastered by rational means; Stalin's successors, therefore, were confronted with the task of establishing a new pattern of power better adjusted to these demands.

Two ways out of the deadlock created by Stalinism were open to them: one leading back to a revival of Leninism's original spirit by newly enhancing the role of an ideology that had, under Stalin, been progressively emptied of its content; the other leading forward to a new empiricism and pragmatism by a gradual process of 'de-ideologisation'.

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It looks to me as if Khrushchev tried, in a very remarkable way, to combine elements of the two solutions. He has decentralised and, by doing so, rationalised an economic administration that had become far too cumbersome; he has done his best, in a rather pragmatic way, to overcome the tremendous disproportions inherited from a purely voluntarist regime, and he has somewhat (though hesitantly) enlarged the sphere of freedom both on the individual and on the collective level by allowing a measure of economic, scientific, and artistic discussion at home, as well as a measure of autonomy within the Soviet orbit. At the same time, however, he has taken care to keep the centrifugal forces under stricter and more unified control by establishing the primacy of the party machine and subordinating to it the various sub-apparatuses that had developed in Stalin's time. In order to do this, he had, on the one hand, to make this machine more efficient by putting a premium on the exercise of administrative and economic talents. On the other hand, the dominating role of the party needed some justification, and this could only be found in ideological terms; therefore it proved necessary to inject new life into the old and outworn concepts. This could not be done unless a resolute attempt was made to re-establish some links between ideology and reality (which lies at the core of what the Chinese call Khrushchev's 'revisionism'), but neither could it be effective without rekindling the fire of revolutionary fervour. When the leadership dropped Stalin's grotesque thesis, according to which the class struggle becomes all the more intense the further socialism advanced, or when it revised even Lenin's theory about the inevitability of war under imperialism, it went some way in the direction of ideological adjustment; when it insisted that the Soviet Union had already entered the stage of 'building communism' or that socialism was going to 'bury' capitalism, it tried to whip up enthusiasm for brilliant revolutionary perspectives.

The question remains open whether this typically Khrushchevian combination can last or whether it constitutes only an intermediate stage. Does it really solve the Soviet problem or does it rather postpone its solution? Will Khrushchev's successor—whoever he may be—be able to keep up the precarious balance that he has tried to strike between an empirical relaxation of over-wrought ties and an ideological reassertion? We cannot wholly exclude this possibility. Still, it looks more probable that, by overcoming the inherent contradictions of Stalinism, Khrushchev's 'neo-Leninism' has generated new contradictions which may well provide the point of controversy over which the inevitable next succession struggle will be fought.

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI: The changes that have taken place in the USSR since the death of the Soviet dictator indicate the following: (a) The system created by Stalin was not simply the transient product of crisis nor a passing phase of personal tyranny. Its subsequent evolution has refuted the expectation that it would be incapable of further gradual change along the axis of its own development, and that it was doomed

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either to static rigidity or revolutionary upheaval. The post-Stalinist decade has proven the system's socio-political stability and, by the same token, it has also shown that the system today is inextricably linked to the Stalinist past. Every healthy political system changes, but if the change is gradual it tends to be shaped by the present and the past. Thus, Togliatti and Gomulka are quite right when they point, respectively, to the Russian autocratic tradition and cultural backwardness, and to collectivisation, as the deeper causes of Stalinism, causes more 'objective' in nature than the 'subjective and idealist' explanations offered by Khrushchev, and, what is more, causes that still have profound significance in so far as the character of the present Soviet regime is concerned.

(b) The system is becoming a self-sustaining one, combining elite direction from above with orthodox mass support from below, and isolating into political impotency the intermediary social layer of the intelligentsia. Khrushchev, to restrain the intelligentsia after 1956, did not hesitate to appeal to the McCarthyite anti-intellectualism of the newly urban Soviet masses, and is now relying on such devices as mass vigilantism—i.e. Popular Assemblies and Comrades Courts—to restrain deviant behaviour. The use of terror is no longer indiscriminate, while the system in its economic policies is demonstrating greater *operational* rationality, although still guided by dogmatism in its values and assumptions. (The two, however, are not mutually exclusive, as anyone familiar with patterns of paranoid behaviour well knows.)

(c) The party has emerged supreme and is the only source of political leadership and social cohesion. All other institutions have been diminished, and the party leadership—the professionally trained *apparatchiki*—wield the effective power. The Soviet political system is thus almost unique in the sense that both power is wielded and policy is shaped by bureaucrats. In the other communist states, one can still differentiate between the old revolutionaries or the ideologues, and the bureaucrats—and that still was to some extent true under Stalin. In the West, there is a bureaucracy but there are also the politicians. The Soviet system is a bureaucratic dictatorship—with no checks, balances, or restraints, except those which the bureaucracy finds it expedient to tolerate.

In the decade to come, one may expect the following: (a) a struggle for succession after Khrushchev's death or serious illness, culminating in an anti-Khrushchev party congress by approximately 1968. Preliminary alignments already appeared at the 22nd party congress in 1961, and the new leader will probably emerge from among the present 40–50 year-old Soviet leaders, many of whom advocated a punitive policy against Molotov *et al.* in the name of redressing Stalin's crimes. It is doubtful whether Kozlov, Khrushchev's heir apparent, will survive Khrushchev's fading from the scene. A far more likely transitional leader, or even successor, is Leonid Brezhnev, a man in his early fifties, who combines party experience in a regional apparat with exposure to agricultural problems (Kazakhstan), with prolonged service in the central apparat, with supervising of the military, with administrative skill

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displayed when he directed the reorganisation of industry, with, last but not least, a presently politically neutral but prestigious position as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. The struggle itself is likely to take place primarily within the apparat, since Khrushchev has imposed its supremacy on the other institutions of power. As a result, the struggle is not likely to be quite so destructive as it was after Stalin's death, when the relative institutional balance between the party apparat, the state bureaucracy, the secret police, and even the army, resulted in an institutional struggle as well.

An anti-Khrushchev congress is likely to take place because the man has been so controversial, so erratic, and occasionally so reckless that it would be difficult—and politically perhaps unwise—for his successor to claim his mantle. Much safer would be the traditional claim to true Leninism. The nature of the anti-Khrushchev condemnation will depend on the outcome of the struggle for power, the shape of international affairs, and the character of the then-prevailing Sino-Soviet relationship. In general, two lines of indictment would appear to make political sense to a successor: one, to return to *true* Leninism, it is necessary to break with Stalinism. Khrushchev merely pretended to do so for purely opportunist reasons. His stand was not one of Leninist principle but was based on opportunist, subjective desire for power. He thus used anti-Stalinism whenever convenient, and without regard for its effect on the morale of the people and on the international communist movement, as for example in the 20th and 22nd party congresses, but he refused to allow socialist justice to be applied to Stalin's accomplices because he was one himself. Here would follow a litany of Khrushchev's personal crimes—and it would not be difficult to document.

Alternatively, Khrushchev could be charged with revisionism and reformism. His 'economism' could be contrasted with Lenin's praxis and revolutionary determination, and he could be charged with causing a reckless, thoughtless, and objectively harmful (even subjectively treasonable) deterioration of the unity of the world communist movement. Domestically, depending on the economic situation and world tensions, he could be accused either of wrecking Soviet agriculture and neglecting consumer industries (his speeches of 1954 and 1962 could be cited), or of undermining Soviet military potential and sabotaging industrial development (speeches of 1958, 1959, 1961). Either approach would be quite fruitful and politically sound.

(b) On the economic plane, a modification of the present agricultural system is not to be excluded. The Yugoslav and Polish experience, countries both 'building socialism', has had an impact, and earlier Soviet criticisms of these two models have almost entirely subsided. Indeed, there has even been some Soviet praise of what the Poles have been doing. However, it is unlikely that the ruling party could make a public confession of error on a subject which has been such a fundamental tenet of the dogma; hence outright abandonment of collectivisation is unlikely. Far more probable are gradual adjustments, designed to retain the sacred

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'collectivism' but to inject into agriculture an element of individual responsibility, initiative, and interest. One possible way might be to combine continued 'collective ownership' as a legal fiction (thereby meeting the requirements of the ideology) with more private use of the land and of some of the machinery, and with more differentiated 'material incentives' (or profits, as they are called under 'exploiting capitalism'). The collective face of the party will be saved, so will the collectivism, and yet a fundamental concession will have been won by the Russian peasant, after forty years of struggle.

(c) In the social-psychological realm, we are likely to witness a further intensification of nationalism in the Soviet Union, a mounting sense of historical momentum, an intoxicating feeling of superiority in relationship to the West. One already notes it now, and it is most unlikely that in the near future this mounting sense of collective arrogance, superiority, and self-righteousness, reminiscent of the Germans in the thirties and the Americans in the twenties and teens, will be reversed. It will provide the regime with a major source of support, buttressing the potentially waning revolutionary commitment to the ruling ideology.

Greater reliance on science is also likely to characterise the relationship between the political regime and society, both in terms of controlling the increasingly complex economy as well as of individual and collective behaviour of the people. The new—and intense—Soviet interest in cybernetics as a control science is not without significance in this respect.

WOLFGANG LEONHARD: We are not—or not yet, at all events—dealing with 'liberalisation' or 'democratisation', but with the *modernisation* of Russian communism, with an attempt to adapt the system inherited from Stalin to the new conditions and requirements of the modern industrial society that has since come into being in the USSR. Important as the post-Stalin reforms are, it has hitherto been a case of changes *within* the system rather than changes in the system itself.

The post-Stalin reforms were necessary because the evolution of a modern industrial society meant that the methods and practices of Stalin's day were no longer capable of solving vital economic and political problems, not only because conditions have changed but also because, with and on account of industrialisation, new social forces (scientists, economists, and technicians) have arisen whose role and significance is constantly on the increase. Party leaders must take these forces into consideration more and more if they want to attain their own major economic objectives.

All the changes that have occurred in the Soviet Union since Stalin's death in March 1953 testify to the Russian leaders' determination to adapt the 'superstructure' of the regime to the realities of Russian industrial society, to make the system more elastic, rational, and modern, *without thereby impairing the absolute supremacy of the party machine.*

No analysis or appreciation can afford to neglect these two factors: on the one hand, the maintenance of the authority of the party machine

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(whose functions have in part been extended), and, on the other, the need for major economic and social reforms. Anyone who focuses his gaze exclusively on the system of political power and the absolute control of the party machine over all spheres of existence runs the risk of overlooking or underestimating the great economic and social changes of the past decade. By contrast, anyone who concentrates his attention solely on the changes in the social, economic, and (up to a point) cultural fields, important though they are, will be readily inclined to under-rate the role of the party machine and reach over-optimistic conclusions.

Where further developments are concerned, the determining factor is how the glaring contradiction in contemporary Russian communism is resolved, namely, the conflict between the supremacy of the party machine on the one hand, and the demands of modern Soviet industrial society on the other. Major controversies will probably arise over the question of whether the solution of economic problems should be based principally on administrative measures (coupled with ideological propaganda), or on material incentives; whether the ends in view demand an emphasis on politico-ideological considerations or a realistic assessment of economic potentials; and, finally, whether the measures of the next decade should be regarded as part of the task of realising the overall communist objective or as subordinate to scientific and technical considerations.

Any forecast of the next decade must depend upon whether further developments in the Soviet Union proceed normally, that is to say, on the same scale and at the same pace as in the past decade, or are abruptly and significantly accelerated—or even diverted into other channels—by special circumstances, e.g. a lengthy crisis of leadership fought out by rival claimants to Khrushchev's position. Given that things develop normally, we may assume that during the coming decade the political system will adapt itself to new conditions even better than it has done hitherto, and that the party machine will be forced into further concessions to the ever-growing social and economic pressures within Russia's new industrial society. On the socio-economic plane, it is likely that the administrative planning system will be curtailed, and that individual factories and enterprises inside industry will not only be granted greater autonomy, but may even become entirely independent. The same may apply at a later stage to the kolkhozes and sovkhozes.

In the political sector we can expect professionals to make their presence felt more strongly, not only in the economic and administrative hierarchy but also—though rather more cautiously—in the party machine. The growing influence of economists, scientists, and technicians may find expression in the establishment of special organisations or consultative bodies whose advice on the solution of specific problems will be sought by the party leaders. The party machine and its leadership will be increasingly dominated by the sort of modern party administrator who combines the advanced technical training and practical experience of an engineer with the ideological stability, toughness, and discipline of a party stalwart.

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Whether, in the coming decade, we shall see the 'withering away' of party control commissions in industry and of 'socialist competition'. together with the economic activities of the party machine as a whole, and whether this will be accompanied by a really extensive replacement of administrative measures and political propaganda by material incentives in every field, depends on the party machine's powers of resistance. Hard as it is to foresee possible changes in the next decade, one thing is highly probable: these changes will not come about smoothly. They will be fiercely and persistently contested by the party machine, which will try to check developments and restrict reforms to a minimum, and which can, at least temporarily, render a particular reform in a particular field null and void.

VICTOR ERLICH: As I see it, the most essential change that has occurred in the Soviet Union since Stalin's death lies in the 'rationalisation' of Soviet totalitarianism. The post-Stalin regime has done away with the irrational excesses of the Stalin rule by reducing the role of the dread secret police and the reliance on terror as a mode of dealing with real or imaginary opposition, and has thus restored to the party activist and the run-of-the-mill Soviet citizen a measure of personal security. If in the realm of culture this reassertion of 'socialist legality' has allowed for some mild dissent and personal self-expression, politically it is probably more significant that by and large the post-Stalin regime has been able to ensure overt conformity without resorting to brutal and arbitrary police methods.

It would be foolhardy to minimise the importance of the developments which have markedly affected the atmosphere in the Soviet Union and the Soviet citizen's pattern of living. Yet the change which has occurred hitherto is not a structural one. The fundamental nature of the Soviet system has not been transformed. Whatever grim satisfaction one may derive from Khrushchev's sensational admissions, the fact remains that both the 20th and the 22nd Party congresses were thoroughly totalitarian performances. The 'anti-party' villains were not given their day in court —the bitter factional strife had been driven underground. While imaginative literature is not immune these days to mildly heterodox opinions, the regime is determined and able to stifle open political debate.

A return to Stalinism, that is, full-scale police repression, seems highly unlikely. Thus it is not inconceivable that in a situation of relative disarray, caused, say, by a renewed struggle for succession, the regime might show greater responsiveness to the younger generation's hankering for a measure of cultural and economic pluralism. Yet this is hardly an immediate prospect. For the moment the Presidium seems to have the situation well in hand. In other words, I do not envisage any substantial attenuation of Soviet totalitarianism; rather, on the basis of available evidence, it is difficult to foresee any significant changes, or, to put it more cautiously, to visualise the nature of such changes as might occur.

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CONVERGENCE

Do you foresee a gradual convergence of the social and/or political systems of the West and the Soviet Union?

CHRISTOPHER MAYHEW: The principal differences between the two systems arise from the Soviet Union's lack of political, personal, and cultural freedom, its lower living standards, greater social equality, and higher level of economic planning and stability. If each of these fields is examined, it becomes evident that a distinct convergence between the two systems has taken place and is likely to continue to do so.

Political freedom: From the Western side there has been, and is likely to be, little significant development towards Soviet political methods. But it should not be overlooked that the power of the executive over the legislature—and perhaps also over public opinion—has increased in Western countries and is likely to increase further. The trend towards bi-partisanship in foreign affairs, and the steady erosion of party differences on internal questions will continue, and this could possibly be represented as a trend towards single-party as against multi-party democracy.

On the Soviet side there have been some notable advances towards Western standards—a marked decrease in the power of the secret police and in the personal power of the Head of State; a significant increase in freedom of speech for private citizens and in their foreign contacts; and a small increase in the autonomy of the courts, and of local and central government institutions.

These advances are likely to continue. As in the past, they will not be accompanied by spectacular changes in the formal structure of the Soviet political system. (This system is already so democratic in form that it can accommodate any predictable advance towards genuine freedom without substantial change.) Power will continue to rest overwhelmingly with the Soviet Communist Party.

Nevertheless, on the reasonable assumption that the rapid increase in living standards is maintained, further liberalisation along established lines can be confidently forecast. When Mr Khrushchev disappears, his successor is unlikely to inherit his full measure of personal power. A further increase in the relative power of the Central Committee is probable, and differences of opinion in the committee are likely to become more open. This trend will not constitute an unmanageable threat to party unity unless —which does not seem likely—a strong 'Chinese' faction emerges. It is hard to envisage indigenous political forces strong enough to produce a decisive anti-revisionist reaction on the Central Committee.

We can therefore conclude that the Soviet and Western political systems will continue to converge in the coming decade, with the Soviet system making much the greater contribution towards closing the gap.

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Personal freedom: While there will be no diminution of fundamental civil rights in the Western countries, the increased complexity of their societies will continue to add to petty restrictions on personal freedom. On the Soviet side, though penalties for anti-social activities may increase as a result of increased opportunities and temptations, there seems no reason to forecast any reversal of the current trend towards greater respect for individual rights and ' socialist legality '.

Cultural freedom: On the Western side, no significant change need be expected. On the Soviet side, there will be tactical fluctuations in the amount of freedom allowed to musicians, writers, and artists; but the long term trend towards greater liberty will not be stopped or reversed. The popularity of the changes, and the increasing dependence of the Soviet state on its intelligentsia, make this increasingly difficult. Similarly, the Soviet Government is now so deeply and publicly committed to the principle of cultural contacts with foreign countries that a sudden restriction on these would be extremely embarrassing and would not be lightly undertaken.

The spread of popular Western-type music among young people in the Soviet Union is also virtually unstoppable and will continue. Western style of dress and other consumer goods, being brighter and better, will continue to gain a hold. In general, the cultural gap between the two systems has narrowed, and will continue to do so.

Living standards: The convergence of living standards, which has been a feature of the last decade, will continue. East-West differences in housing conditions, standards of dress, and recreational habits (other than motoring) will tend to disappear.

Economic planning and stability: The avoidance of a major capitalist slump for two decades has probably been the outstanding feature of ' East-West convergence '. This is an all-important Western advance towards Soviet standards. The Western trend towards central planning—through budgetary policy, incomes policy, large public expenditures, and direct public enterprise—is likely to continue, in response to technological developments, especially those involved in the United States' space and defence programmes.

At the same time, continued Soviet failures in agriculture and retailing will compel measures of de-centralisation and increased personal financial incentives. The accounting system in Soviet industry will develop the important concept of rent and interest as charges for land, machinery, and other capital assets. Here again, therefore, continued convergence is likely.

Social equality: In the Western countries, the trend over the last decade has been, on balance, towards educational and social equality, and uniformity of manners and culture; and this is likely to continue. Further advances will be made in the United States against racial discrimination.

In the Soviet Union, on the other hand, rising living standards, the increased availability of luxury goods, the state's dependence on the

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intelligentsia, and increased financial incentives, are likely to produce greater social differentiation.

From this survey, a further general convergence of the systems seems very likely. This process will be hastened by the increasing tendency on both sides to conceive competition between the two systems in concrete terms—i.e. not in terms of 'freedom' and 'socialism', but in precise measurable economic achievements. This will create a strong incentive on both sides to apply empirical tests to political and economic nostrums, and to abandon those which, however attractive ideologically, fail to produce results.

HENRY L. ROBERTS: In commenting on the prospects for a gradual convergence of the Western and Soviet social and political systems I shall limit myself to a few observations on this question as it has presented itself in the past, on certain fairly predictable impulses towards either convergence or divergence, and on the necessarily uncertain nature of the outcome.

Interpreting Russia's relationship to Western Europe has long been a staple of Russian historiography, and, rightly or wrongly, a number of features of this relationship have been subsequently incorporated into comparisons of the Soviet Union with the West. In my judgment pre-revolutionary contrasts have probably been drawn too sharply; Russia's traditional relations to the rest of Europe are, on the whole, more satisfactorily described in terms of the gradations of a spectrum extending across the continent rather than of an antithesis or polarity. That there was a *sense* of antithesis, in both Russia and the West, is clear, and the importance of such subjective views should not be underestimated. Moderate differences in degree can easily be conceived of as symbols of a major difference in kind.

In any event, I have the impression that this picture of antithesis, whether we take it to be a historical reality or a subjective projection, was becoming increasingly irrelevant in the two decades preceding the first world war, clearly on the cultural and intellectual plane, less so on the political. The creative burst in arts and letters of Russia's Silver Age is closely allied to similar activity in the West, and the nineteenth century formulas about Russian-Western relations seem oddly out of place in this setting. It should be noted, however, that this growing similarity was not the consequence of a coming together of the two societies or a synthesis of their differences; it was rather a common irruption into the strange and disquieting moral, intellectual, and esthetic landscape of the twentieth century, a landscape we are still trying to chart. If there was a convergence between Russia and the West at this time, it was not through resolution but through advance into the unknown.

Then the first world war struck. While it was both a symptom and an expression of new and disruptive impulses, in some respects it also—like other major convulsions, such as the Reformation—seems to have set the clock back. Out of war and ensuing revolution there re-emerged the

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old East-West antithesis, this time garbed as Communist East and Imperialist West. This is not to deny an explicit and central conflict between the goals and means of communism and those of other societies. But one of the continuing problems of historical scholarship on communism has been precisely the double, and extremely difficult, task of relating the dynamism and hostility of communism to the Russian soil in which it developed, and of ascertaining wherein this soil differed from that of Germany or France or Great Britain.

In addition to the doctrinal hostility of communism and the uncertain influence of earlier historical differences, once the Revolution had taken place and sought survival in an unfriendly environment (in good part of its own making), there was a quite important impetus for divergence in the very act of breaking away, of disaffiliation. This struggle for separate identity is a common feature in human affairs: in a child's escape from its parents, in a colony's separation from the mother country, in a religious or social revolutionary movement's withdrawal from the culture which brought it into being. This process of separation is a painful and intricate one, not a struggle between two unrelated and alien orders, but an intimate internecine conflict. In the course of this conflict features of the old order inevitably carry over into the new, giving it a necessary if unacknowledged texture, but also presenting a threat in the form of 'backsliding' or, at the extreme, of explicit Restoration. (Nothing more clearly indicates Russia's involvement in European culture than the contrast between Soviet communism's sensitivity to the possibility of religious revival and Chinese communism's far less engaged, if brutal, anti-religious stance.)

For many years the danger of backsliding or of restoration was undoubtedly a central preoccupation of Soviet leaders, especially those of the first generation, whose own lives and characters had been involved in the revolutionary break. In the 1920s and 1930s the fear of apostasy was an important element in nearly every major political crisis. (Even if one views certain features of Stalinism as backsliding and a desertion of revolutionary ideals, the ferocious care Stalin took to prevent any intimation that this might be the case suggests the importance of this concern.)

This particular source of divergence would appear to be of diminishing significance for the future, simply because of the passage of time and the rise of generations born and reared in the new order. The Soviet system is a going concern; the prospects for an explicit Restoration—in the sense of an overt denial of the Revolution and its values—seem infinitesimally slight. The result may be somewhat paradoxical: the achievement of a securely established 'distance' between the Soviet system and the West may reduce the divergence. I have felt this reduction in some of the young Soviet scholars with whom I have spoken, men of the postwar generation. In some respects they were more remote than their fathers; one could not count on certain overtones and connotations getting through to them. On the other hand, I sensed less personal

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combativeness, no particular need to demonstrate to me that they were on the other side of the fence—they simply were.

Now if only this were involved, one might conclude that the achievement and maintenance of the new order over a protracted period of time might continue to reduce the feeling of a need for divergence and might even promote an attrition of the hostile and aggressive elements of the ideology.

In times past, however, these acts of disaffiliation were assisted in their consolidation by the opportunity of going separate ways; there was more geographical and social space. Today, the Soviet Union and the West are constantly being thrown back on one another, not only by the demands of power politics, but by the universality of contemporary science and the pervasiveness of means of communication. Along the entire front of contacts between the two societies there are constantly appearing a host of what we might call partial convergences. Some are inimical, such as adaptations by one side of some real or imagined advantage of the other; some are neutral or positive, such as the exchange of insights and techniques in various areas of the arts and sciences. It is these latter partial convergences that often produce such sanguine expectation on the part of scientific and artistic visitors to the Soviet Union.

Yet one may question whether these areas of partial or specialised convergence can actually promote any general political or social meeting of the two systems. Indeed, their presence might have quite the contrary effect of arousing, and perpetuating past their natural span, the political sensitivities of the period of revolutionary break. It is perhaps significant that when a French correspondent suggested to Mr Khrushchev three or four years ago that modern science might unify the world, the latter at once denied that this was possible so long as the overriding political and social issue—the overcoming of capitalism—was not achieved.

In looking forward to the future, then, I am sceptical whether these partial convergences, which promise to increase in scope and range, will lead by themselves to political convergence. And while I see with the coming of new generations ('which knew not Joseph') the fading of certain subjective obstacles to convergence, I do not expect any explicit reconciliation of the political and social divergences: too much human history has now gone into them.

If it is permissible to indulge in pure speculation, one might suggest that any general political convergence, if it is to come, will not be in the form of a drawing together after a reconciliation of political differences, nor in the form of two mirror-image antagonists forced into hateful identity (even the mirror game of chess does not permit the opponents to adopt the same stance). Perhaps it will come about in the manner of the aborted pre-1914 convergence: as a common breakthrough into the new and uncharted, but this time on the social and political level, though presumably with roots in the intellectual and artistic explosions of the earlier decades. If one is sensitive to the jolting and disturbing implications of these explosions (post-impressionism, Nietzsche, Freud, Joyce,

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existentialism), one can hardly look forward to an equivalent movement on the social and political plane with any complacent optimism. The political future of both sides would equally be at stake; conventional and traditional notions of strengths and vulnerabilities would be in question. And while the outcome might be politics 'in a new key', it would be a strange key with unsettling dissonances. If such a transition occurs, the question of convergence may well seem a matter of slight importance.

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI: Not really. Obviously, there are certain universal traits inherent in the industrial order, in so-called modern society, as well as in certain manifestations of mass culture and leisure. In that sense, there is, there has been, and there will be, a convergence of the West and the East, including also China. Every factory built in some isolated Chinese town reduces the time gap, the cultural, economic, and social distance between, let us say, Chikurting and Chicago. But these are superficial considerations, as shown by the profound chasm which separated Essen under the Nazis and Detroit notwithstanding certain economic and technological similarities. The internal political organisation, the fundamental purposes of the political system, the methods used to obtain the desired aims—these are the crucial considerations which differentiate political and social systems.

These considerations, in turn, are shaped by the methods used in the past to build the present society, and here too the differences are so profound as to render unlikely any meaningful convergence. The forced, brutal means used to industrialise the Soviet Union, repeated today in China, leave their mark on the subsequent social order, create vested interests, shape institutions and values, that differ profoundly from a socio-economic system that developed gradually, spontaneously, and pluralistically, through an adjustment of competitive interests. The Soviet image of the future communist society leaves little doubt that their system is moving towards a welfare totalitarianism, combining elite leadership with mass voluntarism, with little room for political pluralism. It would hence differ profoundly from the welfare democracy towards which the West is evolving.

WOLFGANG LEONHARD: It entirely depends on what is meant by 'gradual'. Provided that no startling changes occur (e.g. the potential crisis of leadership mentioned earlier), such a process should evolve slowly. Any mutual convergence would take place mainly in the social and economic sphere. The growing influence of the state in the economy of Western countries would be matched by a decrease in state control over the economy of the Soviet Union—for instance, the replacement of detailed state planning by a broader framework, or the introduction of Common Market features into the Soviet economy. The increasing importance of the managerial class within both forms of society and the burgeoning similarity in training and outlook bear witness to the existence of such a process. From the political aspect, however, prospects for a

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rapprochement between the two systems appear far less favourable. The party machine will probably exercise absolute control over all spheres of life in the USSR for a long time to come, and there is virtually no question of any departure from the fundamental tenets of the ideology which provides the basis and justification for the party's complete supremacy.

VICTOR ERLICH: No, I do not. As Alex Inkeles recently pointed out, the two systems, especially as represented by the US and the USSR respectively, already have a number of common features which are either inherent traits of large-scale industrial societies or corollaries of the Cold War. One might mention the expanding bureaucracies, the vast productive plants geared in large part to military purposes, mass culture and mass education, strong emphasis on science and technology, and finally—though, in this latter realm, differences are ultimately more important than similarities—the average citizen's increasing inability to participate meaningfully in political decisions based on classified information and on data intelligible to experts only. Yet an actual convergence of the two systems appears highly improbable. Such a process presupposes either a gradual drift in the West towards the garrison state, or a far-reaching democratisation of the Soviet system, or, for that matter, a considerable measure of both. As I have already indicated, I don't see any tangible sign of the latter. Nor do I envisage the former. In spite of the dangers inherent in the much touted eminence of the 'military-industrial complex' in the United States, the American, and more broadly the Western 'social and political system' remains fundamentally pluralistic and thus qualitatively different from the somewhat modified version of Soviet totalitarianism.

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POLYCENTRISM

What significance do you attach to the polycentric tendencies in the communist bloc?

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI: The gradual effect of polycentrism might well be the relativisation of the hitherto absolutist doctrine, thereby sapping its chiliastic appeal, and eventually merging some of its more moderate offshoots with the plurality of outlooks that characterises the present condition of mankind.

More specifically, it is to be expected that China will become increasingly independent and self-assertive in its foreign policy, even if its conflict with the USSR should subside after the disappearance of both Mao and Khrushchev. Certain basic differences in aspirations, in intensity of revolutionary outlook, and in international priorities, are likely to persist, thus making the problem of divergent unity a matter for continuous bargaining, quarrelling, and patching up. With the Chinese in possession of nuclear weapons probably not later than 1964, their leverage on the similarly frustrated North Korean and North Vietnamese communist leaderships will probably increase, thereby further reducing Soviet influence. Likewise, it may be expected that the Chinese will strive to increase their role among the ' national liberation ' movements, especially those which by then will be engaged in active combat against ' imperialism ' (e.g. parts of east and south Africa). It is also conceivable that the persisting Sino-Indian border dispute will result in a curious Sino-Pakistani v. Indo-Soviet alignment, with the Ladakh and Kashmir issues providing the cement for these unlikely allies, even though Pakistan will remain allied with the United States against the Soviet Union, and India also will be relying on American aid against China.

Since both parties see their own experience as having universal significance, they find it impossible to understand within their own perspective the relevance of the other's view. They are, in a way, the prisoners of their own historical context, while the dispute between them has helped to crystallise their conflicting positions.

There are parallels between the experience in the early twenties of the social-democratic leaders with their communist comrades, and the current pattern of relations between the Soviets and the Chinese. The social-democratic attitude to the bourgeoisie in the early twenties may have been a composite of various motivations: there may have been elements of cynicism based on the desire to enjoy the new status; there may have been an element of overconfidence—the feeling that capitalism was already doomed and that socialism was strong; there may have been a sense that excessive radicalism was counter-productive and artificially delayed the accelerating trend towards socialism by stimulating otherwise avoidable fears on the part of the bourgeoisie. This may be the way the Soviet leaders feel today towards the West, and, with Russia relatively

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developed, the more purely Marxist economic determinism may better fit the outlook of the Soviet leaders than the more directly political Leninist-Stalinist perspective on world affairs. The Soviet leaders are still naturally sympathetic to revolutionary movements elsewhere, but so were the social-democratic leaders towards general strikes and more active forms of revolutionary activity. At the same time, the Soviets may be less willing to take risks on behalf of these activities, irrespective of their sympathies. If an open split takes place, the Soviet leaders may find themselves in the same position as the social-democrats when the new Bolshevik state arose, when a more radical socialist party proclaimed itself the leader of a world revolution based on an economically and socially backward country. At first, the social-democrats competed for revolutionary primacy; later they yielded the field to the revolutionaries and found themselves increasingly cooperating with their erstwhile bourgeois opponents, while still waging the political struggle for socialism, although now within the framework of the established 'rules of the game' of the societies in which they existed.

In Eastern Europe, the differences between Poland, Hungary, and Yugoslavia will probably fade gradually in the course of the next few years. Yugoslavia, probably ruled by Rankovic, might move closer to the USSR, while Poland and Hungary will strive to combine domestic autonomy with a close association with the Soviet Union in international politics. While it is to be expected that the other communist states will lag behind, they too will be gradually exposed to mounting domestic pressure for greater moderation, for a more domestically-oriented policy. However, all of these strivings for greater liberty from Soviet domination are likely to be hobbled by the continued instability of the East German regime, as unpopular as ever, as dependent on Soviet sponsorship as ever, and by the consequent tension in Central Europe, exacerbated by persisting territorial insecurities.

LEONARD SCHAPIRO: Polycentric communism, if I may borrow the phrase, is rather like fried snowballs—a contradiction in terms. The 'polycentric tendency' in the bloc really means the disintegration of the authority of Moscow, which created the bloc, and the decline of the authority of the one doctrine, 'scientifically' correct, historically predestined, and binding on all its followers. The defection of Albania seems to me to prove that we are now faced with a situation in which the solidarity of the bloc is little more than a reflection of the extent to which the Soviet Union can enforce its military influence over its allies. Poland, for example, and even Yugoslavia, can be said to illustrate the modern trend of each 'communist' country manoeuvring to secure as much internal freedom of action for itself as it can at the price of solidarity in international politics. I should think that this tendency will continue. The USSR will no doubt be strong enough to prevent an actual defection from the international bloc (as in the case of Hungary), but not strong enough to resist increasing assertion of internal independence. I should

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expect to see in the process an even greater decline of interest in communist theory than has already been discernible in past years.

The vital question, however, remains that of relations between the USSR and China. I find it difficult to imagine that the present uneasy state of hostility will continue for as long as a decade. It could conceivably be resolved by complete agreement between the two powers. This would enormously strengthen the bloc and would destroy the polycentric tendencies in the process. It would also create a rather dangerous situation so far as the peace of the world is concerned, since I cannot at present foresee any agreement by China for a reconciliation with the USSR (so long as a communist regime survives in China) which did not involve a more aggressively 'revolutionary' and assertive policy than even that pursued by the USSR. Personally, I feel that a break between the two powers is much more likely—either in the lifetime of Khrushchev, or after he is succeeded by a younger man. This seems to me to be made likely by the fact of industrial disparity between the two countries: China, a long way behind in the industrialisation drive, with its aims of domination over Asia and indeed over the whole underdeveloped world, will for long remain comparatively indifferent to the risks of nuclear war which are naturally more terrifying for urban, industrialised powers: the USSR is quite aware of them. I cannot conceive that a cold war partnership between the two of them can last for long without disastrous results (the Cuban affair was nearly one), and I think the USSR will sooner or later recognise this. Perhaps this is over-optimistic—the alternative seems to me to be nuclear annihilation for us all, which seems a bit over-pessimistic—particularly since I am firmly convinced that the Russians (having made the momentous discovery in 1959 that nuclear bombs can kill Russians as well as Americans) do not want nuclear annihilation any more than we do. If a Sino-Soviet break does take place, I think it will most probably have the effect of pushing each side to a different policy: the Chinese, probably with some Asian and African following, remaining protagonists of the violent anti-colonial and revolutionary clichés of the twenties, which now sound so out of date; and the Russians finding their way at long last towards some basis of sane compromise with the 'capitalist' countries which obstinately refuse to accept their marxist death sentence.

F. R. ALLEMANN: The polycentric tendencies in the communist bloc (and in the communist world movement) will probably become much more important. Up to now, Stalin's heirs have proved unable to work out a solid and shock-proof framework to hold the camp together and to overcome not only ideological oppositions but also divergent national interests. The 'Commonwealth of Socialist Nations', which seems to have been Khrushchev's leading idea, has not achieved a real, let alone a lasting balance between national autonomy and international cohesion. The disputes with China and the defection of Albania show clearly how difficult it is to establish a homogeneous outlook (let alone a unity of political

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action) without a strict Stalinist discipline and a rigorous central direction. Up till now, the Soviet leaders have avoided an open break within the camp, and they may avoid it for a long time still—as long as they themselves, at least, stay united. But what will happen if a new crisis inside the Soviet Union breaks out before these questions are solved (and I am deeply convinced that, at the very latest, this crisis will crop up after Khrushchev's disappearance as surely as it did after the death of Lenin and then of Stalin)? Once two (or maybe more) factions start fighting for his heritage in Moscow, each of them will try to mobilise support in the other states of the camp—and in such a situation even the measure of autonomy these states have now attained may prove dangerous for the cohesion of the whole system.

Any attempt to look beyond that point seems to me too highly speculative to have much sense. However, I should like to add one word of warning. Even if the developments inside the Soviet Union should finally lead to a further devaluation of ideology, this would not necessarily mean that the East-West conflict would lose its present sharpness. We cannot be at all sure that a more pragmatic and 'de-ideologised' Soviet regime based, for instance, on some kind of post-Leninist and post-Stalinist 'national socialism', would be more ready to solve its conflicts with the West peacefully; it might, on the contrary, take on more ruthlessly expansionist features. Even a gradual convergence of the social systems of the West and the Soviet Union would not provide any guarantee against a continuation of the cold war or ensure a more viable form of coexistence.

WOLFGANG LEONHARD: The importance of polycentrism in the communist bloc lies not only in the fact that several centres have now become established in place of the former unified centre, Moscow, but also that through the establishment of several centres de facto approval has been accorded to differing ideological interpretations and differing approaches to current questions of vital importance. The development of polycentrism to date has demonstrated not only that the ideological world-centre is a thing of the past, but even that the consultative principle, that is to say, the attempt to agree upon a common line by means of regular meetings between leaders of the international communist movement, is no longer viable.

Instead of revealing a unified world movement with a unified centre, a graphic illustration of international communism would now assume roughly the form of a rainbow whose spectrum ranges from the reformers ('revisionists'), via sundry intermediate stages, to modernised communism à la Khrushchev, and from there, via further gradations, to communism on the Chinese pattern and, at the furthest extremity, Albanian communism, which differs even from the Chinese variety.

For all the importance of polycentrism, we should not overlook the fact that—disregarding Yugoslavia and certain trends in Poland and the

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Italian Communist party—it is not a question of a change in objective but in the methods by which that objective is to be attained. Wide agreement exists both on the domestic and the international goal, namely the worldwide victory of communism—or, rather, of the economic and political system which Eastern bloc leaders of varying hue choose to term communism. Current differences of opinion arise from differing estimates of the present world situation, of the respective strength of the great powers, of strategic orientation, political alliances, and, finally, of the methods by which the common goal should be achieved.

The future significance of polycentrism can be broken down as follows:

(i) There is every likelihood that the spectrum of international communism will be widened by the emergence of more and more 'centres', each distinguishable from the other by its differing interpretation of doctrine and approach to the problems of the moment. African and Latin American versions of communism may play a major part in this process.

(ii) Differences between individual states within the Eastern bloc will spring into ever sharper relief. The various communist states will become increasingly independent and mutually distinguishable, even if the policy of economic integration so enthusiastically championed by Khrushchev is successful.

(iii) The greater the differences between individual members of the Eastern bloc become, and the more communist centres come into being, however, the more scope there will be for communist parties outside the Eastern bloc to manoeuvre between various centres, trends and interpretations. Communist parties, both in the industrialised West and in the underdeveloped countries, will thus become increasingly autonomous and independent.

In this way, international communism *as a whole* will be weakened, but it is quite possible that the growing independence and autonomy of *individual* communist parties in individual countries wll invest them with greater powers of attraction and enable them to play a more effective role.

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COEXISTENCE

What are the prospects of 'coexistence' for the sixties?

C. M. WOODHOUSE: In the autumn of 1962 the communist rulers were running remarkably true to form. Seldom indeed has there been a more harmonious union of theory and practice. The Chinese communists, who do not believe in peaceful coexistence, were attacking India. The Soviet communists, who do believe in it, were first installing missile bases in Cuba and then agreeing to withdraw them under strong American pressure. To most Western observers the withdrawal of the missile bases seemed to be a welcome, though belated, return to peaceful coexistence. It is important to realise that from the Soviet point of view the original installation of the bases was equally an exemplification, and not a contradiction, of the doctrine of peaceful coexistence.

What then is peaceful coexistence? In 1961, at a conference held in Sussex under the auspices of the GB-USSR Association, a Soviet participant declared that there must be either peaceful coexistence or a destructive war: 'there is no third possibility'. It will be shown, paradoxical though it may seem, that this apparently obvious truism is in fact untrue. The same speaker also referred to:

> the well-known fact that Vladimir Lenin, the founder of our socialistic state, laid the foundations of the policy of peaceful coexistence.

His remark was doubtless addressed to Chinese ears ten thousand miles away just as much as to his British audience. For the Chinese communists believe that Lenin (which means, practically speaking, the Holy Ghost) did nothing of the kind; and they are quite right. Like other well-known Soviet facts, this one is not a fact at all.

Lenin expressly said on a number of occasions that the existence of the Soviet Republic and the capitalist states side by side for any length of time was unthinkable. So far as I can trace, the first Soviet leader to use the term 'peaceful coexistence' was Malenkov in 1929, and he also declared it to be impossible. On the other hand, Stalin repeatedly expressed his belief in peaceful coexistence, both before and after the second world war. That obviously should give us food for thought: if Stalin believed in it, then clearly 'peaceful coexistence' cannot mean what most ordinary people in the West would naturally presume it to mean, which could be roughly translated as 'live and let live'.

All recent pronouncements by Soviet leaders and official spokesmen go to show that this is indeed so. The meaning of peaceful coexistence in its Soviet interpretation is most clearly shown in the communiqué of the conference of 81 Communist parties in Moscow in December 1960 and in the new programme of the Soviet Communist party published in July 1961. The context of the two documents is slightly different, since they are concerned in the first instance with external and internal problems respectively. But the general tenor of both is much the same. Both

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presuppose a continuation of peaceful coexistence with the capitalist world, but neither has any difficulty in reconciling that relationship with the promotion of revolution and violence within that world. There was nothing ironic, in the Soviet view, about the coincidence that on the day the new party programme was published there also took place a spectacular naval review at Leningrad, complete with nuclear submarines, rocket-firing cruisers, and belligerent speeches by the Commanders-in-Chief.

A few quotations may help to show that these are not mere paradoxes. The 1960 communiqué reiterates the dogma of the aggressive nature of capitalism, but adds that 'real forces have appeared that are capable of foiling its plans of aggression: war is not fatally inevitable'. Although the document does not refer explicitly to the nuclear deterrent, contemporary publications of a quasi-official character show that a doctrine similar to that of the West is in fact accepted by the Soviet government. That would in any case be the inescapable conclusion both from the new series of Soviet nuclear tests in 1961 and from the Cuban adventure in 1962. So far the inferences are encouraging: the unthinkability of nuclear war implies the inevitability of peaceful coexistence. But we are then confronted with the definition of that relationship as (to quote Khrushchev himself) 'a form of intense political, economic, and ideological struggle between the proletariat and the aggressive forces of imperialism'. This definition is repeated in different ways in the 1960 communiqué; and both that document and the party programme show in detail how 'the grim struggle between two ideologies, communist and bourgeois', is to be fought out. It is indistinguishable from the cold war.

Peaceful coexistence is therefore a dynamic and not a static relationship. It does not mean a reconciliation between 'socialism' and 'capitalism', but 'an intensification of the struggle'. Socialism is 'continually sapping and destroying imperialism, leading to its weakening and collapse'. It is still the task of 'the international revolutionary movement' to help the working class in capitalist countries, and in newly emerging ex-colonies, to overthrow their bourgeois governments, if necessary by force. 'Where the exploiting classes resort to violence against the people, the possibility of non-peaceful transition to socialism should be borne in mind.' Such is the plan for the 1960s: such is peaceful coexistence. At the same time, and in the same documents, there is set forth a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of independent countries and of 'improving and developing relations with all capitalist countries with a view to safeguarding peace'.

The theoretical reconciliation of what seem, in Western terms, to be contradictions, is quite simple in Marxist terms. It rests upon the doctrine that relations between states are one thing, relations between classes or between ideas are quite another. But we cannot be seriously expected to accept such a reconciliation, and the fact remains that there are two fundamentally distinct interpretations of peaceful coexistence current in the world. Consequently it is not true that 'there is no third possibility' apart from the two alternatives of destructive war and peaceful

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coexistence. There are in fact three possibilities: war, peaceful coexistence in the Soviet sense, and peaceful coexistence in the Western sense. Since the second is in fact a verbal subterfuge concealing the continuation of a policy of 'making mischief by all methods short of war involving the Soviet Union in open hostilities' (as the cold war was once defined in a Chatham House publication), it is obvious that the object of Western policy must be to bring about the third possibility rather than either of the other two.

What are the chances of success? It seems natural to be relatively optimistic in the immediate aftermath of the Cuban crisis. But the declared intentions of both the Chinese and the Soviet communists hardly encourage optimism in the long run. The Chinese communists differ from the Soviet interpretation of peaceful coexistence only in regarding it as too mild and soft. Their readiness to accept the alternative of war is already standing up to the test of experience in India; and those who are qualified to judge leave us in no doubt that it is only a question of time, perhaps quite a short time, before they have nuclear weapons. The one grain of comfort here is that every precedent suggests that the acquisition of nuclear capacity is a sobering experience, which has led those who possess it to take a more responsible view than before of the risks of war and the delicacy of the international equilibrium. It is not impossible that the Chinese reaction may be the same once their present inferiority complex is overcome. Meanwhile, it is reasonable to suppose that the current conflict with India can, at the worst, be insulated and contained.

There remains the 'grim struggle' to which the Soviet communists are dedicated under the name of peaceful coexistence. Obviously they cannot expect the West to accept their interpretation of the phrase once it is understood. Can we expect them to accept ours? Perhaps never—certainly not in the 1960s—in the form of an explicit admission. But it seemed to be a legitimate inference from the Cuban crisis that the Soviet government was not prepared to push its dynamic interpretation of peaceful coexistence to the point where the Western allies had no alternative but surrender or war. If that is correct, and if other instances accumulate to the same effect in the next few years—and none to the contrary effect—then that will be tantamount to a tacit acceptance on the Soviet side of the Western interpretation.

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI: Both the instability in the East and the uncertainty in the West are likely to make coexistence in the sixties a very tense thing. There is unlikely to be a major war, i.e. one involving thermonuclear weapons. On that there may well have been already a revolutionary breakthrough in human consciousness, although only time will tell whether this has been so. However, there are few, if any, precedents in the history of mankind for the absence of war in the context of the tensions, hostilities, ideological rivalries, and military polarisation that characterise our age. This is not without its meaning, and it suggests that mankind, which only recently overcame its endemic condition of civil

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anarchy, may be painfully moving in the direction of overcoming international anarchy. In both cases, weapons development and the gradual socialisation of mankind were of crucial significance: they have made family vendettas, city versus city conflicts, even domestic rebellion, relative rarities, practised primarily by asocial elements still relying on primitive means of combat.

Similarly, in international politics, there are still persisting aberrations, which remind us that the age of international anarchy is not far behind us. Local wars are the equivalent to murder in civil society—something that the rest of the community hastens to contain and extinguish. Thus an international order may be actually emerging—but by stealth—and this is precisely the way order has always emerged. First comes order as a preferable condition to disorder, and later comes its conscious legitimation and institutionalisation. Today, in the American and Soviet nuclear self-restraint, we may be witnessing what years ago our forefathers witnessed, usually without knowing it, when gradually, out of individual and group combat, larger units were shaped and learned to tolerate, even if not to like one another.

Precisely because this process is so tenuous, so delicate, so easily reversible (as mankind's history shows), it is important that no sudden imbalances interfere with its consolidation—either through the achievement of a fundamental military superiority by the side desiring revolutionary change and hence the side more likely to use this military superiority to its advantage, or through the one-sided disarmament of the more status quo-oriented power—which would have the identical effect. Indeed, one may wonder whether even joint disarmament may not be dangerous, especially if it took place at a time when the differences dividing the two sides were still acute. Removing the mutual restraint of fear would leave the field open to the still dominant passion of hatred.

The situation will doubtless be further complicated by the acquisition of nuclear weapons by some second-rate powers, although the actual military significance of that should not be overestimated, since by then the gap between them and the United States and the Soviet Union will have widened even further, with the latter two powers possessing space ships, neutron bombs, death rays, etc. First-generation atomic bombs and old-fashioned means of delivery are not likely to alter the basic military polarisation of the world. Coexistence is thus likely to remain tense, but without a cataclysmic confrontation by the two competing camps. The area of the most tense and promising communist activity will probably be Latin America, East and South Africa. In Latin America, the Europe-oriented intelligentsia, steeped in both Christianity and anti-clerical radicalism, in Hegelianism and Marxism, and displaying a markedly Latin propensity towards impetuous action, is likely to engulf many parts of the continent in bloody conflict, in the sort of civil anarchy which other parts of the globe have already left behind them. Anti-Americanism, combined with left-wing Marxism and supported by the communist world, will create revolutionary situations and even local wars,

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thereby sorely straining mutual American-Soviet self-restraint. Similarly, in East and South Africa, it is likely that communism will be in a position to take advantage of the intense anti-white settler feeling, probably exacerbated in the course of the next few years by direct armed clashes. The communist camp will then be able to pose as the active sponsor and promoter of the Africans' struggle against white colonialism.

In Europe, communism is likely to be on the defensive. An economically and increasingly politically unified Europe will inevitably tend to assume the political initiative in European matters, especially with the United States preoccupied with holding the line in Asia, with local conflicts in Latin America and Africa, and with assisting the new nations in crossing the threshold between static underdevelopment and initial development. This new and powerful Europe will shortly acquire its own nuclear deterrent, and afterwards, given its technology and wealth, more sophisticated means of delivery, and the sense of power and greater security that will come in its wake is also likely to engender a more purposive outlook among the West Europeans. Their power, their wealth, and particularly their European identity will exercise, even without any overt political action, a magnetic attraction on the East Europeans, who will crave closer association with the new Europe and will bitterly resent the restrictions that may stand in the way. The 'Europe till the Urals' concept, casually launched by President de Gaulle in May 1962, will thus become an irrepressible force, captivating the imagination of most Europeans, even perhaps Russians, increasingly fearful of the Chinese, thus dictating the pattern for the seventies.

Eventually, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) may become the intermediary stage for the East Europeans states' progress towards European unity. Given their still rampant national rivalries, it is doubtful whether they could fashion on their own the unity that the more mature Western nations have gradually forged. Furthermore, while still relatively underdeveloped, they would be at a disadvantage in the industrial Western complex. But when united through external force and rapidly industrialising, also through force, they may be able in the next decade or so to seek on the basis of a collective advance closer relations with the Europe to which they belong, bringing with them even the Soviet Union. In 1949, there were twenty isolated European economies; the sixties are seeing the emergence of two; the seventies may see the birth of one.

There is a danger in all this that these events may force the United States to revert to its traditional role of being a political adjunct of Europe, of providing for Europe the sense of economic reserve and military depth but no longer the political leadership. In part, this danger is rooted in the apparent economic stagnation of the United States. Its pace of economic growth is several times slower than that of Western Europe or of the Soviet Union, and there seems to be little likelihood of a dramatic change. Unemployment is increasingly viewed as a chronic condition, inherent in the present market and technological stage. The

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apparent conservatism of the American electorate will probably inhibit or delay any drastic increase in public outlays, but without a return to the so-called unlimited free enterprise system. Caught between the two conflicting pulls, the economy may continue at dead centre, incapable of generating a sudden spurt, either on the West German ' free enterprise ' model or the French ' planned governmental investment ' pattern.

In part, this change in relationship—this gradual decline of American pre-eminence—is also inevitable simply because the emergence of Europe, politically ambitious and economically thriving, is bound to alter the present balance in the so-called Atlantic community. Furthermore, while America is basically a satisfied power, the mounting sense of European unity is bound to reopen the issue of the division of Europe, thereby making Europe politically more assertive. So long as America was the only Western power capable of fashioning and supporting, militarily and economically, a policy against the communist threat, the inherent defensiveness of that policy could not be brought out in sharp relief. All criticism foundered simply on the fact that no alternative could be tested. Thus the American failure to capitalise on its military power and economic strength in the promotion of clearly discernible, affirmative goals, designed both to alter the character and to shrink the geographical scope of the communist camp, was never exposed to the challenge of an alternative policy. The emergence of a unified Europe, economically pre-eminent and eventually militarily self-sufficient, might well alter this picture, and it may be expected that such a Europe would no more acquiesce to the unnatural division on the Elbe than America did to the appearance of communism in Cuba.

It is thus not inconceivable that by the end of this decade the roles played by the major actors on the international scene will have been switched. America will be preoccupied with the defence of the Western hemisphere. Russia will be on the defensive in Europe. Europe and China will be the offensive powers, but neither in direct conflict with the other. To be sure, Russia will be supporting communist efforts in Latin America, and America will be encouraging and backing the European efforts in Europe. But deflected conflict—rather than a direct confrontation by the two major powers—may be a step towards the elimination of international anarchy in the world.

LEONARD SCHAPIRO: ' Coexistence ' is a fraudulent term, as used by Soviet writers, and as rather unwisely adopted by us. In its only proper meaning, i.e. absence of physical war, the chances of coexistence in the sixties are as good as they have been in the fifties—provided the balance of nuclear power between the United States and Russia remains as it is. Obviously, if the USSR could be *sure* of knocking out the USA without fear of some effective retaliation, our continued survival could become very precarious. But so long as the nuclear balance is maintained, neither side will be prepared to start nuclear warfare, whatever crisis may blow up, and whatever new moves are thought up by Soviet leaders in the

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international poker game. In other words, the crises must end with one side or the other climbing down. The difference will remain as hitherto, that if our side climbs down on any vital issue, part or all of the freedom of the Western world will be lost—or, looked at from the Soviet point of view, the frontiers of the 'socialist' world will be extended. The prizes at stake will thus be so high for the Soviet leaders that they can be expected to go on testing the nerves of their opponents in all manners suggested by their ingenuity.

However, this is to assume that nothing will change in the nature of Soviet leadership—an assumption which will not necessarily remain valid for a whole decade, since Mr Khrushchev can hardly be expected to last as long as that. What his successor will do is a matter of conjecture. I have already indicated the possibility that the realisation of the growing menace of China may force Russia to seek partnership with the United States and her allies in place of fraudulent 'coexistence'. But even in the event of a collapse of communism in China, or a relaxation of Chinese intransigence, one could conceive of new, younger leaders of the USSR who would be capable of realising that the arms race and the continued war of nerves, all in the interests of communist expansion, must *inevitably* either fail, or lead to nuclear destruction of the civilised world. It is thus conceivable in the next decade that such a successor or successors to Khrushchev, with a more flexible attitude, might seek some genuine agreement on disarmament and cooperation. He, or they, would certainly have wide support among many sections of Soviet public opinion—and it is even conceivable that in another ten years Soviet public opinion will begin to have some effect on Soviet foreign policy.

CHRISTOPHER MAYHEW: The prospects are more favourable than for the fifties or forties. Admittedly, certain problems will be more critical than ever. China will soon acquire nuclear weapons, and may thus be in a position to precipitate a crisis over Formosa. Room for manoeuvre in Berlin will be more restricted than ever for both sides, and the possibility of a clash will to that extent be greater. The weaker halves of all partitioned countries—Germany, Korea, and Vietnam—will reach new peaks of instability and produce serious crises.

On balance, however, the prospects for coexistence are more favourable than before. In the first place, each side now credits the other with a sincere desire to avoid war. Each side has a more realistic understanding of the other's position and intentions; and is more fully aware of the consequences of nuclear conflict. The possibility of preventive war has thus virtually vanished. Progress has been made towards a clear understanding of what practices are, and what are not, permissible in the cold war. The practice of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries is more generally understood and practised.

Moreover, the ideological war will become less clear cut and bitter, the central direction of world communism—which now scarcely exists at all—will virtually disappear. 'Communism' and 'capitalism' will

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continue to become far less homogeneous, and the social systems now emerging in Africa, Asia, Latin America, will be seen to be virtually unclassifiable in Marxist terms. The concept of a confrontation of two ideologies across an unbridgeable gulf, which was never very realistic, will within a decade become palpably absurd. The present growth of apathy towards ideological struggle among young people on both sides will continue. To this new generation, the idea of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries will be self-evidently right; the urge to proselytise will continue to weaken, and the idea of *ideological* coexistence will seem increasingly natural and desirable.

VICTOR ERLICH: ' Coexistence ', as we all know, is a tricky word. If we mean by it merely absence of a hot war, prospects for the sixties are reasonably good. Barring a fatal accident or a miscalculation, a thermonuclear war is not very likely, since both parties are anxious enough, one hopes, to avoid a holocaust. But if by ' coexistence ' we mean an actual relaxation of tensions, the chances of achieving this state of affairs remain as dim as ever. Fundamentally, Khrushchev's foreign policy is as dynamic and expansionist as was Stalin's. The targets have changed and so have some of the techniques, but the pattern of ' making trouble ' for the West wherever and whenever possible, and of maximising trouble where it already exists, of probing the vulnerable spots, of manufacturing crises—preferably two crises at a time, e.g. Berlin and Cuba, so as to attempt to extract concessions from the West in one area in return for a last-minute Soviet retreat in another—is still very much with us, and there is little reason to assume that it will not persist through the next decade. In other words, a hot war is not very probable. But neither is the termination of the cold war.

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RICHARD LOWENTHAL: When the dust settled after the succession struggles that followed Stalin's death, and N. S. Khrushchev emerged as the undisputed victor, two contradictory changes had taken place in the character of the Soviet regime.

On one side, the rule of the Communist party had been strengthened. Khrushchev had won as the exponent of the party's liberation from the police intervention typical of Stalin's personal despotism, of the restoration in fact of its primacy over all branches of the state machine which under that despotism it had preserved in name only, and of the revival of its ideological programme of revolutionary advances abroad and revolutionary transformations at home, looking to the worldwide extension of communist rule and the worldwide achievement of the classless society.

On the other hand, the adjustment of the methods of government to the industrial and cultural level reached by Soviet society had begun to impose limits on the ruling party's ability to implement the domestic part of this programme—to continue its permanent revolution from above.

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Once it was recognised that mass terrorism and a large sector of slave labour could play no useful role in a modern industrial economy, the balance between compulsion and incentives had to shift decisively towards the predominance of incentives, and the climate of everyday life changed accordingly. Yet without the climate of universal fear, the party could no longer remould society at will, nor enforce the appearance of unanimous enthusiastic approval of its every measure. The spontaneous desires of various social groups began to make themselves felt, and while they did not find organised and articulate expression as they would in a democracy, they created objective pressures to which the regime had to react and which it sought to canalise by a mixture of counterpressures, propaganda, and concessions. It could no longer impose its own dynamism like a steamroller; neither was it reduced to a mere reflection of the new social forces—hovering above society, it sought to divert those forces in its own, ideologically determined direction by a series of now brutal, now conciliatory manipulations.

As a result, the recent development of Soviet society has proceeded in an uneasy zigzag corresponding wholly neither to the party's aims nor to the society's needs, each dynamic impulse being partly thwarted or at least deflected by its encounter with the other. Thus the party has not been able to assimilate the collective farms to the state farms, to overcome the economy's dependence on the private plots and herds of the individual peasants, or to make significant progress towards the creation of agrotowns; yet the kolkhozniki have not been allowed to enjoy for long the benefits of the reforms that improved their delivery prices and allowed them to acquire their own machinery, but have quickly been subjected to stricter investment norms and increased party interference. The steadily growing managerial pressure for less bureaucratic planning methods in industry and more freedom to adjust to market needs is being partially met by periodic reorganisations of the planning machinery, but each reform is being distorted by the effort to combine it with a compensatory strengthening of party control. Measures genuinely intended to strengthen the legal security of the citizens have been mixed up with the ideological fantasy of replacing law-bound state organs by ' voluntary social organisations ', leading in practice to wild abuses of power by irresponsible local gangs of youthful vulgarians. The party can no longer force the bulk of the people to pretend an interest in its official ideology, but can still preclude most of them from access to independent sources of information, and periodically cracks down on those interested even in religious, literary, or artistic ideas of non-party origin. Monolithism has been replaced by the admission of discussions on many subjects, excepting only the most vital issues of high policy; but each discussion is started and ended by a fiat from above.

As time goes on, however, we may expect the pressures for reform to grow relatively stronger, and this tendency is likely to be reinforced by the failures of an ' ideological ' foreign policy. One of the foundations

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of Khrushchev's ideological revivalism has been his faith in a new round of victorious communist revolutions, to be accomplished without another world war; and this faith in turn has been based on the hope of exploiting the nuclear stalemate to achieve local advances at critical points, on the expectation that the revolutionary process of decolonisation could be canalised to expand communist influence in every quarter of the world, on the confidence that independent communist powers—Russia, China, and any future newcomers—could advance their influence harmoniously without serious conflict of interests, and on the calculation that the economy of the 'imperialist' powers, gravely hit by the consequences of decolonisation, would no longer be able to compete with the rapidly improving economies of the 'socialist camp'. After five years of a world-wide offensive based on these premises, which has sharply raised international tension at great cost to Soviet domestic welfare, it seems obvious that decolonisation has not generally turned to the communists' advantage, that the standards of living of the West European peoples have gained both absolutely and in relation to their East European neighbours, that nuclear blackmail has failed to achieve a breakthrough at Berlin and ended in defeat in Cuba, and above all that differences of national interest between Russia and China have reached a point where the two great communist powers are both openly striving to frustrate each other's foreign policies and denouncing each other before the world communist movement. The ideological offensive has strained Soviet resources without extending Soviet power; the ideological alliance with China, so far from securing the Soviet rear, has created new dangers and conflicts and been worn threadbare in the process. As a result, the party's claim that its accumulated wisdom guarantees the greatness of Russia appears to have become somewhat unconvincing.

While the party regime, and Khrushchev as its exponent, cannot abandon their worldwide ambitions in principle any more than they could renounce their utopian domestic aims, a discontinuation of the recent futile and costly offensive, and the acceptance of the need for another 'breathing spell' of relaxed international tension to improve conditions in Russia and Eastern Europe, would now be a rational and plausible act. A return to this type of 'coexistence'—the kind that Stalin's heirs attempted between 1953 and 1956—would not end the conflict underlying the Cold War, but make it less acute and dangerous, giving the world a respite from the periodic war alarms of recent years; it would probably also strengthen the need for Khrushchev to respond to the pressures for domestic reform.

If we imagine the kind of economic and social changes that could take place in a relaxed international atmosphere even under the present party regime, the indications that they would tend in a 'Titoist' direction—in other words, that scope would be given to the forces of market demand and managerial initiative within the framework of an overall plan laying down only the general lines of economic growth—are strong. If, on the

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other hand, we observe the tendency of the West European Common Market to assume some degree of planning authority (despite the resistance of such 'Stalinists of Free Enterprise' as Professor Erhard), talk of a 'gradual convergence of the social systems of the West and the Soviet Union' may not be wholly fanciful. Yet it should not be forgotten that the division of the world known as the Cold War was never due to a conflict between the *social* systems of 'capitalism' and 'socialism'—we have always had a great variety of social systems on the Western side—but between the *political* system of ideological party rule in the Soviet Union and the nations threatened by it; and I can conceive of no convergence between that system and Western democracy.

The ultimate question, then, remains whether a cumulative process of economic and social reforms in the Soviet Union, taking place less and less in the direction of preconceived ideological dogma and more and more in the direction of the actual needs of a modern society, will eventually force a change in the political system as well. It is, of course, difficult to be apodictic about that question, as we have no precedent for the ending of this type of ideological party regime, except after defeat in war. However, two facts of experience seem relevant to the issue. On one side, we are already observing a weakening of the original totalitarian dynamism of the communist regime in the Soviet Union, and have observed the same in Tito's Yugoslavia for a long time. On the other, even in the latter country—so much weaker and more exposed to Western influence than the Soviet Union—the party regime has been able effectively to maintain power, thanks to its existing monopoly of organisation and the preservation of unity at the top. I conclude that while such a regime may be gradually undermined by social change, it cannot be gradually transformed politically: it can only be ended in the one type of political crisis that is possible within its own framework—the crisis of succession, when the aspirants to power are forced to appeal to the diverse sectors of the state machine and of society. The transformation of the methods of government that took place in Russia after 1953 had long been overdue; but it took the crisis of succession following Stalin's death to adjust the 'superstructure' to the new 'basis'. The far more profound political change of ending the supremacy of the party seems to me to be conceivable in another such crisis.

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IDEOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS

What in your view are the most significant ideological developments in the USSR since Stalin's death?

WILLIAM E. GRIFFITH: Writing after Cuba, one is tempted to think that the most important ideological change in the Soviet Union since the death of Stalin has been the new doctrine of peaceful coexistence. Its proclamation at the twentieth congress in 1956 was overshadowed, as were the other contents of Khrushchev's public speech there, by his 'secret' and sensational downgrading of Stalin. Yet in retrospect the future course of Soviet policy to this day was forecast with remarkable accuracy by Khrushchev's three major new ideological pronouncements at the congress: his new theory of peaceful coexistence, his rejection of the Stalinist theory of the sharpening of the class struggle during the transition to socialism, and his reformulation of the relationship between the Soviet Union and other communist states and parties.

The first remarkable aspect of these 1956 ideological declarations is the consistency and persistence with which they have been applied. Khrushchev's retreat on the issue of Soviet missile bases in Cuba is only the most recent example of his steady refusal to accept a major risk of a thermonuclear exchange with the United States. On the issue of the Chinese border incursions into India, he has also been willing to contribute greatly to the worsening of Sino-Soviet relations rather than to give full support to these Chinese military moves. The Berlin crisis has now been going on for more than four years but Khrushchev has not taken it so far as to precipitate a decisive military confrontation with the United States.

Khrushchev has also been consistent in his application of the second ideological innovation, the rejection of the Stalinist doctrine of the sharpening of the class struggle. At the height of the Moscow literary and student ferment subsequent to the Hungarian uprising, he did not resort extensively to Stalinist 'administrative measures', although he made quite clear that he was prepared to do so if necessary. Since then there has been a gradual moderation in Soviet literary policy, coupled with some retrogression in other intellectual fields.

In the third area of ideological innovation, that of relations with other communist parties and states, Khrushchev has also been remarkably consistent, indeed almost stubborn in his implementation of his twentieth congress position. Often frustrated in and frequently appearing to abandon his policy of a rapprochement with Tito, he has always come back to it, as recent events have again clearly demonstrated. Although he accepted Gomulka's access to power in Poland reluctantly, he is now on the most friendly terms with him. Only with Mao has his policy failed, and here perhaps any other would have failed as well. Nevertheless, during the whole course of the Sino-Soviet dispute, Khrushchev has

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constantly made clear his willingness to give the Chinese more leeway but also his determination to hold here as well to his 'centrist' line, so clearly expressed in his replacement of the doctrine of the 'leading role' of the Soviet Union with that of the CPSU as the 'vanguard' of the world communist movement.

But there has been more to Soviet ideological change than merely the consistency with which it has been carried out. The change has been towards a centrist position, a more rational one, one which diminishes the gap between theory and reality, and one which is intended *inter alia* to revitalise ideology in the Soviet Union and, secondarily, throughout the world communist movement. Such a change has been caused in part by the advent of thermonuclear weapons, in part by the crisis in which Stalin left the Soviet Union internally, and by the crisis within the communist camp brought about by Moscow's exploitation, Stalinist over-centralism in Moscow, and the growth of other communist states, particularly China. Khrushchev met the challenges by taking one negative ideological move, the downgrading of Stalin, and several positive ones, as outlined above. His ideological goals were particularly difficult ones to achieve, since they involved a blow at the previous ideological idolisation of Stalin, one bound to be particularly damaging in the weak parties in the satellites, plus an attempt to revitalise the ideology through its 'rationalisation', i.e. a modification of its extremist features while retaining its essence. The events of 1956 in Eastern Europe showed the great difficulty of doing this; recent Soviet developments have shown that it can have some success there; and the Sino-Soviet dispute since 1960 has demonstrated the impossibility of retaining ideological unity throughout the communist camp.

Yet, paradoxically enough, Khrushchev's ideological problems have been considerably eased by the successes in the field of missiles, thermonuclear weapons, and space travel, for which Stalinist industrialisation had provided the industrial base. As compared even with Stalin, and certainly with Lenin, Khrushchev's ideological style is primitive, characterised by oversimplification, repetition, chauvinism, and vulgarity. Yet the modifications he has made in the Stalinist regime have appreciably diminished the popular tensions which it produced, while his success in raising the standard of living (food, consumer goods, and housing) has been complemented and reinforced by the Soviet missile and space achievements. In a certain sense, therefore, some of the characteristics of what has been called 'the end of ideology' have been reached in the Soviet Union: the decline of revolutionary idealism has been in part compensated by a greater satisfaction of material needs, while the 'moral equivalent' of revolutionary fervour has been provided by a combination of chauvinistic nationalism and the sense of adventure produced by the space successes.

To date, therefore, Khrushchev's ideological reversal of the Stalinist doctrine of the intensification of the class strugggle during the transition

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to socialism has certainly been successful; it has lowered the level of cynicism about ideology by decreasing the gap between it and popular desires and expectations. Khrushchev's doctrine of peaceful coexistence has enjoyed almost universal popularity in the Soviet Union except, probably, in some of the more conservative and chauvinistic elements in the party and the armed forces; it is so completely in accord with the deep-seated and profound desire of Soviet citizens for peace that it has, not surprisingly, gone far towards giving Khrushchev one of the major bases of his undoubted popularity at home—the popular conviction that he is working for peace.

It is with the third ideological innovation of the twentieth congress and thereafter, the modification of Soviet theory and practice in respect to relations with other communist states and parties, that Khrushchev is encountering the most difficulty. This arises from several causes. In the first place, the term 'vanguard' is almost deliberately ambiguous, particularly when it is coupled with Khrushchev's constant assertions of the independence of each party in its own decisions. Secondly, its effectiveness comes from the fact that Soviet military, economic, and political power within the international communist movement give Moscow an automatic large majority in any international communist meeting. Finally, the present polycentric situation in international communism is only with increasing difficulty encompassed and described by any ideological formulation, while the continued maintenance between Moscow and Peking of the increasingly hollow pretence of unity has created a yawning new gap between theory and practice. This gap will probably produce increasing 'ideological erosion' in the Soviet Union and within the international communist movement: a repetition on the international scene of the domestic erosion of ideology which arose from the gap between Stalinist theory and reality.

Can one draw up a provisional balance sheet on post-Stalin Soviet ideological developments? Do the regime's losses exceed its gains? It seems highly unlikely that this is a subject that comes anywhere near to occupying much of the time of the average Soviet citizen; for him, ideology except in the most elementary form is a rather inexplicable pastime of his masters. In the party itself, the practitioners of power may well look down upon the professional ideologists as those who must think up *ex post facto* justifications for their previous actions. Nevertheless, the practitioners have also been conditioned by their long ideological training; and in their subconscious at least (not that they yet admit they have one!) this must have some effect.

All in all, the Soviet domestic ideological scene seems to me at present somewhat less strained, and characterised by somewhat less of an—always dangerous—gap between theory and practice than under Stalin. The elements of the ideology have become increasingly accepted by the younger generations; the few intellectual rebels have been cleverly contained; and Khrushchev's socialist legality and peaceful coexistence

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symbolise sufficiently great changes to have engendered popularity, while Stalin's memory and the present regime's occasional demonstration of the iron hand beneath the velvet glove have until now combined to keep dissent in check. On the foreign scene, the contrast between ideological uniformity in theory and increased polycentrism in practice is still too recent to have produced much effect; yet this contrast may well eventually turn out to be a greater eroding force than the more slowly working elements of strain on the domestic scene.

RICHARD PIPES: The phenomenon vaguely and often misleadingly labelled 'revisionism': it is a broad reform movement that has very little to do with the original revisionism of Bernstein, except that it too attempts to adapt formal theory to the exigencies of life. Of course, revisionism is not a definite ideology, for whether a given idea does or does not qualify as revisionist depends entirely on who happens to be in power and what ideas at a given moment enjoy the status of orthodoxy. Ten years ago the whole theory of 'peaceful coexistence' would have been condemned in Moscow as the worst kind of revisionism, as indeed it is condemned today in Peking and Tirana. But revisionism represents, nonetheless, a distinct ideological current whose tendency it is to push communism to the right, away from eschatology and utopia, towards common sense and pragmatism. In the past several years revisionist tendencies have clearly made much headway, despite repeated efforts of party zealots to expose and suppress them. Perhaps the most significant manifestation of these tendencies is the striving of scholars and scientists to free themselves from the tutelage of the party and official ideology, and to establish academic excellence rather than political orthodoxy as the highest criterion of achievement. The efforts to introduce Freud into psychology, Wittgenstein into philosophy, or opinion polls into sociology, to diversify thought and scholarship, and to bring them into closer contact with life, represent very serious challenges to the official ideology. No wonder conservatives oppose them strenuously. Theory, as Goethe once said, fits life as the cross fits the human body, and in the end life always emerges triumphant.

VICTOR ERLICH: I must confess that I fail to detect any truly significant ideological developments in the course of the last decade. I would not put in this category Khrushchev's assertion that the war between the 'socialist camp' and the 'imperialist' one was not inevitable, a dictum which was widely advertised in the West as a major heresy. For one thing, I am not sure how central is the alleged dogma about the inevitability of war to the Leninist doctrine. Lenin, too, set much store by the internal contradictions within capitalism. He fervently hoped that these antagonisms would enfeeble the enemy camp beyond repair. Of course, he felt that if necessary history must be given a push, but there is every reason to assume that this belief is shared by Nikita Khrushchev. For

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another thing, I suspect that both the unduly hopeful Western observers and the consistently grim Chinese communist fundamentalists tend to take Khrushchev's disclaimer a bit too literally. Perhaps all he was implying in his much touted remark is that a direct clash with the US might be too dangerous or expensive at this time and that consequently other avenues of communist advance ought to be explored and taken advantage of. True, Khrushchev's aggressiveness is kept in check by his indubitable awareness of the appalling cost of a nuclear war, but, in all fairness, Stalin was not immune to such considerations, either.

It may well be argued that Khrushchev deviated from the Stalin pattern more markedly when in the process of wooing back the Yugoslavs and trying to keep restive Poland within the fold he admitted, in effect, that there might be several 'roads to socialism'. This grudging admission seemed to run contrary to the Stalinist dogma about the Soviet Union as the only legitimate model and source of guidance for communist governments. The traditional notion, needless to say, was not abandoned willingly, let alone enthusiastically, nor did it necessarily reflect a change of heart on the part of Stalin's heirs. What was involved here was rather a reluctant coming to terms with the realities of communist polycentrism which Khrushchev clearly felt unable to prevent, even if since 1956 he has been attempting to contain it as best he can.

There has been much talk about Khrushchev's pragmatism in social and economic matters. It is true that the post-Stalin regime has laboured hard to rationalise and streamline the Soviet economic performance, and in doing so was more willing to pay heed to Western techniques and concepts than had been the case under Stalin. Khrushchev is ready to learn from the enemy. He is clearly impressed by American gadgets and he does not prevent the Soviet economists from studying such Western constructs as the input-output theory. None of this seems to have affected, however, the basic principles underlying Soviet economic policy, e.g. the belief in the primacy of heavy industry and the commitment to the collectivisation of agriculture.

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EROSION OF IDEOLOGY

Do you envisage an 'erosion of ideology' in the Soviet Union in the next decade?

DANIEL BELL: The central feature of Soviet ideology is not the formal content of any doctrine, but the idea of *partiinost*—that the Party in its collective wisdom is always correct, and that party pronouncements take priority in every field of thought and endeavour and direct the work to be done by individuals in those fields. Only in this fashion can the party weather the successive changes of political line or the tactical defeats and reverses that it occasionally suffers. Only in this way can it rationalise the abandonment of old doctrines that were thought to be hallowed (e.g. Lenin's on equality) and adopt new doctrines that have little basis in previous party dogmas.

Yet the question arises as to how long the party can keep inviolate the doctrine of *partiinost* when it is forced successively by the demands of science, the confrontation with reality, the need to be pragmatic, or the simple demand for historical truth, to admit that old dogmas were either false, inadequate, or for reasons of expediency have to be put aside. How many times can the pitcher go to the well? What happens when prophecy fails? In the last decade, such questions have arisen over the relation of dialectical materialism (the diamat) to science, the sterility of socialist realism in the arts, the inadequacy of the law of value in economics, and pre-eminently, the failure to explain the 'cult of personality' in the conduct of party affairs.

The difficulties of squaring dialectical materialism with the methods of science is an old one in the Soviet Union. Alexander Weissberg has given an account of his difficulties as editor of the Soviet *Journal of Physics* in 1931 when he was told by Joffe to preface the first issues with a genuflection to dialectical materialism. The introduction duly carried the statement that the discoveries reported therein, including experiments on gaseous diffusion, were made through the application of dialectical materialism to physics. His chief difficulty was how to explain subsequently to the German Academy of Science, exactly how the 'diamat' had aided such discoveries.

From any number of accounts it is evident that in the last decade a 'private accommodation' has been effected in Soviet science, so that scientists no longer are required to give lip-service to dialectical materialism. Soviet science has become part of the international community of science, and subject to its norms of inquiry and verification. It is doubtful that we will ever again find, as one did in the 1930s, references to 'bourgeois physics' and 'proletarian physics'. In fact, it is now the Soviet philosophers who are on the defensive. A well-known Soviet philosopher formulated this attitude as follows: Today dialectical

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materialism recognises everything which results from and is proved by science.

Once a regime accepts the proposition that a theory is to be tested by experiment rather than by dogma, the demand for the autonomy of science inevitably follows. And what begins as private accommodation often breaks out into the open. In a remarkable article entitled 'The Authority of Facts: Concerning the Scientific Heritage and Dogmatism' (*Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 24 February 1962), Professor V. V. Parin, a Member of the USSR Academy of Medicine, wrote: 'The main harm caused to science by the cult of the individual lay in the proclamation of a single opinion, a single viewpoint, as an " inexhaustible fount of wisdom ", as the supreme truth. One could cite numerous examples, beginning with *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR* [i.e. Stalin's last written work] and the grasslands crop rotation shibboleths in farming'.

But what begins also as one more routine endorsement of the twenty-second Party congress turns unexpectedly into a plea for genuine experimentation in all fields of science, and in particular into a defence of revisions of Pavlovian theory in physiology which had caused anguished cries from the party dogmatists. The strategy, it seems, is to open with a discussion of the revisions in physics, a field which now seems to be sacrosanct, to move on into biology, and then into the 'softer' scientific fields. By counterposing 'experiment' and 'fact' to 'dogmatism' (a word applied equally by Khrushchev to the Chinese) the demand for more freedom in science is advanced.

The same strategy now seems to be at work among the economists. In *Izvestia* recently (7 April 1962) in a column headed 'Economic Reflections', there appeared an article entitled 'Are Experiments needed only in Physics?'. In it the author remarks that he 'envies the engineers, the technicians and designers'. When a problem arises in technology, the scientists are allowed to experiment, but when, as he recalls from a meeting of the Estonian *Sovnarkhoz*, a report was received that a plant had suffered a drop in production because of an innovation in wage incentives, the answer is 'we must put an end to experimenting'. But 'can the young economic science of socialism do without experiments' in creating 'new forms for the economic organisation of society?', he asks. And the writer, having set forth his base-line, proceeds to offer some simple but biting comments on the 'extreme centralisation of distribution' in the USSR.

It is quite true, as Alexander Gerschenkron most recently has argued, that the questions of economic decentralisation are intimately linked with the problems of party control; yet there is also a widening area of simple rationality before which outmoded theories and sometimes even political dogmas have to bend. One of the most important Marxian dogmas, that the interest rate (in conformity with the labour theory of value) was only a form of exploitation, fell before the practical necessity of admitting that capital commands a price because of its scarcity. In the choice between

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ideology and rational expedience, the issue went undecided so long as Stalin lived. A year after his death, the ideology was quietly shelved. In effect, the interest rate was admitted as a necessary mechanism in capital allocation.

Perhaps the touchstone is input-output analysis, which had been originated in the Soviet Union by Professor L. V. Kantorovich (and developed by Wassily Leontieff at Harvard), but which had been condemned by orthodox Stalinist economists because of Kantorovich's critical evaluation of the Marxist theory of value. Although Soviet economists still seek to determine prices on the basis of value, it becomes increasingly evident that such exercises are scholastic, and that with the development of inter-industry balance sheets, theory, as well as practice, moves to the acceptance of market prices.

The hostility of the 'liberal' Soviet writers and novelists to socialist realism and even to the idea of *partiinost* in literature since the thaw has been amply documented in the last issue of *Survey* and elsewhere.

The alienation of the youth seems to be a major problem for the Soviet leadership, because for the post-Stalin generation the appeal of 'the party' has become tarnished. One sees this sharply in the stories printed in the journal *Yunost* (Youth); many of them, reflecting the thoughts and aspirations of the younger generation, sound a common theme—of running away from it all, of running away from home, from school, from discipline, and from duty. As Alexander Gerschenkron remarks, 'there is more to this literature than exposure of the seamy side of Soviet life. . . . When one of the younger heroes says: "We have no theories", when a young physician in another novel expresses his disgust at all those sickening "high-falutin words", at all those "verbal fetishisms" . . . [such] views are an open challenge to a state that forces every one of its subjects into an ideological strait-jacket. For "theories" and the "high-falutin words" obviously refer to the totality of official values'.

In seeking to confront these moods, the party has tried at times to appeal to broader loyalties. In some instances, the ideal of *narodnost*, or civic-mindedness, replaces the idea of party-mindedness. This emphasis on the country rather than the party may be one means for the regime to reconcile the young writers and intellectuals. But if the basic note of *partiinost* becomes so diluted, it must begin to erode the central ideology itself; and such erosion inevitably brings into question the leading role of the party itself. How far this tricky theme of *narodnost* will go remains to be seen.

One of the most daring steps that Khrushchev took to re-assert the primacy of ideology, was to re-open boldly the prospect of the 'withering away of the State'. The fundamental implication was that 'we have not forgotten our Leninist promise, even if Stalin did'. Throughout 1960 and 1961, in preparation for the twenty-second congress, articles appeared in *Voprosy Filosofii* on the 'communist society of the future'. And new institutions such as the 'comrades courts' have been

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hailed by Khrushchev as the taking over by the people themselves—the first step in the withering away of the State—of the tasks of 'enforcing public order and the rules of socialist society'.

The basic premise—that the material and technical basis of the society has to be expanded before full communism is reached—of course remains. But the Stalinist thesis that the State must become stronger because of the intensification of the class struggle has been discarded. And in its place has come the new doctrine that the State will wither away when all the socialist countries 'enter the higher phase of communist society more or less simultaneously'. In effect, promises rather than terror has become the chief means of the regime in mobilising the population. And in the reorganisation of the police and in the new decrees on legality, Khrushchev has sought to show that the severe measures of the past are now eliminated. The transitional nature of all controls has once more been emphasised, though naturally no date is given as to when these controls will disappear. The party once again takes on a vanguard, rather than repressive, role in relation to the society.

The central question, of course, is how successful this new ideological counter will be. For the masses of people there is the simple test, as it always has been, of how fast the standard of living will keep rising; and here the regime has to balance its military commitments, foreign aid programmes, prestige campaigns such as sputniks and space exploration, against the demand for more consumer goods. The immediate emphasis on economic rationality and better planning is a vigorous effort to increase productivity without making any basic new re-allocations in the investment programme.

But for the intelligentsia, especially the stratum that articulates ideas, the simple promise of communism and the 'withering away of the State' may no longer suffice as a meaningful belief-system or ideology. In manifold and complicated ways, the entire theoretical structure of Marxism-Leninism is coming into question. The Pandora's box of Stalinism cannot be shut so easily, particularly as more and more bizarre details of the period and the post-Stalin struggle for power come out into the open.

How does one explain such a political system—merely as the consequence of a 'cult of personality'? As the Italian communist Senator Terracini wrote in *L'Unita*, on 12 November 1961: 'Responsibility in fact extends beyond Stalin to the whole of the ruling group of the Stalin epoch. . . . It was absurd to believe that the monstrous process of degeneration suddenly unveiled at the 20th congress could have had one sole author and actor. . . . Hence the inevitable, even if unformulated, question whether other denunciations might not be forthcoming in the future, even going so far as to sweep away Comrade Khrushchev himself'.

The demand for fuller explanations of Stalinism inevitably calls the central ideology into question. Equally there arises the problem of

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explaining, on Marxist-Leninist grounds, the rupture between the communist states. How to explain the differences between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in the 1950s, or the Soviet Union and China and Albania in the 1960s, on the basis of 'class analysis'? And as, in successive communist countries, men like Lazslo Rajk in Hungary or Traicho Kostov in Bulgaria, are posthumously rehabilitated, how does one specify, 'objectively', in accord with Marxist-Leninist doctrine, who or what is 'anti-Party' and who or what is not? After all, the lives of the leaders depend on such specifications. Such questions have already arisen in the Italian Communist party, and they will spread to others. And on these crucial ideological questions the Soviet theoreticians, apart from talking of 'errors', have been silent.

On the domestic scene a different, more evanascent ideological problem looms. The efforts by the scientists to pursue experiment and truth, regardless of the effect on past dogmas, has in its own way already called the doctrine of *partiinost* into question. But such doubts are part of a deeper, more pervasive challenge which inevitably begins to question even the theoretical 'Marxist humanism' which lies at the foundations of the promise of communism. The heart of all Marxist humanism, at its best, is the idea that 'Man' will 'realise himself' only by working with others, only through the collective. But the deepest desires, at least of the Soviet young people, seem to be for a new individualism. The attractions of jazz, of abstract art and of Beat poetry (which seems to be spreading among the young Soviet intelligentsia), are negative expressions from the Soviet point of view precisely because they involve, implicitly, the nihilistic rejection of the collective. Classically, the mood of idealistic disillusionment has always provoked a call for a return to the 'old' ideals—and one sees much of this in the public poetry of Evtushenko and others, in their need to find some roots in the purity of the Revolution. But beneath these public expressions one can also sense the private desire, inchoate as it is, to be left alone, to relax, to carve out some sphere of individual life immune from the constant party calls even for 'civic-mindedness'.

When one combines this mood of the young intelligentsia with *embourgeoisment* of the technical class in the Soviet Union (a demand for a new style of life with its classic demands for personal comforts and status symbols), then one can mark out a more pervasive feeling which threatens to erode the ideology of communism in the Soviet Union.

The function of an ideology is not only to provide a social map of a society but equally to provide a set of justifications for the existing boundaries or for the direction in which change is pointed. The further function of ideology is to provide an *elan* or a passion for action (as in the early years of the Revolution), for ideology in this case means a voluntary compliance with the demands of the party. Given the monopoly of force, the party can still re-institute repressive measures, once again re-introduce Zhdanovism in the arts. But now that the Idol has

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been smashed, the rationalisation for terror will no longer be believed. Only ideology—and material incentives—remain as 'coercive' devices. And the ideology itself is no longer easy to maintain. It may well be that one day Khrushchev's successor will say to a party congress, about the new problems of individualism, what Lenin said in 1922 (in his report to the eleventh congress justifying the New Economic Policy of state capitalism), 'It did not even occur to Marx to write a word about this subject; and he died without leaving a single precise quotation or irrefutable argument; that is why we must get out of the difficulty entirely by our own efforts'.

And that point may well mark the end of ideology in the Soviet Union as well.

VICTOR ERLICH It is difficult to discuss a prospective 'erosion of ideology' without identifying the status and content of ideology in present-day Russia. I for one would like to argue that much of the original canon had been eroded well before Khrushchev's ascendancy. The treatment of Marxism-Leninism in the Stalin era was both ritualistic and cynical. Depending on the 'objective conditions' or on the current propaganda target, important facets of the doctrine were now piously invoked, now ignored or falsified beyond recognition. Several tenets, e.g. egalitarianism, proletarian internationalism, principled opposition to racial discrimination, had been quietly discarded or subverted. In Chapter Four of *The Short History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, the Marx-Engels-Lenin version of dialectical materialism had been partly emasculated. In the process of a totalitarian coarsening and manipulation of Bolshevik ideology 'the means have swallowed the ends'—organisational loyalty has become the central virtue, and apotheosis of the vehicle of the World Revolution—the Communist Party and its chief bastion, the Soviet Union—its chief tenet. Beyond that the operational content of the ideology which Russia's present rulers have inherited from Stalin can be boiled down without much simplification to the following propositions: (1) There is an irreconcilable conflict between 'us' and 'them' (this fundamental truth is liable to be obscured at times but is not denied by intermittent peace manoeuvres aimed chiefly at confusing and demobbing the enemy). (2) Total planning is intrinsically superior to 'capitalist anarchy', a label which encompasses not only modified capitalism of the American version but the social-democratic version of mixed economy as well. (3) 'Capitalism' in all its forms is doomed as it is rent by internal antagonisms, yet its demise must be expedited from the outside by various methods at the disposal of world-wide communist movements, preferably short of a major war. (4) The communist movement and the communist system embody the inexorable progress and the will of History; thus, in furthering its objectives, they have both the right and the duty to perpetuate total controls wherever they are in power and

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to extend such controls over as wide an area as possible. There is no reason to doubt Khrushchev's allegiance to all these residual assumptions.

Of course, Khrushchev and his associates are not going to last indefinitely. In the long run Soviet policy and ethos are likely to be affected by the attitudes of the rising generation. Recent reports seem to indicate that a number of younger Russian technicians, managers, and intellectuals do not feel too strongly about some of the above propositions. The growing impatience with the official shibboleths, the apparent tendency to replace history-mongering communist expansionism with an unaggressive Soviet patriotism, a pride in the achievements of Soviet science and technology, all these syndromes, if widespread and persistent, are likely to register sooner or later. But for the time being, that is, during the next decade, I do not expect this 'erosion of ideology' to progress very rapidly. The party needs at least a semblance of ideology in order to legitimise its monopoly of power. And the party as a decision-making agency has grown stronger rather than weaker since Stalin's death.

RICHARD PIPES: No. Ideology, in the sense of a particular world outlook, has become profoundly impressed on the Soviet regime and its entire ruling class. It is inconceivable that communist society should survive without it. But this is not to say that ideology will not change. Ever since 1917 ideology has been transforming itself from a concrete and immanent force into a more and more vague and syncretic abstraction. This transformation occurs in all religious movements, theistic and not, as a result of prolonged contact with political reality. I would expect ideologists of the Soviet regime to make very skilful periodic adjustments of a semantic and even fundamental kind to harmonise ideology with reality. The manner in which Einsteinian physics has been embraced, once it became expedient to do so, by the simple device of proclaiming Einstein an 'unconscious materialist', may serve as an example of such procedure. This does not mean, however, an erosion of ideology, because ideology, no matter how much adjusted and adapted, is likely to remain a vital source of Soviet conduct. Behind the hope of Soviet ideological erosion, there lies, I suspect, wishful thinking on the part of Westerners, as well as a constitutional inability of societies which have already undergone cataclysmic spiritual upheavals to understand those which are in its throes. Those who expect an erosion of ideology vastly underestimate the fervour of the Russian ruling elite.

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CULTURAL TRENDS

What do you think have been the most outstanding cultural achievements since 1953?

GEORGE L. KLINE: Four developments stand out from the general drift of Soviet culture during the post-Stalin decade: (1) A partial undoing of the Stalinist falsification of Russian and Soviet political and cultural history. (2) A disclosure of the vitality and scope of the 'cultural underground'. (3) An increased, though still limited, access to non-Soviet culture. (4) An incipient awareness that cultural pluralism is not incompatible with political orthodoxy. To take each in turn:

(1) In his last years, Stalin and his ideologues made copious use of Orwellian 'memory-holes', shaping a galaxy of political and cultural 'unpersons' out of whole historical cloth. Trotsky headed the political sub-galaxy, but Bukharin, Zinoviev, and Radek stood not far off. Prominent in the *cultural* sub-galaxy were Meyerhold (theatre), Akhmatova, Tsvetaeva, and Mandelshtam (poetry), Olesha (novel), Zoshchenko and Ilf-and-Petrov (satire), Stuchka and Pashukanis (jurisprudence). Not all of these historical shadows have been given flesh: Trotsky remains in Soviet limbo, despite some feeling among Italian communists after the 22nd CPSU congress that 'the time had come to re-evaluate his historical role'. But Bukharin and Radek—like Stuchka and Pashukanis—are being 'judicially rehabilitated'; Meyerhold is fully restored; Akhmatova, Tsvetaeva, and early Pasternak, as well as Olesha, Zoshchenko, and Ilf-and-Petrov have been brought back to cultural life through fresh printings of their selected works. Such rehabilitations are an important first step in the post-Stalin expansion of cultural and intellectual freedom. But it will require more, and more drastic, steps to restore a tolerable balance to the lopsided Stalinist image of pre- and post-1917 Russian history.

Cultural rehabilitation has not yet reached the plastic arts; the superb collections of paintings from before and after the first world war by Kandinsky, Chagall, Malevich, Filonov, and Goncharova (to name only the best known) remain behind locked doors in the 'closed reserves' of Soviet museums, accessible only to the thinnest trickle of specialists.

(2) Sporadic rumours leaked out of Stalinist Russia in the years after the second world war testifying to the existence of a non-conforming 'cultural underground'. The years since 1953, and especially since 1956, have brought abundant evidence that there is in fact a vital and independent underground movement in Soviet culture. A series of arresting literary works, unpublished and unpublishable in the Soviet Union, have appeared abroad. In addition to Pasternak's *Dr Zhivago*, there is Abram Tertz's novel *The Trial Begins*, I. Ivanov's play *Is there Life on Mars?*, Yesenin-Volpin's cycle of poems 'A Leaf of Spring', and the same author's 'Free Philosophical Treatise'—along with a variety of interesting minor works. Many unpublished poems, plays, short stories, even

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motion-picture scripts, circulate in the Soviet Union in typescript or mimeographed form. Underground work in the plastic arts is equally vigorous; in recent years many of its products have come to the attention of a wide non-Soviet public.

Soviet culture in the coming decade—if it escapes *re*-Stalinisation—may see the gradual public emergence of these subterranean currents. An encouraging straw in the cultural wind is the semi-public status that non-conformist art has achieved in such provincial cities as Riga and Tbilisi, which, in this respect, stand far in advance of Leningrad and Moscow.

(3) During the past decade the Soviet public has been increasingly exposed to non-Soviet culture and ideology, although this exposure remains weak and spotty compared to that in Poland, Yugoslavia, and even Czechoslovakia. These countries, Poland most of all, serve as channels through which non-Soviet culture flows into the Soviet Union; since about 1958 the flow has slackened, but it has not yet dried up.

There has been greater cultural hospitality towards the non-Soviet *past* than towards the *present* (or near-past). There is nothing by way of 'abstract expressionism', for example, to match the impressionist and early post-impressionist collections in Soviet galleries. Whitman and Melville have been translated, but only the minutest sampling of Faulkner's work has been published—although boxes of manuscript translation languish in the 'underground'. There are still *no* translations of Kafka, Camus, Valéry, Eliot....

Spinoza, Rousseau, and Hegel have been retranslated, but not Plato, Nietzsche, or Kierkegaard. Translations of contemporary philosophers have been limited to works in logic and epistemology, such as Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Carnap's *Meaning and Necessity*, and Bertrand Russell's *Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits*. There have been one or two historical studies, including an abridgement of Russell's *History of Western Philosophy*. The first serious discussion of (as yet untranslated) Whitehead appeared in 1962. The few scattered Soviet discussions of Dewey, Cassirer, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, Jaspers, and Wittgenstein (all but the last untranslated) are perfunctory and tendentious.

(4) Evgeni Evtushenko is neither Khrushchev's 'court poet' nor the 'angry young man' of Soviet letters, although he has been identified as both. Politically conformist and intellectually 'safe', Evtushenko nevertheless marks the beginning of what may prove to be a significant trend in Soviet cultural policy. A professed Marxist-Leninist of tested political purity, he is open and sensitive to the plural forms of non-socialist-realist culture, forms which Stalinists have always branded as 'decadent' and 'reactionary'. When the Soviet government made two recent quasi-Stalinist moves— putting down opposition at the Helsinki Youth Festival and putting up missile installations in Cuba—Evtushenko's response was prompt and partisan; he heaped Mayakovskian invective upon the 'trouble-makers' who were resisting the wise decisions of his government.

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His 'Letter to America', written in Havana and transmitted by telephone to Moscow (*Pravda*, 25 October 1962), is distinguishable only in form (rhymed iambic pentameter!) from Zorin's diatribes in the Security Council. But one stanza strikes a fresh note:

> Putting aside debates and brushes,
> *Realists* and *abstractionists*
> Rush through the rain along the quay,
> Grimly checking their guns.

The implication is clear: two-party culture is no threat to one-party politics; cultural pluralism is fully compatible with political monism. When the 'imperialist' enemy approaches, abstract painters as well as (socialist) realists leap to the defence of Fidel's Revolution. Evtushenko here attempts to allay the lingering Stalinist suspicion that to open the door to non-socialist-realism in art and literature is to open a Pandora's box of 'alien ideologies', and hence of potential political subversion.

Soviet policy-makers still operate on the premise that political single-mindedness presupposes cultural single-mindedness: one party, one culture. Whether Evtushenko, a politically loyal apologist for cultural pluralism, can persuade them to abandon that fateful premise remains a central question for the second post-Stalin decade.

RICHARD PIPES: In terms of tangible cultural 'product', nothing created since 1953 can qualify as an outstanding *Soviet* achievement. The only literary works of true merit to have come out of Russia in the past decade, such as Pasternak's or Akhmatova's, can be in no way considered Soviet, because they were written by authors quite out of sympathy with the Soviet government and were indeed inspired by profoundly anti-Soviet sentiments. It is not in books, paintings, or plays produced since Stalin's death that we must seek signs of a cultural maturation of Soviet Russia, but in the less tangible realm of taste. The twenty-five years of Stalin's tyranny destroyed nothing so effectively as taste, whose survival, always so tenuous, depends on cultural and social continuity, freedom, and some degree of material well-being. When Stalin died, Soviet society lacked the elementary standards by which to judge literature and art, and public taste had to be revived. No one who has visited the Soviet Union at one- or two-year intervals during the past decade can doubt that such a revival has taken place. Several factors have made this possible: the relative increase in creative freedom, thanks to which art can establish its own canons of right and wrong; contact with Western models, which provide standards by which Soviet achievement can be measured; and an improvement in living conditions. Creators and public alike now have some standards by which to judge, and slowly but perceptibly develop criteria of good taste. Culture, which for Stalin, as for all despots, comprised only that which was either dead or irrelevant—and therefore safe—has gradually come to be reinfused with life and spontaneity. Against this

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background, the emergence in Russia of a true culture capable of producing lasting achievements has become once more a possibility.

VICTOR ERLICH: May I rephrase the question before answering it? Outside of science and technology—and those are matters on which I do not feel competent to comment—I am not aware of any 'outstanding Soviet cultural achievements since 1953'. (A considerable improvement, from the standpoint of methodological sophistication and scholarly rigour, can be discerned in such humanistic disciplines as linguistics and literary history. But to speak about major achievements in this field would be something of an exaggeration.) The recent trends in Soviet literature, which for obvious reasons have been widely commented on in the West, are more properly described as significant and often heartening *symptoms* than as impressive *accomplishments*. It is by now a truism that nearly all the major manifestations of the literary 'thaw' are of interest not as works of literature but as human or social documents, as testimony that years of totalitarian brain-washing and doublethink had failed to eradicate the yearning for candour, spontaneity, personal decency, and emotional privacy. Esthetically, the 'thaw' literature ranges from the third-rate to the second-rate. Dudintsev's *Not by Bread Alone* is nearly as drab as the conformist production novel whose premises it challenges. Evtushenko's stance is often refreshing; he seems to have the courage of his convictions. Yet, for all his rhetorical effectiveness, he is a facile and derivative poet. (True, he is not the most genuine lyrical talent in his generation.)

Of course, there is the 'underground' literature which in some respects is most interesting, if possibly less representative. In Tertz's remarkable essay and his stories, especially *The Trial Begins*, a thoroughgoing ideological non-conformism is coupled with a repudiation of official Soviet esthetics, an attempt to reach beyond social realism towards non-realistic modes of expression. The results are spotty—a weird mixture of nearly surrealistic suggestiveness with naiveté and clumsiness. Years of socialist-realist aridity must have taken a heavy toll. Moreover, it seems that esthetic standards are more perishable than the basic human values. It will take decades, I'm afraid, before Soviet literature will be capable of 'outstanding achievements'. As Hugh McLean recently put it in the *Slavic Review*, 'The Russians will have to go to school again as they did in the 18th century to find out what literature is and how to go about making it'. Yet the reassertion of old-fashioned moral absolutes is not entirely beside the point here. Noble sentiments alone can't produce good literature. But the plea for truth and sincerity is a plea for a climate in which significant literary achievements may again be feasible.

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CULTURAL RELATIONS

How can cultural relations with nations in the Communist bloc be best promoted in the coming years ?

VICTOR ERLICH: By keeping all relevant channels open; chiefly, by maintaining and strengthening the cultural exchanges between the Western countries and the nations in the communist bloc. The experience accumulated hitherto offers little basis for optimism regarding the scope of, and immediate benefits from, these contacts. The American-Soviet graduate student and faculty exchange programme with which I have been closely associated has not been an unalloyed success. Yet, on balance, the advantages have clearly outweighed the drawbacks. In addition to acquiring a valuable insight into Soviet society and culture, the Western students—at least some of them—apparently managed to establish a genuine rapport with a number of thoughtful and relatively open-minded young Russians.

The faculty exchanges have barely started. Clearly, they ought to be promoted. So should the international congresses and conferences in which *bona fide* intellectuals from communist-controlled countries are likely to take part. As in all realms, difficulties and rewards will vary depending on the nation involved. The ' dialogue ' with the Polish intellectuals has been almost invariably fruitful, whether held in Warsaw or, say, Cambridge, Mass. The other satellites, and, to be sure, the Soviet Union, are more likely to weigh down their official delegations by ' safe ' bureaucrats. Yet in their endeavour to make a good impression, especially where scientists are involved, the communist authorities will at times be impelled to include genuine scholars. These are the men and women whom their Western counterparts ought to try to reach, above the heads of the hard-faced and impregnable party hacks.

RICHARD PIPES: We ought to support, encourage, and promote in every possible manner all the healthy (i.e. free and spontaneous) artistic and intellectual currents in the communist bloc. We ought to do all we can to help liberate culture from ideological control and political exploitation. The first of these objectives can be attained by making the greatest possible use of opportunities provided by existing cultural exchanges. The second, by helping Soviet writers and artists, through a merciless but fair critique of their works, to achieve the highest possible standards. The Soviet authorities are very sensitive to Western critique (provided it is not obviously political in motivation), because, for all their boasting, they are clearly conscious of the cultural superiority of the West. Exposure of the political shackles which constrain Soviet culture, of anachronisms, fanaticisms, vulgarities forced on creators by communist regimes, represents, in my opinion, the most effective way in which Westerners can help promote genuine cultural relations with the communist bloc in the coming years.

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ECONOMIC GROWTH

How do you assess the prospects of Soviet economic growth in the next decade?

ALEC NOVE: Assuming that no further 'crash' military programmes will disrupt economic advance, one must expect that basic industries will grow rapidly, and that by the end of the decade the USSR will in fact be able to announce with a flourish of trumpets that America has been overtaken in the production of a list of commodities, such as steel, cement, natural fabrics, and so on. Aggregate industrial production may well approach American levels, though not per capita, by 1970. There is no reason why a country which invests in industrial growth, and which still gives priority to the achievement of increases in output over other desiderata, should not continue to outpace America. The more so as the US market is saturated for a wide range of products, and so large a proportion of US economic activities is concerned with services of all kinds rather than with material production. Of course, the problem of measuring Soviet progress, in relation to its own past or to the United States, is a very complex one, which cannot be discussed here. The question can only be answered in the broadest terms.

However, even in these terms, one must raise a rather different question, which is already relevant to the assessment of Soviet growth and must become more relevant as the economy grows more 'sophisticated': this concerns the quality, durability, and usefulness of the product. So long as one is concerned with relatively homogeneous products, such as oil, cement, steel, electricity, growth can be fairly readily measured in terms generally recognised as meaningful. If we say that steel output has doubled, or that it is three quarters that of the United States, these statements have some sort of meaning—though even here one must not overlook the existence of steels of different kinds. However, a comparison of rolling mill products is already complicated by the fact that the Soviet 'success indicator' system stimulates waste: the heavier the product, the easier it is to fulfil the plan. The Soviet press is full of reports showing that certain products are made which are inefficient, while efficient alternatives are ignored, for reasons which form an integral part of the planning system. This point arises again on a later question. At the moment, we must only consider its relevance to growth statistics. Suppose, to take actual examples from issues of *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta*, the dental equipment industry produces fillings and dentures which disintegrate rapidly, or that unproductive and clumsy metallurgical equipment is being produced, or that the Likhachev automobile factory continues to make an out-of-date lorry for ten years and more, or that the clothing industry makes suits which citizens are ashamed to wear. None of these defects shows in output and growth statistics. The replacement of poor quality goods by better ones requires, in each case, some reduction

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in conventional productivity statistics (more careful workmanship, a halt for retooling, the use of a different and perhaps cheaper material, etc.). There would certainly be a gain for the national economy, and for the citizen. But in most instances the price of the better commodity or service will not differ from the old. How would the gain be measured? Is it in fact measurable? If dental fillings last six years instead of six months, the statistical effect is that fewer of them are needed, and fewer visits to dentists occur. This represents a *diminution* in recorded economic activities, and a net *rise* in real welfare (accentuated in this case by the acute disutility of sitting in a dentist's chair).

The serious point being made here is that, as the USSR approaches American levels in the output of some basic commodities, real progress will increasingly depend on the flexible adjustment of production to the real requirements of society, and also on the provision of a wider variety of services. This is widely recognised in the USSR itself. The point is that the system is not geared to fulfil these purposes, and is geared to achieve rapid growth where it can be conveniently measured in quantitative terms. If, by reforming the planning system, this bias is removed, we may see a slowdown in growth which will be accentuated by the very factors which now exaggerate it, operating in reverse: better quality and greater durability of machines, cloth, dental fillings, etc., would be achieved at the ' cost ' of reduced growth indicators.

Finally, it is my belief that a reform of planning, especially in the supply system, is quite indispensable if major inefficiencies in the use of resources are to be corrected. Otherwise the economy may be overwhelmed by the growing complexities of planning. But more of this below.

ABRAM BERGSON: How rapidly is the Soviet economy growing? What are the prospects for its expansion in the future? The inquiry that has been submitted to me I believe calls especially for comment on these familiar but properly still-much-discussed questions.

Stalin died on 5 March 1953. For the eight years that followed, the Soviet government claims that the USSR was able to expand its national income at an average rate of 9·7 per cent a year. Judging from independent Western calculations, the correct figure probably is about 6 per cent. This is still a rapid tempo. While not by any means unprecedented in Western experience, it compares favourably enough with the rate of increase, 2·7 per cent, which was realised contemporaneously by the country which the USSR seeks above all to overtake and surpass, the United States.

As for the future, in expanding output in recent years the Russians have been able to rely only to a very limited extent on increases in employment of labour. In other words, the expansion has been achieved predominantly through increases in output per worker. Moreover, if we may judge at all from available population projections, employment

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is not likely to increase any more rapidly in the coming years than it has recently. Possibly the tempo will decline, though in hourly terms the government might avoid such a trend if it should decide to postpone the promised reduction in the work week to 35 hours by 1964-68. By the same token, the growth in output must still turn in the future, as it has done in the recent past, primarily on the increase in productivity. What are the prospects in this regard?

Any serious appraisal must consider to begin with that, owing to limitations in the volume and quality of natural resources, production in the USSR as elsewhere is subject to diminishing returns. In the coming years, the limitations will be felt generally, but they should be relatively weighty in agriculture, for the USSR in terms of soil and climate is not nearly so well endowed agriculturally as its great land surface might suggest. Recent experience is a dramatic reminder of this, particularly the already reduced returns on the vast new acreage taken into cultivation during 1955–58. Thus, in Tselinny krai, the heartland of this acreage, even according to dubious official figures, the grain harvest, which was not especially high to begin with, has steadily declined since, being 14·3 million tons in 1958, 13·9 millions in 1959, 12·9 millions in 1960, and 10·3 in 1961.

Then, too, in expanding output lately, the Russians have still been able to profit from opportunities to borrow new technology from the West, and to extend to industry generally new technology previously borrowed but as yet incorporated only in advanced enterprises. This 'advantage of backwardness' is already no longer so important as it was in the thirties, and as the economy continues to advance in the future its role necessarily will decline further. Of course, the USSR now has a large corps of scientists and engineers of its own, indeed one that can stand comparison with that of the USA, and the government is devoting large and increasing sums to research. As opportunities to profit from foreign technology dwindle, therefore, self-generated innovation will be something of an offset, so far as productivity is concerned.

Closely related to but not the same thing as the state of technology is economic efficiency. To weigh from this standpoint the impact of the extraordinary changes in economic organisation, principles, and procedures that have occurred since Stalin is a difficult task indeed, but by all accounts the Soviet planning system still leaves much to be desired in respect of economic efficiency, and the succession of reforms testifies at least to the serious concern of the government to exploit such 'hidden reserves'. Moreover, the government has also seen fit recently to allow Soviet economists a degree of discretion to explore and debate alternative techniques that for decades under Stalin was quite unheard of. As everyone knows, even branches of 'bourgeois' theory, such as input-output analysis and linear programming, are no longer beyond the pale.

By implication, so far as returns diminish and technological progress slows, the Russians may still be able to avoid a retardation in productivity

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increases by raising economic efficiency. In seeking such a result for their planning system, however, the USSR will be treading new and as yet unexplored ground, and what it will be able to achieve remains to be seen.

What has been said refers to the efficiency of the planning system generally. In agriculture, chiefly because of the use of the state farm in the execution of the new lands programme, the notorious collective farm is no longer as important as it once was, but it is still predominant, and avowedly the government will continue to rely heavily on it in the coming years. When we consider the adverse natural endowment, we see that the Soviet collective farm is not quite so inefficient as is often supposed, but future gains in this regard are likely to be modest. There are indications, however, that the government at long last is preparing the ground for the transformation of the collective farms into state farms. Among other things, in place of their customary cooperative shares, collective farm members are increasingly being paid a money income of a sort very much like the money wage of state farm employees. If due allowance is made for differences in capital and quality of land, how the state farm compares with the collective farm in productivity is a complex matter on which the facts are still not very clear. Nevertheless, particularly in regard to grain growing, the state farm probably is often superior to the collective farm, as Soviet economists maintain, but to what extent the higher productivity would survive the conversion of the latter into the former, especially if this is at all abrupt, is another matter. More generally, how much progress will be made in agricultural efficiency will surely depend very much on the prudence and restraint exercised in respect of farm policy and administration, and these are qualities which so far the arbitrary and impatient government has found it difficult to realise.

If labour productivity has risen rapidly in the past, not least of the reasons is the authoritarian political control that is maintained over capital investment, and it would unhappily be highly optimistic to suppose that this will not persist. Indeed, given such control, one might wonder whether through its exercise alone the government could not offset or more than offset any and all forces making for retardation. But the Soviet stock of fixed capital is already growing at an extraordinary rate: in the fifties by some 11 per cent per year. Even to maintain this tempo, never mind to increase it, will be a difficult task, for it would not suffice for this merely to maintain at past levels the share of the national income currently devoted to new capital investment. Rather the government would have continually to raise this share. This important fact is still not always understood, but that it is so is readily seen when it is considered that the capital stock has been growing much more rapidly than output, and that, given the relatively modest growth in employment of labour, it has only been on this basis that it has been possible to expand output at all rapidly to begin with. The share of income going to capital investment would have to rise even if in the future output continued to grow

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at the past tempo. If, because of retarding forces elsewhere, output should slow down, the rate of investment would have to rise still more.

By implication, the share of national income available for consumption would have to fall. If the tempo of growth of income should be maintained or not decline much, total consumption and even consumption per capita could still increase, but the gains in the latter would have to be modest, and no doubt would seem only more so to a people like the Russians who have waited so long and have lately been led by their government to expect so much. Thus, even supposing that there should be no retarding forces elsewhere, and with the capital stock growing no more rapidly than before, output should continue in the future to grow at 6 per cent. If allowance is made for the investment needed currently to ensure a continued expansion of the capital stock by 11 per cent, according to a crude calculation, consumption per capita during the sixties might rise by 2·3 per cent or $9·00 to $12·00 a year from the 1960 level of (say) $400 per capita. This would be respectable progress, but the result would hardly be the affluence that has been promised. If, because of retarding forces elsewhere, output should tend to grow less rapidly than 6 per cent, consumption would increase still less.

In deciding on its future policy on investment the government must consider such possible consequences. As we may judge from the continuing stress on heavy industry compared with consumer goods industries, it has already determined to increase further the rate of investment, but how much is a momentous matter which it no doubt will only decide in the light of the circumstances of the time.

The future consumption of communal services, particularly education and health care, is conjectural, but for purposes of this calculation they are taken to increase proportionately with national income. Hence, with their inclusion in consumption, this category might grow somewhat more rapidly than was indicated. Actually, under its new programme the party has committed itself to expand sharply the scope of communal services in the coming years. Among other things, housing in time is to be supplied free of charge instead of (as now) at a nominal rental. But such rearrangements would be purely financial, and could not affect at all the underlying realities of the matter, particularly the total supply of consumer goods that will be made available.

For purposes of hypothetical calculation, I also assume that defence outlays will increase proportionately with national income. Should they fail to do so, there would be additional productive resources available for either consumption or investment, as the government might wish; the Russians can only gain economically from disarmament, but on the record to date there is little reason to suppose that the government might determine its future course on disarmament simply on this basis.

In sum, we can hardly foresee with any accuracy the future course of the Soviet economy, but it should be difficult for the Russians in the coming years to maintain the 6 per cent rate of growth of output they

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have realised since Stalin. Still, we must assume that on this count they will continue to outpace the USA, at least for some years to come, but most likely the margin by which they do so will tend to diminish. At the time of writing, prospects for a sharp acceleration of American growth do not seem as bright as they did in November 1960, but a quickening expansion of the labour force is in prospect. Partly for this reason, many US economists feel that in the coming years the USA must grow by at least 3·5 per cent a year. If this rate is realised, the margin between the Soviet and American rates of increase will narrow the more.

In any event, it is premature to talk, as many commentators have been doing, about the Russians' overtaking the United States. This emerges clearly enough from the following hypothetical projections of national income in the two countries. All figures, including those for the USSR, are expressed as percentages of the United States national income in 1960:

	USA with annual increase of		USSR with annual increase of	
	3·0 per cent	4·0 per cent	5·0 per cent	6·0 per cent
1960	100·0	100·0	48·0	48·0
1970	134·4	148·0	78·2	86·0
1980	180·6	219·1	127·3	153·9

Until US growth has accelerated, we might easily discount unduly the Soviet economic challenge, but it is not quite so serious as many in the West have supposed.

PETER WILES: It is a pleasure for Cassandra to revisit the scene of her first moan ('The Soviet Economy outpaces the West', *Foreign Affairs*, 1953). In the nine years since then much has happened, much better information has been made available, and much better theories of economic growth have been worked out. The prediction implied in the title of that article has been splendidly verified *hitherto*, but may it be reasserted with equal confidence? A far better job of analysis can now be done: will it lead to the same result?

I have insisted on replying to the question in the name of the communist bloc as a whole, not the USSR in particular, because of the extreme importance of agriculture everywhere, and because of the great weight in the totals of China. To insist, as I did in 1953, on the future growth of *Soviet industry* would be to score an easy victory over the hazards of prediction. If there was merit in seeing even that much then, there is no point now in labouring what has become obvious: Soviet industry will continue its successful career, close to the top of the world growth league.

But the obvious is still, as so often, important. The second greatest industrial power on earth has moved from c.40 per cent of US industrial

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output in 1955 to c.75 per cent in 1959. Nothing but a hydrogen bomb can stop it catching up and surpassing the USA, just as Stalin said it should, thirty-five years ago. The Soviet rate of growth has fallen off in recent years, and if our analysis is right it will fall further, owing to the agricultural bottleneck. But that should not depress it much below twice the likely US rate.

Agriculture matters just as much, however, and here we may paint a much blacker picture. Khrushchev has wrought innumerable improvements: in incentives, in organisation, and in such state-supplied inputs as fertilisers and capital. But he has also made a consummate ass of himself in the virgin lands, the maize campaign, the continued toleration of Lysenko, and now the order to plough up the fallow. Allow for an increase in overstatement after Khrushchev seized power and began to turn on the heat, and for a quite special overstatement in the bumper year 1958, when the fantastic Chinese claims had to be overtopped, and we get an annual increase in output of perhaps 6 per cent p.a. from 1950–52 to 1957-59. This was very good going indeed, but since that time we see almost complete stagnation (until the 1962 harvest, which looks, as this goes to press, as if it will be better).

Nor is the long-term picture better. All plan targets have been regularly under-fulfilled in the past, yet present plans are equally grandiose. There is no more virgin land, erosion proceeds apace, and the campaign against fallow promises more of it. All popular institutional changes have been made that are ideologically acceptable; the only ones left to make are unpopular, like the reduction of private plots (which would in any case directly reduce output), The notion persists, and even, with the approach to Full Communism, gains ground, that the Central Committee can control nature in some way denied to capitalist governments. So long as this is believed, the succession of Soviet ground-nut schemes will stretch indefinitely into the future.

Of the remainder of the economy (education, medicine, construction, transport, trade, etc.) it is perhaps enough to say that it is very important —hardly ever less than a third of the total, and in many countries over a half. The unwary observer often forgets them. Communism has achieved remarkable successes in many of these fields, and growth in all of them is currently very rapid. This holds even for the fundamentally neglected among them, such as dwelling construction and trade. I can see no way in which either policy errors or natural resource scarcities could in future brake their growth; nor any hope that this growth will cease to outstrip Western growth.

The point is doubly important, because the greatest discoveries of economics in the field of growth since 1953 are that physical investment contributes less and educational investment more than was then supposed. It is quite wrong to think of investment as only bricks and mortar (provided by the construction sector) and machinery (provided by the industrial sector); it is also education—even in terms of mere cost

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education is very large. Moreover, research contributes more to growth than any kind of capital accumulation, even the schooling of the labour force. What needs emphasising here is that communist governments appreciated these points in a practical way long before they were appreciated by Western economists. The shift in growth theory finds communist economies obeying the new rules before they were even formulated; they have always spent very heavily on research and education.

In the communist countries of Eastern Europe the same chiaroscuro picture may be drawn, down to such details as sharp increases in the retail price of food last autumn (USSR and Bulgaria); or new shortages of food not yet met by retail price increases (Czechoslovakia and East Germany). And of course that industry and the rest of the economy are forging ahead need not be documented.

It is common to make too much of the success of Poland's uncollectivised agriculture. Here are the official figures:

Gross agricultural production
(percentage increase p.a.)

	Actual 1950/53–1958/60	Plan, 1961–65
Albania	5·5	11·5
Bulgaria	4·0	
Czechoslovakia	2·0	4·1–4·2
Hungary	3·0	5·4–5·7
Poland	3·0	4·1
Rumania	3·5 (1951/53–1958/60)	9·2–10·3 (1960–65)

Poland is distinguished, then, more by the realism of her future plans than by any really striking past success. The USSR—it is true, at much higher cost in labour and industrial resources—can point to a far greater achievement; and so can the strongly left-wing, super-collectivised agriculture of Bulgaria. The thing about Poland is that her farmers are happy, not specially productive. In every country hitherto mentioned agricultural output is growing faster than population.

Were this the whole communist picture I would unhesitatingly write off the agricultural lag as a somewhat unimportant feature of it. This was my—surely justifiable—attitude in 1953. Now, however, there is a genuinely new element: what may be called the three agricultural slums. Their existence is very important. For man must eat or die, and even communist governments will sacrifice huge quantities of education and metal goods for food when the only alternative is death.

Chinese agriculture is a mystery. There never were any reliable statistics, and now there are no unreliable ones either. It seems clear that: no-one is starving but everyone has been hungry since 1959 inclusive; in 1955–57 people were better fed; in 1958 the towns were ill fed, but

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perhaps only because the Great Leap Forward had disorganised transport; the population continues to increase at an unknown rate; there is a decline in non-food crops, causing a decline in the industrial production based on them; food imports have soared. I infer (deduce would be too strong a word) a decline in agricultural production since 1957. A quite small one would do: 5 per cent off by 1959 and then stagnation would produce a famine if population had grown by 2 per cent p.a.

It is not really obvious why this has happened. That there have been exceptional natural calamities three years running all over a very large country—the official excuse—is unbelievable but not impossible. That it is all due to the horrors of the People's Communes is hardly more believable. These universal and vastly unpopular concentration camps were founded in about May 1958. They had run the whole gamut of Left-Wing Infantilism by December 1958. Since then they have been relaxed and decentralised beyond recognition, almost out of existence. Nor was their original imposition accompanied by a massacre of livestock that would take long to repair—as was Stalin's collectivisation; the Chinese have far fewer livestock to massacre. Three years of continuous concession to human frailty must surely have cancelled out most of the original impact. So, fourthly, we turn to errors of policy. Have the Chinese been ground-nutting too? Does the ghost of Sir Leslie Plummer loom as large in Peking as in Moscow? Seemingly yes, in a less spectacular but very pervasive way: there is erosion and deforestation, the wrong rice seed is used in the wrong place, deep ploughing destroys the paddy-field, peasant energies are diverted into useless backyard industry, etc., etc.

If these be the causes of the Chinese dearth, they are within reason corrigible, indeed are being corrected. It cannot be unreasonable to expect food output to keep pace in future with population (note the new birth-control campaign), albeit beginning from a lower ratio than in the palmy days of 1957. This would leave industry based on technical crops in a very bad way, however, and would necessitate food imports in bad years. It would also be a severe drag on other communist countries, even if they offered no aid—as we may safely presume they will not. For in the good old days China was a great agricultural exporter, providing in 1956 one third of the USSR's agricultural imports.

The Cuban case is not at all one of natural catastrophe, insufficient resources, or Malthusian pressure, but simply of foolish policy decisions, unpopular institutions, and lack of incentives. Now that the Soviet virgin lands are occupied, indeed over-occupied, Cuba is the only communist country with under-employed land. The great policy mistake has been to substitute other food crops for sugar; as if not economic rationality but imperialist wickedness had caused the island to specialise in sugar initially. Uncertainty of tenure for individual peasants, inexperienced management for cooperatives, low agricultural prices, low wages, and a lack of goods to spend them on, have all played their part. These are the government's fault: the US blockade is merely contributory.

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Here, too, it is difficult to believe that stupidity will prevail for ever. As in China, the situation is corrigible, even without sacrificing ideology. The same surely applies to the DDR, where agriculture is again so unsuccessful that we have no official data. The principal trouble here is another elementary mistake: collectivising, indeed having a communist regime at all, with an open border to freedom. The flight of farmers was as menacing as that of doctors and professors, and eventually of course the wall had to be built (August 1961). It is reasonable to predict no further fall, indeed possibly a slight rise, in East German output after this event. Plainly, throughout communist agriculture there are other issues besides collectivism versus individualism; and unpopularity of the former makes it costly but not impossible. Ideology exacts a price, in more fertiliser and tractors to make up for peasant discontent. This price can be paid, and presumably will be. It is the super-imposition of natural calamity and miscellaneous policy errors that brings disaster.

But how different is the Western situation! Where is the communist soil bank, the communist equivalent of untilled pampas, of empty French farms, of burdensome stocks? This extraordinary contrast is what seems to me to be what is most new in competitive coexistence. Agriculture is far from being everything, and it is not even statistically a very important affair (5 per cent of the US national income). Moreover, hydroponics or vitamin pills may render it obsolete, or that philosopher's stone of dietitians, the Directly Digestible Tree-Leaf, may make it ridiculously easy. Yet if the future cannot be foreseen it must be guessed, and my guess is that for the next decade the West will possess an incalculable advantage in its agricultural surpluses. It is a wonderful thing to hit the moon, but in the end even the most dogmatic Afro-Asian must recognise that it is a greater wonder of modern science to export wheat. 70 per cent of the world's communists are under-fed.

Generalising even more dangerously, we can say that the 'West' merely happened to industrialise first. With a more even world-wide spread of techniques, it is not natural or obvious that its export surplus should be industrial. On the contrary, the individualism and enterprise of its citizens, the fertility of its land, and the comparative sparsity of its population dictate that many parts of it (Canada, Australia, New Zealand, USA, Argentina, Uruguay, Eire, even France, Sweden, Holland, and Denmark) should specialise in food, exchanging it for the manufactures of Malthusian Asia, whose proletariat must export or die. That more capital is available in the West is neither here nor there: for agriculture is not, in technically advanced economies, either more or less capital-intensive than industry. What it needs is more land, and these countries have the land. For this food surplus the communist countries and the remainder of the West must compete with S.E. Asia. Individual manufactures may of course be traded in almost any direction, but this is how food will flow.

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Outside the West there are very few natural food exporters: perhaps just Burma and parts of Africa. Thus the NATO powers and certain countries of like mind with them are near-monopolists of food; and at least three of these powers (USA, France, Argentina) have surplus capacity. They could with fair incentives export a great deal more. It follows that where once I was intensely gloomy about the economics of competitive coexistence I am now merely gloomy. Is there not some *political* price China could have been charged for Canadian wheat? We must handle our advantages more imaginatively.

GREGORY GROSSMAN: When the 'western' computations are made in due time it may be found that the Soviet national product nearly doubled in the ten years following Stalin's death. If so, the annual average rate of growth has been seven per cent or something close thereto —a very respectable performance, though not without parallel even in the non-Soviet world. A major factor contributing to this rapid growth has no doubt been the very high proportion of the gross national product consecrated to investment. (The word 'consecrated' is apposite here.) This proportion, the investment rate, computed according to western concepts and *à la* Bergson, averaged about 30 per cent over the ten years, and has been rising steadily since Mr Khrushchev reaffirmed the 'primacy of heavy industry' in early 1955.

Another major contributing factor has been the growth of the labour force, and particularly the very rapid growth of non-agricultural employment. So long as agriculture remains, broadly speaking, a reservoir of under-employed manpower, it is the increase in non-agricultural employment rather than of the total labour force that is crucial for the speed of growth of the Soviet economy as a whole. Non-agricultural employment increased by 50–55 per cent over the decade, i.e. by 4–4½ per cent per annum on the average. The growth of the urban population has been almost as fast. As Mr Khrushchev has pointed out, of the 29 million increment in the total population between 1953 and 1961, some 28 million are accounted for by cities and towns.

We must distinguish, however, between growth and dynamic efficiency. The latter can be conceived as actual growth in relation to the resources devoted to it (in the forms of investment, training, research, and development, efforts expended on taking over foreign technology, and the like), considering also the rate of expansion of the labour force (in this instance, non-agricultural employment). So understood, the dynamic efficiency of the Soviet economy has not been especially high in the past decade. In other words, the Soviet economy has been growing rapidly by devoting a very large proportion of its resources to growth and by rapidly shifting the structure of its labour force in favour of the high-productivity sectors, rather than by converting resources into over-all economic growth in a very efficient manner.

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The last observation takes on added significance if we bear in mind the various advantages, some temporary, that the Soviet economy enjoyed in this regard between the early fifties and the early sixties. Many of them fall into the category of ' advantages of backwardness '.

a. The past decade has been notably a period of ' shake-down ' or assimilation (*osvoenie* is the favourite Russian word) of the advances made in the quarter century between 1928, the start of the first five-year plan, and 1953. The enormous accumulation of productive capital and human skills over most of that quarter century had little opportunity to prove itself fully in Stalin's lifetime. The feverish and almost chaotic construction and training of the early thirties, the collectivisation crisis and its many repercussions, the terror, the Great Purges of the later thirties, preparations for war and the war itself, the grimness of the post-war years, stepped-up militarisation of the economy during the Korean War, and the inadequate and warped incentives to the producers throughout this period—all these and many other factors prevented reasonably full use of what had been acquired with so much toil and suffering. But the inefficiencies of the thirties and forties harboured promise for the fifties. An appreciable part of the rapid growth after Stalin is probably due to the relative normalisation of the political and economic climate and the consequent assimilation of the previously acquired productive capacities and skills.

b. Though postwar reconstruction was virtually completed before he died, Stalin left the Soviet economy technologically still very backward in relation to the West. There was still very much foreign technology to take over, and take it over the Soviets did on a vast scale. Simultaneously, imports of capital goods increased sharply, both from the West and from the more advanced countries of Eastern Europe.

c. Similarly, Stalin left an extremely rigid organisational structure. Its loosening, such as the industrial reorganisation of 1957, helped do away with some waste, at least for a while. (Now once again ' productive forces ' seem to have outrun ' production relations ' in the Soviet economy and the moment of truth in organisational matters is here anew.) As for agriculture, both organisationally and technically it had ' no place to go but up '.

d. Certain ineffective technico-economic policies carried over from the Stalin era were abandoned; e.g. since about 1958, petroleum and natural gas have been stressed in place of coal, and the neglect of the chemical industry is being remedied. The increased growing of maize from 1955 on perhaps belongs in the same category.

e. Some important once-for-all measures also contributed to the growth rate. For instance: the release of hundreds of thousands (or millions?) from the forced-labour camps, and the putting under the plough of 100 million acres in the New Lands.

f. During most of the decade, up to mid-1961, the percentage share of defence in the national product was steadily reduced, and was halved or

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more in the process. The share of fixed capital investment rose by about as many percentage points.

Naturally, not all the developments during the decade were uniquely favourable to growth. Among the unfavourable factors we may cite the reduction of the standard work-week (outside agriculture) from 48 to 40 hours, and the diversion of resources to extend economic and monetary aid to non-communist countries.

What of the next decade? The crystal ball is no less clouded for all the long-range Soviet plans. True, a few major factors can be anticipated with some assurance, always barring what is to be barred. First, the Soviet economy will continue to enjoy many technological opportunities, thanks to its still relatively backward position and to the rapid pace of technical progress the world over. Secondly, skills will continue to grow. Thirdly, between 1962 and 1972 the *total* Soviet labour force will increase in about the same proportions as it did between 1952 and 1962.

However, as we have argued, the increase in the total labour force may not be as important from the standpoint of growth as the increase in non-agricultural employment; and it seems unlikely that now, when it accounts for over half the active population, non-agricultural employment will expand proportionately as fast over the next decade as it did over the preceding one. But the big unknown is, of course, the amount of manpower that agriculture will be able to release; one would have to be very brave to say anything definite on this score. (We may note in passing that the 20-year programme implicitly expects the agricultural population to remain stable, if not diminish slightly, between 1960 and 1970—this however with very ambitious targets for output and productivity.) Other major questions: How much of a drag on growth will be the shortage of urban housing? To what extent will labour productivity respond to higher levels of education and training? Can the pace of automation be substantially quickened? What will happen to the presently very high rate of participation of women in the labour force? Will it be maintained, if not raised, as women acquire more skills and as their wages rise? Or will it decline as men's wages also rise, housing becomes more adequate, and the sense of social urgency perhaps loses in intensity?

Another major unknown relates to the investment rate. There is little doubt that it will continue to increase in the near future, if Soviet plans mean what they imply. (The investment rate may not have risen between 1961 and 1962, but this would be due to the presumably non-recurrent sharp increase in defence expenditures in mid-1961.) How fast it will grow depends in large measure on what happens to the military component of the national product. We may guess that in the near term most of the resources, if any, released from defence would be directed into investment rather than into consumption (though investment in consumer goods industry is not to be excluded), because of the physical nature of such resources, on the one hand, and because of the bottlenecks in investment (construction), on the other. But how much of additional national

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product per annum will each ruble's worth of future investment produce? Soviet plans assume that this ratio, the capital-output ratio, will be declining in the foreseeable future, thus giving investment a higher pay-off in terms of growth. This indeed has been the American experience since at least the turn of the century, and especially since 1929. Yet Soviet experience in the fifties was just the opposite: the national product grew more slowly than the capital stock. Can the trend be reversed?

A substantial reduction in defence outlays presupposes a major reduction in international tension—a prospect that invites speculation regarding the various indirect effects that a change in political climate may have on Soviet economic growth. For example, should Soviet leaders feel more secure at home and abroad, should they be in less of a hurry, should they therefore relax the pressure on the country's economic resources—all very big assumptions—their objections to a thorough decentralisation of planning and economic administration may weaken, and possibly disappear. That the logic of events in a rapidly expanding and maturing economy is already pressing in that direction, is not to be doubted. Should this happen, and should the decentralised organisational solution be an effective one, the favourable effects on the performance of the economy may well exceed those to be derived from the sheer recapture of several per cent of the national product from military use. The enterprise, talent, skill, and inventiveness that are now repressed and restrained by the over-centralised and excessively complex system must in all likelihood be very great; their release may well impart a new dynamic to the economy. At this point the political economist will doubtless object that the investment rate would hardly stay as high in a politically relaxed society as in a taut one. What may be gained by way of resourcefulness may be lost owing to slackened pressure from above. and what is gained through greater flexibility may be lost on account of lesser mobilisation of the economy. Perhaps. But we have gone far enough on the path of conjecture; let the reader take over from here.

(Professor Grossman's contribution is dated 10 November 1962.)

ALFRED ZAUBERMAN: Several factors seem to justify a forecast of a certain slow-down in Soviet economic growth. The most evident is that as the industrial economy ages, as the frontier of development moves eastwards, less easily exploitable resources have to be tapped (less easily exploitable, that is, in terms of the cost of making them effectively available rather than of physical conditions). There is every reason to expect a continuing and powerful expansion in technology in the world, with the Soviet Union among its beneficiaries; but for some time it is likely to entail heavy capital outlay on re-equipment; and—under Soviet conditions—this too may have an initial retarding influence. There may also be a growing shortage of labour even if, under Soviet conditions—due to the notoriously wasteful uses of manpower in agriculture—this has a

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relative sense. The shortage may require some considerable labour-saving, one may call it 'non-growth', investment in non-agricultural sectors. The alternative would be to speed up the transfer of labour to these sectors; this, however, would entail compensatory investment in agriculture, with a high capital/output ratio. More generally, the effect of any policy of allocating more resources to farming will be similar, whatever its motives. In a word, at least some of the probable changes in the pattern of Soviet capital formation may have a certain restraining effect on the over-all growth of the economy. Further, although foreign trade makes up only a marginal proportion of Soviet national product, its role in the Soviet economy is tending to grow; and to this extent the Soviet Union is likely to suffer from a secular trend in terms of trade moving against her type of trade (exporting mainly primary products, importing mainly equipment). With all these qualifications, however, there is no reason why the Soviet economy should not continue to expand at a fairly high rate. Quantitative predictions would be, of course, very risky: nobody can be sure that the yearly rate, in terms of national product, will be, say, seven rather than five per cent; but it seems that one closer to the lower limit of this range is the more plausible. It is also possible that the USSR will continue to outpace the USA and some other, though not necessarily all, leading industrial capitalist countries—for the last five years or so the Soviet Union has been far outpaced by Japan.

Cuadernos

REVISTA MENSUAL **69** **FEBRERO DE 1693**

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BERTRAND RUSSELL
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LIVING STANDARDS

How do you think the Soviet level of living standards will then compare with that of other industrialised countries ?

EUGENE ZALESKI: For any country, it is very difficult to compare living standards and real wages over a long period. The consumption pattern changes and the problem of weighting appears. But, apart from the weighting problem, which concerns the methods of calculating the cost of living index, there is the difficulty of assessing all those elements in the ' way of life ' which cannot be integrated in the computed indexes.

In international comparisons of living standards, especially between countries with different social systems, all these difficulties are greatly magnified. The assessment of services furnished by a collectivist government may also be very controversial. In a country like the USSR, where statistics are only very partially published and often only in general terms, it is very difficult to comment on the official data about per capita production or per capita consumption, and consequently some doubtful conclusions are often drawn.

Since no ideal indicator can be found for comparisons of living standards, we have to look for the least imperfect indicators. Average real wages, per year or per hour can certainly be considered one of such possible indicators. To be able to compare real wages in different countries, we have to compute the purchasing power of national currencies. Theoretically, the difficulties should be no greater than in estimating the cost of living index within one country over a long period. For western countries we have the excellent work of Milton Gilbert (which has been translated into Russian and published in the Soviet Union). But for the purchasing power of the ruble, only some tentative evaluations have been made. The most important were those of Norman Kaplan and Eleanor Wainstein published in the *Journal of Political Economy* (December 1956), and that of Alec Nove, published in the *Bulletin* of the Oxford Institute of Statistics (No. 2, 1958), giving the purchasing power of the ruble in terms of dollars in 1950 and of sterling in 1955. Another, unpublished, estimate of the purchasing power of the ruble in terms of French francs has been made by the author of this note for the year 1955. A more general estimate of ruble purchasing power in terms of dollars and francs has been made for the years from 1913 to 1957 by Professor Maurice Allais.

A detailed comparison of Soviet and Western real wages would exceed the limits of this reply, and so only USA/USSR comparisons are given here. The reader can find in other works, like that of Milton Gilbert, comparisons with West European real wages.

It appears that in 1950, average Soviet wages represented only a very small part of American wages: 12·9 per cent when measured according to the USA consumption pattern, and 19·0 per cent according to the

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USSR consumption pattern. It appears also that the relative value of Soviet wages has improved only slowly during the last ten years. In 1960 it was 17·0 or 25·1 per cent of USA wages according to the consumption pattern, American or Soviet, adopted for the estimates.

For the comparative study of Soviet and American real wage levels in 1970 it should be possible to use the Soviet plan figures. Unfortunately, this cannot be done, for many reasons: the Soviet 'perspective' plan for 1961–80, which also gives the targets for 1970, was only partially published in October 1961, and Mr Khrushchev's speech of 18 October 1961 only gave the rate of growth (100 per cent for 10 years) of 'real incomes per capita of the population'. This is a very broad definition, including kolkhoz peasants and social advantages which might be useful for other calculations, but not for estimating real wages of workers and employees. Experience of Soviet planning practice shows that it is not possible to admit at their face value the Soviet targets for real wages. These targets have been underfulfilled for all the five-year plans with the exception of the fifth (1951–55); in any case the seven-year plan (1959–65) targets for the rise of real wages are already compromised, and the figures of the ten-year plan (1961–70) have to be modified in the part concerning private comsumption. The plans elaborated in 1958 and 1960 retained a slight retail price reduction and the progressive reduction of income taxes. Instead of that, on 1 June 1962 the government decreed a strong upward revision of certain retail prices of foods (meat, butter, milk) and on 24 September 1962 the promised reduction of income taxes was suspended. All this was unplanned, and will have adverse effects on the planned growth of real wages.

In discussing economic competition with the United States, Soviet writers generally use the past rates of growth for producer goods, for industrial output, or for national income, to prove the probability of overtaking the United States. But this method is not used for the indicators of economic welfare, and especially for real wages. But for the present, and until a better method of forecasting Soviet economic development is elaborated, this is the only way to make some hypothesis on the prospects of growth of Soviet living standards for the next ten years.

Over the last ten years the annual average rate of growth of real wages in the Soviet Union has been about double that of the United States. But this result was obtained primarily because of the low living standards in the Soviet Union after the war and until 1950; the difference in the rates of growth of real wages, which was considerable for 1951–55, was much smaller for the years 1956–60. In extrapolating the past rates of growth of real wages until 1970, two hypotheses could be used: The hypothesis more favourable to the Soviets, that the rate of growth of the last ten years will be maintained, and the less favourable hypothesis, that it will continue at the rate of the last five years. But it is obvious that only the second of the two hypotheses can be admitted for

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estimating real wage prospects in 1970. What, however, is most striking is that on *both* hypotheses Soviet real wages will represent only a small part of United States wages: in the more favourable case the Soviet figure will be 33·2 per cent of the American, and in the less favourable, 20·9 per cent of United States real wages in 1970.

The comparisons based on Soviet and Western real wages have been criticised by some Western writers. For example Lynn Turgeon states:

> The above-mentioned Western studies simply measure the relationship between the wage and price levels in the two countries, and not only tend to give an inflated picture of the height of Russian prices but also, to some extent, magnify the size of the gap between the levels of living in the United States and the USSR.

Lynn Turgeon bases his ruble-dollar ratio not on the respective levels of prices of goods and services, but on the family disposable incomes of 'subsistence family' and 'average family' of the two countries. He obtains in this way a ruble-dollar ratio of 4·5 rubles, or 6·2 rubles for 1 dollar in 1958. The magnitude of subsistence and of average levels, however, vary widely from country to country, and it is precisely this that we are out to measure. Physical subsistence levels and socially-accepted subsistence levels are in fact two quite different magnitudes.

Part of Mr Turgeon's criticism is however justified; real wages of individuals do not signify real incomes of families, or per capita consumption levels. But the latter are very difficult to estimate, and Mr Turgeon admits this in his statement that 'the Soviet per capita consumption of food might be slightly more than half of our own, and the Soviet per capita consumption of clothing might be somewhat less than half of our own [in 1958]. But the big advantage that American consumers have over their Soviet counterparts must surely be found in the area of durable consumer goods and services'.

It seems that without a good deal of research it will not be possible to make a definite statement about the respective USA and USSR per capita consumption levels. But for the study of future Soviet and Western living standards, the possible rates of growth are even more important than the respective levels for recent years. So, avoiding the controversy about present per capita consumption, and admitting, provisionally, Mr Turgeon's figure of a 50 per cent level for 1960, it would be possible to compute, for 1970, the hypothetical per capita consumption based on the past rates of growth of real wages. Even on this hypothesis, Soviet per capita consumption would represent only 61·3, or 66·1 per cent of the United States level in 1970, not a very spectacular advance.

Summing up, it seems likely that if the policy, in general favourable to the rise of consumption levels, that prevailed in the Soviet Union during 1956–60 is continued, Soviet living standards will come closer to those of other industrialised countries, but the gap will still be wide in 1970. However, Soviet policy on consumption is often a 'residual', and depends on the realisation of other objectives of the Soviet government.

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This means that even this relatively modest rise of Soviet living standards cannot be considered certain within the present framework of the Soviet planned economy.

ALEC NOVE: Soviet living standards in 1970 will still be below those of Western Europe, because, despite impressive aggregate production figures for cloth, butter, watches, etc., distribution is likely to remain defective, quality is often very bad, service ranges from poor to appalling, and, despite the likelihood of improvements, it will take a generation or two, *and* a change in the planning system, to catch up in these respects with Western Europe, let alone the United States. If one adds overcrowded housing, the absence of rural roads, the length of queues at bath-houses, the lack of sanitation and piped water supply in many areas, the situation looks relatively even less good. Diversity and availability of foodstuffs, apart from staple items, depends on a transformation of agriculture, which seems far away. Lack of interest of the trading network and of the manufacturers in consumer demand remains an integral part of the system. Of course, all this is known to the Soviet planners, and they are attempting and will attempt to take remedial measures. Improvements will occur. But if by 1970 the *real* living standards approach those of any West European country, this would be a sizeable achievement, which seems unlikely to me.

ALFRED ZAUBERMAN: I lack the courage to commit myself to any prophecy about the political mood, about the internal—and interconnected external—Soviet political developments over the coming decade; yet they must influence any hypothesis about the shaping of the population's livelihood. Assuming no dramatic change in them, and—on the economic side—continuing growth with the present rate of capital formation more or less maintained, one can accept as probable that living standards will rise in step with national product. On this assumption Soviet living standards ten years hence would be perhaps three-fifths as high again as they are today, which can be illustrated—but only illustrated—by saying that Soviet real wages may by that time correspond to about three-fifths of British wages (present British wages that is: I hope I have not been asked to predict what British real wages will be like in 1973). I regret that my forecast is so awkwardly hedged, but from this kind of forecasting one in fact gets back largely only what one puts into it.

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AGRICULTURE AND PLANNING

What changes do you expect in the organisation of Soviet agriculture and in the planning system?

NAUM JASNY: Of the questions posed by the editors of this journal I will say a few words only on the agricultural sector of the Soviet economy, and even here I make my attempt at forecasting without enthusiasm. For, to enjoy forecasting, two conditions must be met: the prophet should not know a great deal about the subject; secondly, he must possess the ability to forget his (wrong) forecasts completely. Perhaps there should be a silent agreement not to remind one another of each other's errors.

It may sound comic now that, with the almost complete ignorance about what was going on in the Soviet economy in the early 1950s, a conference at Arden, New York, was engagegd in 1952 in making forecasts of Soviet economic growth in the next twenty years. This is not a misprint: *twenty years*. Some of the participants were farsighted enough to make their forecasts for a shorter period or to keep them in indefinite terms, but even so they all proved wrong in a few years at most.

Our knowledge of what is going on in the USSR is now immensely greater than it was ten years ago. But do we know all that is needed for a forecast for a longer period? For myself, the answer is a decided ' no '.

It should not have surprised us greatly that, effective from 1 June 1962, the prices paid by the government on procurements of animal products from the kolkhozy, were substantially increased, but only, or mainly because simultaneously with the new prices evidence was released which dispelled any doubts that the former procurement prices involved losses, sometimes large losses, to the producers. Indeed, with this new evidence in hand, one might ask why Khrushchev stuck to those procurement prices so long, although per capita output of animal products had practically stagnated since 1958. But with the evidence as ambiguous as it was before 1 June 1962, I am sure that on 31 May 1962, i.e. one day before the announcement of the new procurement prices, I would have risked a forecast that they would be raised within six months.

But let us go back to 1958, when the farm procurement prices, now abandoned for animal products, were established. Both for crops and for animal products, those in power foresaw in 1958 only one development: that an increase in the certainly very low labour productivity in agriculture would permit the new prices to be reduced. I was not so certain about the possibility of reductions, but it would be untrue to say that I had realised that the new prices of animal products were grossly inadequate. With the evidence on production costs of farm products as good as nonexistent (it seems not to have existed even in secrecy), one had to proceed by speculation. I operated mainly with feed grain/hog price relationships. In hog-producing countries of Western Europe the usual ratio between the prices of feed grains and hogs (live weight) is as

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5·5–6 to 1. In the United States the corn-hog price relationship was, on the average for 1955–59, as 7·9 to 1. The hog prices used in such calculations naturally include not only the cost of feed, but also that of labour and of all overheads, and normally ensure a certain profit to the producers of the hogs as well.

The procurement prices established in the USSR for the kolkhozy in 1958 implied a feed grain/hog price ratio of 14–15 to 1. I was never an admirer of the kolkhoz system, yet, even allowing for some specific conditions in the USSR making for higher feed grain/hog price relationships, those established in the USSR in 1958 seemed to be adequate, perhaps more than adequate, to ensure normal development of hog production.

Since 1961 evidence on production costs of animal products started to appear, indicating the probability of great losses for the hog producers from the procurement prices established in 1958. Data released in 1962 simultaneously with the raising of prices showed that while European capitalist countries manage to cover all costs of hog production with a 5·5–6 to 1 ratio of the price of feed grain, and in the United States the ratio is 8 to 1, in the USSR a more than 20-fold ratio is needed. The cost of labour used in Soviet hog production alone exceeds (in terms of prices of feed grain) all costs of hog production, including that of labour, in, say, West Germany. And the cost of feed is much greater than the cost of labour. About twice as much feed is used in Soviet 'socialist' agriculture per pound of hog than in many other countries because of the very low content of protein in the hog feed. And some feeds are used which are much too expensive relative to the cost of grain.

The expectation that production costs of animal products would decline did not materialise. At last it was realised that serious progress could not be expected with the great disproportion between production costs and procurement prices, and so the prices paid to the kolkhozy on state procurements of animal products were raised by not less than 35 per cent on all meats on the average, by 29 per cent specifically on hogs, as from 1 June 1962. But, at least on beef, pork, and poultry, the new procurement prices, high as they are, are lower than the production costs in 1961. (Cattle, 83·9 as against 88·5 rubles per quintal; hogs, 105·9 as against 118 rubles; and poultry 124·2 as against 133·5 rubles per quintal.) It is obvious from the announcement on the new prices that the additional cost of animal products is being borne by the consumers.

With great emphasis it is again proclaimed that the measure is only temporary, that prospective increases in labour productivity and increased efficiency in utilising feed will allow the new procurement prices to be reduced.

The fact that the output of animal products continued to rise, although slowly, in recent years, in spite of the great losses incurred by the producers, is an indication of the amount of force exerted on the kolkhozy. Other indications are the growing of corn in areas and under

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conditions where only small yields of mediocre watery silage are obtained, of sugar beets requiring a great labour input and yet producing only miserable yields, etc. The reorganisation announced at the central committee meeting of November 1962 continues in the same vein. There will be still more direction, still more control, still more force. Possibly a guess may be ventured that force, which was given more than a fair trial, will not after all these years suddenly become a stimulant for the output of farm products. It will be enough if the enhanced application of force does not make the difficulties in agriculture even greater.

Some promise lies in financial measures to strengthen the kolkhozy. Those taken in 1961 included reductions in the prices of some agricultural machines, spare parts, gasoline, and building materials. The gains by the kolkhozy from these are estimated to amount to about 1·15 billion new rubles per year. The additional income from the June 1962 price increases of animal products is estimated at 1·2 billion new rubles per year. In November 1962 it was announced that capital investments by the state in agriculture would increase in 1963 from 3·1 billion to over 4·0 billion rubles, i.e. by about 30 per cent. Next to the state farms, the kolkhozy are likely to benefit from this increase. Altogether the money incomes of the kolkhozy may be boosted by about 20 per cent by all those measures. This is likely to boost production. But by how much? With the disorganised state which Soviet agriculture continues to be in, in spite of volumes of Mr Khrushchev's orations, forecasts for the future can be made only with trepidation.

I would not expect the 1970 targets of the 20-year programme, or even a proportionate part of the seven-year plan, to be even approached, not only because of physical (climate and soil) and technical limitations. On the other hand, should farm output grow by less than, say, 2 per cent per head per year in the next few years, additional measures, specifically additional financial help, will presumably be provided.

The inefficiency of animal husbandry, revealed in connection with the price revisions, is so marked that a certain reduction of production costs of animal products in the future would seem not impossible. But whether the price ratio between feed grain and hogs will be as 22 to 1 or as 18 to 1, the recent revelations seem to leave no doubt that the Soviet form of agriculture is incompatible with providing the population with animal products at anywhere near reasonable prices, prices at which the consumers in the capitalist countries are supplied by their profit-making producers.

Developments in agriculture will naturally have important repercussions outside. The substantial increase in investment in farming is made at the expense of some other branches of the economy. Since the increase in retail prices of animal products occurs at the expense of the non-farm population, and part of the additional incomes of the kolkhozy will go to the kolkhozniki, a certain closing of the great income gap between the two population groups is probable.

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If the Soviets were to give priority to efficiency in farming—which would mean applying private farming principles in one way or another—the outlook would be different, but whether or not they will do this is anybody's guess, and in this case anybody's is as good as mine.

ALEC NOVE: Sweeping changes in the planning system are quite unavoidable, and even the dumbest party official and ideologist will have to concede this. It is quite another matter to guess about how far they will go. In industrial planning, reforms can proceed from two ends: central planning can adopt more and more the mathematical techniques advocated by Novozhilov and Kantorovich, though certainly retaining the right of the top leadership to define not only general objectives but also some of the means by which these objectives should be achieved. At the 'micro' level, some of the suggestions made by Nemchinov and Liberman are so logical that the opposition to them will have gradually to retreat, though a prolonged rearguard action by the 'traditionalists' is certain. Essential features of a new system would be more flexible use of prices, increased significance of the profit motive, the partial replacement of material allocations by free purchases, by contract between enterprises, greater enterprise automony in deciding the product mix by reference to commercial orders, and so on. The 64,000 ruble question is: can such a decentralised system at 'micro' level be reconciled with centralised 'macro'-planning? One can readily envisage difficulties, which cannot be discussed in detail here.

Agriculture *needs* effective decentralisation even more than industry. The trend at the moment is the other way, and is likely to remain that way so long as Khrushchev is alive. He is so directly and personally wedded to 'political' solutions in agriculture, through party secretaries. But his successors must surely see the need for change. This could take the form of all-round conversion of state and collective farms into a kind of hybrid species, in which greater autonomy of operations is combined with a state-guaranteed minimum income for peasants, with a graduated tax to redistribute 'rent' income of more favourably-situated farms. Private plots ought to be tolerated, if the leadership is wise, since rural food distribution is still extremely primitive and is likely to remain so, while peasant production of potatoes, vegetables, eggs, milk, etc., is surely irreplaceable as a source of urban consumption, at the very least in smaller towns, and will be so in 1970 too. However, regardless of the wisdom or otherwise of the leadership, the overambitious agricultural output goals will not be fulfilled.

ALFRED ZAUBERMAN: A country's planning system is cofunctional with many non-economic elements of its life. Hence it is a rather artificial exercise to try to predict the development of a planning system by abstracting it from the ideological and political as well as economic milieu. It is almost a cliché to say that—other things being equal—any

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loosening of an over-all authoritarian grip would tend to favour less centralised variants of planning systems; and vice versa more decentralised variants would tend to weaken this grip. It is also almost a cliché to argue that as an economy becomes more complex, decentralisation becomes the more imperative to secure greater efficiency. But without crystal-gazing over the political stage one cannot be certain as to how far the regime will be prepared to yield to these pressures of necessity. The see-saw of de- and re-centralisation during the past half-decade carries a noteworthy lesson for the decade to come.

On the technical side (in spite of appearances to the contrary this is the comparatively easiest side of a prophetic argument), it stands to reason that for a command system the risks of devolution are reduced to the extent that its controllers have at hand dependable instruments for conducting firms—and lower echelons of the economy generally—along the road mapped out at the centre. To fabricate such instruments is a matter of knowledge and of sufficiently developed techniques.

This is in fact true of effective methods and procedures of planning in general. Those evolved in the Soviet Union a generation ago are, no doubt, very crude; but they have their own staying powers. In Soviet economics over the last few years at least the knowledge of matters involved in the methodology of efficient planning has been deepened. Intellectual inertia and vested interest apart, this knowledge comes up against certain ideological obstacles: it requires the abandonment of certain concepts and ideas deeply ingrained in Soviet thinking, concepts and ideas derived from the Soviet-Marxist doctrine as traditionally interpreted. However, these obstacles appear to be gradually diminishing, perhaps somewhat faster than some students, including myself, were inclined to expect only two or three years ago. Escaping from the dead hand of the ruling doctrine without disowning it too explicitly has been developed into a truly fine art in the Khrushchev era.

Making practical use of the improved knowledge is a matter of techniques. Some would perhaps be prepared to see a coming revolution as a result of what has been described by an eminent Soviet authority as an ' invasion ' of Soviet planning by mathematical techniques. I for one would feel that the word ' revolution ' is too strong, certainly too strong when we think of one decade ahead only: ' evolution ' would just do. To mention one big hurdle: operating new techniques requires better information about the course of economic life, and, with its growing complexity, the problem of the ' data-feedback ' becomes even more nightmarish for the planner than it has been hitherto. The practical usefulness of some conceptually exciting novelties in planning is limited, among other things, by the state of computing equipment; and although its present speeds and memories may seem staggering—indeed miraculous —they are not good enough yet for the planner to handle life as it goes on. But I should think that ten years is quite enough to show progress in this field. One can foresee that by the end of that period further progress is

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likely to improve Soviet planning methods so as to make plans intrinsically more coherent (the recent elaboration of the first rudimentary Soviet plan, that for 1962, by ' mathematical ' methods is no doubt a noteworthy milestone). On the other hand, there is probably little likelihood that within a decade the Soviet system will have worked out practical ways of making systematic choice of the more efficient among coherent plan alternatives, although incidentally it is the novelties in this field that are the most exciting. However, one may suppose that in the long run the new techniques will enable the Soviet planner to evolve at least an approximation to a trial-and-error quest for the best plan solution, and substitute it for what today is not much more than a groping in the dark. The penalty for backwardness in this field has been dramatised by the Gosplan journal, where it is estimated that, should the present methods be perpetuated, by 1980 the whole adult population would have to be employed in planning calculations and controls (*Planovoe Khoziaistvo*, October 1962, p. 5). A novel and remarkable variant of the vision of full communism.

The questionnaire asks about the planning system, not about planning strategies. May I be permitted, however, to suggest that this seems to be yet another area of growing Soviet pragmatism, particularly with regard to priorities (preferential rates) in development. This is one more field in which the fine art I mentioned before is now starting to flourish.

* * * *

W.K.: It would be presumptuous to predict Soviet Russia's economic and social development over so long a period as the next ten years. During the decade since Stalin's death Khrushchev, probably more than any other man alive, has shaped public affairs within and without the Soviet Union. Whether or not he lives to see the end of the next ten years, the end of his reign will certainly bring changes as great as, if not greater than, those that have occurred since 1953.

In the economic and social sphere it is fairly easy to forecast developments to the end of the current seven-year plan, but that does not take the observer of the Soviet scene beyond 1965. Thereafter there are the broad outlines of a ten- and twenty-year programme reaching as far into the uncertain future as the 1980s. But the economic elements of the Party programme adopted in October 1961 at the twenty-second Party congress cannot even be regarded as the results of some crude form of linear programming; they are at best the hunches of political pamphleteers. As such they deserve to be considered as an indication of political intent rather than elements of economic forecasting.

This is not to say that no prognosis is possible. Like all sound economic forecasting, it must be based on a sober analysis of the past record. This was not possible ten years ago, but it can now be done and has indeed been done in many places. If Khrushchev's reign has not brought the measure of relaxation in published documents that some, hopefully and wrongly, expected before and after the momentous ' secret '

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speech in the spring of 1956, the amount of factual information which has become available in the last ten years is immeasurably greater than that released in the preceding twenty-five years of Stalin's rule. Without this no prognostication worth the name could be ventured.

This does not mean that all essential economic and social facts are in easy reach. Industrial wages are still not published and rural incomes can be estimated only in broad orders of magnitude. No cost of living index has been published for over thirty years. The consumption of foodstuffs and other daily necessities is unknown to Russians and foreigners alike. The balance of payments, the production of rare metals and a thousand and one other items of economic and social life may be found in the records of developing countries, from Malaya to Malagasy, but not in any of the many statistical publications of the Soviet Union.

Worse still, there are the ambiguities, misrepresentations, and distortions which the fair-minded and the eulogists try to explain away, if not deny altogether. The highly inflated industrial gross production index of 1913–53 is linked officially, without any correction, with the more truthful index of the last decade. As a result, claims as to the magnitude of the improvement in industrial productivity during the Soviet plan era are invariably exaggerated. There are no signs that this practice is to be abandoned. Even more misleading, and thus more prejudicial to any objective analysis, is the reintroduction of false harvest claims, probably surpassing actual barn crops by 20–25 per cent. The exaggeration is carried forward into statements related to the output of animal crops and the consumption of these increasingly important ingredients of an urban, industrial diet.

This list of omissions and distortions is far from complete. The gaps in the knowledge of Western observers are thus substantial, but they are not big enough to make analysis and forecasting impossible. Whether one accepts the official Soviet claim of current rates of growth of industrial output and gross national product of approximately 9 and 7 per cent respectively, or assumes a certain element of exaggeration, there can be no doubt that these rates are substantially greater than those customary in the countries of the Anglo-Saxon world, though no greater than those of countries, such as Japan and Italy, booming after the destruction and dislocation of the second world war.

SOVIET-TYPE economies are able to sustain high rates of growth over long periods, not—as is often wrongly assumed—because they operate according to a plan, but because they tend to give preference to goods for capital construction; to neglect consumer goods by comparison; to allow only insignificant surplus capacities and stocks; and to draw on insufficiently used rural labour reserves. As these elements are likely to continue to operate, growth rates will remain high though probably not so high as given in the twenty-year programme, i.e. 9·7 per cent for gross industrial output and 8·4 per cent for national income.

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Within this framework, to which other countries of the Soviet orbit will be increasingly geared, changes may be expected between various sectors of the national economy. At the session of the Supreme Soviet held in December 1962, the rate of progress planned in the iron and steel industry was slowed down whilst the chemical industry was given the highest priority. This trend will continue for some years to come.

The shape which Soviet Russia's defence is to take within the next decade is not easily discerned. If the statement on the budget of 1963, made by Garbusov in December 1962, is anything to go by, the arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States is to continue. Following the Cuban crisis, a decline in the Soviet defence budget by a mere 100 million rubles would have created the impression throughout the world of a substantial Soviet contribution towards international relaxation, if not disarmament. The Soviet leaders decided otherwise. Barring the unforeseen, there is no reason to expect any change in this respect in the years to come.

The controversy about the role of the consumer sector has not been resolved. In May 1961 Khrushchev was reported to have claimed that light industry and heavy industry will develop at the same pace. Against this the twenty-second Party congress accepted a rise in output of consumer goods by 400 per cent in 1980 against 540 per cent for producer goods. When presenting the plan for 1962, Novikov, the Chairman of the State Planning Commission, foresaw the two growth rates converging, but a year later, at the session of the Supreme Soviet, it was seen that the two continued to diverge. There is no reason to expect any dramatic change during the next decade. For the years to 1980 the annual growth rates of producer and consumer goods are laid down at 10·2 and 8·5 per cent respectively, a small step only, by comparison with the current plan, in favour of the consumer. The 'creation of the material and technical base of communism' seems a long way off in terms of economic reality, however often it may be repeated in all declarations of faith. Other members of the Soviet bloc are unlikely to be any more successful than the Soviet Union in this as in other respects.

If industrial targets may not be beyond reach, the same cannot be said of farming. Agricultural production is supposed to increase in the sixties by 9·5 per cent per annum, against the 8 per cent foreseen for 1959–65; in fact the increase has hardly surpassed 4 per cent in four years. There is no prospect whatever of plan targets being fulfilled in a sphere in which human non-cooperation has consistently defeated most attempts to introduce technological and managerial improvements. There is no evidence that the mechanistic belief in the efficacy of larger farms is giving way to the recognition of the role of intensive farming in modern industrial society. The failure of agriculture will inevitably affect those sectors of industry dependent upon agricultural raw materials, to say nothing of the effects it will have on the level and composition of food

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consumption, on the industrial working family's spending, and on the national income.

The emphasis will remain on institutional forms of consumption. The Soviet leaders do not intend to emulate the West in the volume, quality, or variety of goods produced for individual consumption. There are likely to be improvements, however, in the educational, medical, and recreational consumer services. Housing is bound to cause concern for some time to come. The provision of a dwelling for each family, promised for 1980, would be a revolutionary improvement indeed in Russian living standards. For the time being the authorities remain preoccupied with the provision of the pre-revolution minimum sanitary norm, i.e. nine square meters of floor space for each town dweller.

The weaknesses inherent in Soviet farming and housing put into proper perspective the official aim of surpassing in the near future the output of the United States. The theme of rivalry with the United States runs through the Party programme as through most of Khrushchev's pronouncements. By 1970, it is claimed, Soviet industrial production will surpass present industrial output in the United States, in total if not per head of the population. The same is claimed for the principal agricultural products, such as grain, milk, and meat. However, American calculations suggest that at current rates Soviet output would be no more than two-thirds of that of the United States in 1970. If American annual rates of growth were to increase from the present 3½ per cent to 4½ per cent, the Soviet Union would not surpass the industrial output of the United States at any time during this century. If plans are fulfilled, the Soviet Union will still be using by 1970 less energy and less steel per head than were used in the United States in 1958, a year of recession.

FOREIGN observers tend to judge Soviet policy by its impact abroad. This is an understandable, but not necessarily the most prudent approach. In the economic sphere the concept of self-sufficiency continues to govern Soviet thinking. It is increasingly extended beyond the national boundaries to embrace the faithful within the Soviet orbit. Foreign trade is a residual rather than an essential of Soviet planning. It does not form an integral part of domestic planning, and it is presented in the Party programme, as in previous policy statements, as an afterthought rather than a means of balancing the economy. Foreign trade, now accounting for approximately 3 per cent of the Soviet gross national product, may be less significant in ten years' time in relation to the nation's economic activities, though increased in absolute terms.

More significant still is the silence of the programme on the subject of economic aid to developing countries. Since this document was passed by the congress, there has been a sharp decline in Soviet offers of development aid. It may be too early to draw firm conclusions, but a certain disenchantment with the political return on financial outlays seems to be discernible. Aid is likely to remain an even more marginal aspect of Soviet Russia's economy than trade is.

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Government and Party will continue to be pre-occupied first and foremost with the domestic scene. Recently the most dramatic of a series of reorganisations was introduced. Its purpose was to tackle the contradictions, inherent in all Soviet-type societies, between economic necessity and political expediency. In the last few years the waste of manpower and materials has reached truly stupendous proportions. Previous organisational, administrative, and managerial changes designed to reduce costs, to increase productivity, and to eliminate waste have failed to yield tangible results. Certain economists have argued, therefore, that nothing short of fundamental structural changes will remedy the situation. Such voices have been heard more than once since Stalin's death, but in the last resort they have always been ignored. The latest proposals aimed at greater profitability have been passed as acceptable at factory level, but remain unacceptable for the national economy as a whole, where they would call the whole concept of Soviet economic planning in question and thus become political dynamite.

Instead a reorganisation of Party and administration, unexpectedly broad in concept, has been introduced. It is likely to have far-reaching consequences. These cannot be judged fully at this stage, but old-established vested interests are likely to be disrupted and well-tried relationships dislocated. This is likely to have wide implications, particularly for the Party, which is to add to its role as leader of the nation the functions of an executive organ. As there appears to be no substitute in modern industrial society for such essentials as the market mechanism and the profit motive, this latest reorganisation is unlikely to solve the contradictions of the Soviet economy. Further reorganisations are bound to become necessary in the course of the next ten years, during which many facets of Soviet society may be expected to change.

One may well ask what all this adds up to. There can only be one answer: it does not add up. Serious contradictions remain and new ones will have to be faced in what promises to become yet another dramatic period of transition in the history of the Soviet Union. It is unlikely to lead to revolutionary changes, but it would require a clairvoyant to imagine what the society and economy of Soviet Russia will look like in 1973. Its communist character will be maintained as long as it remains governed by a communist party.

(The replies to the last point in the questionnaire will be published in the next issue of SURVEY.)

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REFLECTIONS ON THE CULT OF STALIN

Georg Lukacs

The following excerpts are translated from a letter from Georg Lukacs in a special 1962 issue of Nuovi Argomenti *devoted to a discussion of the 22nd CPSU congress.*

Dear Senor Carocci,

I am very tempted to reply at length to the problems which you raise in your 'eight questions': for practically everything that has occupied the minds of many of us for years past is concentrated in them. Unfortunately, the circumstances in which I find myself compel me to renounce this intention. But since I do not wish to keep from you completely the ideas in my mind, I am writing just a simple private letter, which, of course, does not pretend at all to deal systematically with all the essential questions.

I begin with the expression 'cult of the personality'. Of course I regard it as absurd to reduce the substance and the problems of such an important period in the history of the world to the particular character of an individual. . . .

My first reaction to the twentieth congress concerned not only the personality but the organisation: the apparatus which had produced the cult of the personality and which had fixed it in a sort of endless enlarged reproduction. I pictured Stalin to myself as the apex of a pyramid which widened gradually towards the base and was composed of many 'little Stalins': they, seen from above, were the objects and, seen from below, the creators and guardians of the 'cult of the personality'. Without the regular and unchallenged functioning of this mechanism the 'cult of the personality' would have remained a subjective dream, a pathological fact, and would not have attained the social effectiveness which it exercised for decades.

It did not need much reflection to understand that this immediate image, without being false, could give only a fragmentary and superficial idea of the origins, character and effects of an important period. For thinking men who are truly devoted to the cause of progress, the problem inevitably arose of the social genesis of this evolutionary stage, a problem which Togliatti first formulated precisely, when he said that it was necessary to bring to light the social conditions in which the 'cult of the personality' was born and consolidated. . . . Togliatti added, equally correctly, that this task was in the first place one for Soviet scholars. . . .

This research has remained, to the present day, an undischarged obligation for true Marxism, and you cannot expect me, who am not a specialist in this field, to make even a simple attempt at a solution; certainly not in a letter, which necessarily has an even more subjective and fragmentary character than an essay on the subject would have. In any case, it must be clear to any thinking man that the point of departure can only be the internal and international situation of the Russian

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proletarian revolution of 1917. From an objective point of view we must think of the devastation caused by the war, of retarded industrial development, of the relative cultural backwardness of Russia (illiteracy, etc.), of the series of civil wars and foreign interventions from Brest-Litovsk to Wrangel, etc. As a subjective element (often neglected) we must add . . . Lenin's possibilities of translating his exact theories into practice. There is today . . . a tendency to forget the resistance which he had to overcome inside his own party. Anyone who knows even part of the background to 7 November, to the peace of Brest-Litovsk, to NEP, will understand what I mean. (In later years a story went around that Stalin said at the time of the discussions within the Party on the Brest-Litovsk peace: 'the most important task is to ensure Lenin a firm majority in the central committee'.)

After Lenin's death, although the period of civil wars and foreign interventions was at an end, there was not the slightest guarantee that they, especially the interventions, would not begin again from one day to the next. Economic and cultural backwardness appeared to be a hardly superable obstacle to a reconstruction of the country, which would be at once the building of socialism and the assurance of its defence against any attempt to restore capitalism. With the death of Lenin the difficulties inside the Party naturally only got worse. Since the revolutionary wave set in motion in 1917 had subsided without establishing a stable dictatorship of the proletariat in other countries too, it was necessary to confront boldly the problem of building socialism in a single country (a backward one). It is in this period that Stalin showed himself a notable and far-seeing statesman. The vigorous defence of the new Leninist theory on the possibility of a socialist society in a single country, against the attacks of Trotsky in particular, represented . . . the salvation of the Soviet form of development. It is impossible to form a historically correct judgment of the Stalin problem unless the factional struggles within the Communist party are considered from this point of view; Khrushchev dealt with this problem in the proper way at the twentieth congress.

Permit me now a brief digression on the significance of the rehabilitations. It goes without saying that all those who in the thirties and later were unjustly persecuted, condemned, or murdered by Stalin must be absolved of all the charges invented against them (espionage, sabotage, etc.). But this does not imply that their political errors . . . should also be the subject of 'rehabilitation'. . . . This applies above all to Trotsky, who was the principal theoretical exponent of the thesis that the construction of socialism in a single country is impossible. History has long ago refuted his theory. But if we take ourselves back to the years immediately after the death of Lenin, Trotsky's point of view inevitably gives rise to the need to choose between enlarging the base of socialism by 'revolutionary wars' or returning to the social situation before 7 November, i.e. the dilemma of adventurism or capitulation. Here history cannot agree at all to the rehabilitation of Trotsky; on the decisive strategic problems of the time Stalin was absolutely right. . . .

Equally unjustified in my view is the legend widely disseminated in the West that if Trotsky had come to power there would have been a more democratic development than under Stalin. It suffices to think of

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the discussion on the trade unions in 1921 to understand that this is a pure legend. . . . I don't want to deal with this problem at length. But it is certain that, in the years that followed, Stalin followed de facto . . . Trotsky's line and not that of Lenin. If Trotsky later on sometimes reproached Stalin for appropriating his programme, we can readily concede that he was in many respects right. It follows, according to my judgment of the two personalities, that what we today regard as despotic and undemocratic in the Stalin period has quite close strategic connections with the fundamental ideas of Trotsky. A socialist society under Trotsky's leadership would have been at least as undemocratic as that of Stalin, but it would have faced the dilemma: a catastrophic policy or capitulation. . . . (The personal impressions which I received from my meetings with Trotsky in 1931 aroused in me the conviction that he as an individual was even more inclined to 'the cult of the personality' than Stalin.) . . .

Let us return to the main subject. With his well-deserved victories in the discussions of the twenties the difficulties in Stalin's position did not disappear. What was objectively the central problem, that of sharply accelerating the tempo of industrialisation, was in all probability hardly to be resolved within the framework of normal proletarian democracy. It would be useless today to ask whether . . . Lenin would have found a way out. We can see in retrospect on the one hand the difficulties of the objective situation, and on the other the fact that to overcome them Stalin, as time went by, went farther and farther beyond the limits of what was strictly necessary. It must be the task of . . . Soviet science to bring to light the exact proportions. Closely bound up with this problem (but not identical with it) is that of Stalin's position in the Party. It is certain that he built up little by little during and after the period of the discussions that pyramid of which I spoke at the beginning. But it is not enough to construct such a mechanism—it must be kept in continuous working order; it must always react in the desired way, without possibility of surprises, to day-to-day problems of every kind. This is the way in which little by little the principle, which today is usually called the 'cult of the personality', must have been elaborated. The history of this too should be radically re-examined by Soviet scholars in command of all the material (including material so far unpublished). What could be observed even from outside was, in the first place, the systematic suppression of discussion within the Party; in the second place, the growing use of organisational measures against opponents; and in the third place, the transition from these measures to procedures of a judicial and administrative character. This last development was naturally received with silent dread. During the second stage the traditional sense of humour of the Russian intelligentsia was still active. 'What is the difference between Hegel and Stalin?' people asked. The answer was 'in Hegel there are thesis, antithesis and synthesis, in Stalin report, counter-report, and organisational measures'. . . .

I do not consider myself at all competent to describe this development and its motive forces. From the theoretical point of view too it would be necessary to show how Stalin, who in the twenties defended the legacy of Lenin with skill and intelligence, later found himself more and more frequently in opposition to Lenin on all important problems:

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a circumstance which is not in the least affected by his verbal attachment to Lenin's doctrines. Thus, since Stalin succeeded . . . in making people regard him as the legitimate heir of Lenin and his only authentic interpreter, since he was recognised as the fourth classic of Marxism, the fatal superstition that Stalin's theories were identical with the fundamental principles of Marxism gained an ever stronger hold. . . . I am not concerned with the question whether and to what extent particular theories can be positively traced to Stalin himself. In the conditions of intellectual centralisation which he created it was impossible for any theory to be firmly established unless it was at least authorised by him. . . .

I begin with a question of method which may appear extremely abstract: the Stalinist tendency is always to abolish, wherever possible, all intermediate factors, and to establish an immediate connection between the crudest factual data and the most general theoretical propositions. The contrast between Lenin and Stalin is particularly obvious here. Lenin distinguished very scrupulously between theory, strategy, and tactics, and always examined meticulously and took into account all the mediating factors between them. . . .

Stalin's unscrupulousness in this matter reached the point of altering the theory itself if necessary. . . . I refer to the Stalin-Hitler pact in 1939. Here, too, in my opinion, Stalin took a decision which from a tactical point of view was substantially correct, but which nonetheless had tragic consequences because once again instead of treating a tactical retreat, made necessary by concrete circumstances, as such, he made his measures . . . a criterion of correctness in principle for the international strategy of the proletariat. . . . The immediate purpose [of the pact] was to repel the threat of an imminent attack by Hitler . . . which would probably have been supported openly or covertly by Chamberlain and Daladier. The long-term tactical calculation was that if Hitler—as in fact happened—took advantage of the pact with the Soviet Union as a favourable opportunity for an offensive against the West, then later on, in case of a war between Germany and the Soviet Union, an alliance between the Soviet Union and Western democracies . . . would have become extremely probable; here too the facts confirmed Stalin's tactical foresight.

But the theoretical strategic consequences which Stalin drew from the pact were fatal to the whole revolutionary workers' movement. The war between Hitler Germany and the European powers was declared an imperialist war, like the first World War. This meant that the strategic formulas of Lenin, correct in their time (' the real enemy is in your own country ', ' transformation of imperialist war into civil war ', etc.) had to remain in force unchanged for countries which wanted and had to defend themselves against Hitlerite fascism. It is enough to read the first volume of *Les Communistes*, by an orthodox writer like Aragon, to see clearly the disastrous international consequences of this ' Stalinist generalisation ' from a practical viewpoint. But the most unfortunate consequences go beyond particular cases. . . . The great authority of Marxism in Lenin's time rested on the fact that the dialectical unity of theoretical soundness, stability of principles, and tactical elasticity was recognised by all. This new ' methodology ' of Stalin made it possible for wide circles, not always hostile in advance to Marxism, henceforward to see in Stalin's theoretical utterances no more than ' justifications '

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. . . of purely tactical measures. . . . Thus Stalin played into the hands of the many bourgeois thinkers for whom Marxism was merely a political 'ideology' like any other. If today the profound and precise formulations of Khrushchev (on the avoidability of imperialist war, coexistence, etc.) are often treated in the same way, this too is the fruit of Stalin's heritage. . . .

We must not forget, besides the motives so far mentioned, that a considerable part of the old intelligentsia in the Party was in opposition to Stalin. . . . Stalin needed the precise execution of his decisions on the part of the apparatus, and also if possible the approval of the broad masses; for this reason too he radically simplified his theoretical utterances. The suppression of intermediate factors, the direct linking of the most general principles with the concrete exigencies of daily practice, seemed a suitable means to this end too. Here, too, theory was not concretised by applying it to practice, but on the contrary principles were simplified and vulgarised according to the exigencies (often purely notional) of practice. Here, too, I confine myself to one particularly typical example (but I could mention an infinite number of others). In his last work on economics Stalin 'discovered' something that had 'escaped' Marx, Engels, and Lenin, that every economic formation has a 'fundamental law' which can be synthesised in a short proposition. It is so simple that even the most limited and uneducated official can understand it at once; and so he is in a position . . . to condemn out of hand for its deviation 'to the right' or 'to the left' any work of scientific economics of which objectively he understands nothing. . . .

Because Stalin wanted to maintain at any cost a continuity 'in quotation' with Lenin's work, not only facts but Leninist texts also were distorted. The most obvious example is the article which Lenin wrote in 1905 with the object of bringing order into the Party press and Party publications in the new conditions of legality. Under Stalin this article gradually became the Bible of *partiinost* in the whole field of culture and especially of literature . . . and although Krupskaya, Lenin's wife and closest collaborator, had drawn attention . . . to the fact that this article has absolutely no reference to literature, even today there is no lack of people who would like to let the Bible remain a Bible. . . .

This tendency reaches its highest point in the *Short History of the CPSU* which was circulated in many millions of copies. Here the *partiinost* of the supreme functionary is the demiurge which creates or abolishes facts, and, according to need, confers existence and significance on men and events or else annuls them. It is a history of struggle between different trends which are not, however, represented or kept going by men, of anonymous oppositions, a history in which, apart of course from Lenin, only Stalin has an existence of his own. (In the first edition, there was, it is true, one exception: Yezhov, 'our Marat', the prime organiser of the great trials, also appeared there; after his fall his name, too, was omitted.)

In all this another methodological aspect can be discerned. For the classics of Marxism it was obvious that science furnishes the materials . . . on the basis of which political decisions are taken. Propaganda and agitation receive their material from science, from practice scientifically

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elaborated. Stalin reversed this relationship. For him, in the name of *partiinost*, agitation is primary. Its needs determine . . . what science must say and how it must say it. One example will make this clearer. In the famous Chapter IV of the *Short History*, Stalin defines the essence of dialectical and historical materialism. Since we have to do with a popular work written for the masses, no one could find fault with Stalin for reducing the quite subtle and complex arguments of the classics on this theme to a few definitions enumerated in schematic textbook form. But the fate of the philosophical sciences since the publication of this work shows that this is a matter of conscious methodology and of a deliberate cultural policy. . . . Stalin's propagandistic simplifications (often vulgarisations) at once became the unique and absolutely binding norm and the utmost limit of philosophical investigation. If anyone ventured, appealing for instance to Lenin's philosophical notes, to go beyond the definitions of Chapter IV or simply to supplement them, he was courting ideological condemnation and could not publish his researches. Ilychev at the twentieth congress said with good reason that philosophy, economics, and history had stagnated in recent decades. . . .

All science and all literature had to serve exclusively the propagandistic demands formulated above, by Stalin himself. The understanding and spontaneous elaboration of reality by means of literature was more and more strictly prohibited. 'Party' literature must no longer creatively reflect objective reality, but must illustrate in literary form the decisions of the Party. It is to the honour of the literary critic Helena Usievich that she made a stand in the thirties against the demand that literature should be illustrative. The poet Tvardovsky, in his speech at the twenty-second congress, continued this struggle which is still necessary. . . . The insistence on illustration makes a general abstract truth (if indeed it is the truth) the base of the work . . . and men and their destinies have to be adapted at any cost to this thesis.

All this of course was not an end in itself. It arose from Stalin's position, from his need for an authority not subject to discussion. I must repeat once again that only thorough investigation by competent scholars can establish what part was played by objective difficulties and what part by Stalin's excessive reactions to them. There was without doubt in the thirties an objective sharpening of the situation: internally, apart from the acceleration of industrialisation, as the result of collectivisation of agriculture; in foreign relations as the result of Hitler's accession to power and the threat of an attack on the USSR by Nazi Germany. Whether the class struggle in the country . . . really became more acute . . . is a problem on which only detailed investigation by scholars can give a competent answer. Stalin, however, found quickly the necessary, simplifying generalisation: the continual sharpening of the class struggle is inevitable under the dictatorship of the proletariat, is its 'fundamental law'.

This thesis . . . aims at creating an atmosphere of perpetual mutual distrust, in which everyone is on his guard against everyone else, the atmosphere of a permanent state of siege. I can only refer in a brief and fragmentary form to the secondary consequences: the fear of

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enemies, spies, and saboteurs aggravated beyond all measure, and a system of obsessive secrecy in everything that has anything at all to do with policy. Thus statistics, for example, became a 'strictly secret' science, whose findings were accessible only to absolutely reliable persons. . . .

Thus the picture of the Stalinist method acquires a complementary trait which hitherto was missing: everything that is objectively inevitable in an acute revolutionary situation, where the existence of a society is in effect at stake, was arbitrarily made by Stalin the foundation of ordinary Soviet practice. I don't want to dwell here on the great trials. This is the subject which has hitherto been dealt with most fully, and Shelepin in his speech to the twenty-second congress gave a detailed analysis of their consequences for Soviet law and jurisprudence. I should like only to draw attention briefly to some consequences of a cultural nature. The suppression of mediate factors carries with it a tendency to treat all the phenomena of life as monolithic blocks. The permanence of the acute revolutionary situation intensifies this tendency. Everyone is dissolved without residue . . . into the function which he fulfils (or which it is claimed that he fulfils) at a particular moment. . . . Thus, to take an example from the logic of the trials: *because* Bukharin in 1928 opposed Stalin's plan for collectivisation it is certain that in 1918 he took part in a conspiracy to kill Lenin. This is the method of Vyshinsky in the great trials. But this methodology extends also to judgments in history, science, and art. Here, too, it is instructive to compare Lenin's method with that of Stalin. Lenin, for example, harshly criticised Plekhanov's policy in 1905 and 1917. But at the same time—and this implies no contradiction for Lenin—he insists that it is necessary to make use of Plekhanov's theoretical work for the propagation and the further study of Marxist culture. . . .

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THE LIBERMAN PROPOSALS

Alec Nove

ON 9 September 1962, the readers of the western press learned that a Kharkov professor named Liberman had apparently advocated in the pages of *Pravda* the widespread use of the profit motive in the Soviet economy. The object of this brief note is to explain what it was that Liberman proposed, why he proposed it, and what is likely to happen in consequence.

Before summarising his *Pravda* article, it is relevant to remark that Liberman had been publicly advocating these same kinds of ideas for many years. He and a number of his colleagues had been putting forward arguments in favour of far-reaching reforms since 1955 at least. Consequently it would show a total misunderstanding of the Soviet scene to assert that sensationally new ideas have been given their first public airing. But it would also be wrong not to see the political importance of having these same ideas given so much prominence in the central party press. The *New York Times* Moscow correspondent, Mr Shabad, promptly jumped to the conclusion that Liberman would not have been so prominently featured if it had not already been decided to adopt his proposals. In this Mr Shabad may well prove mistaken. It is no longer the case in the USSR that a controversial idea is publicised only after it has been decided to adopt it as official policy. We are only entitled to surmise that the need for some kind of radical change has been understood at a high level in the party hierarchy.

What did Liberman propose? He declared himself primarily concerned with the situation of the industrial enterprise. On the one hand, the management received from above a large number of different plans, i.e. instructions, which had the effect of greatly restricting desirable initiative, even if they were consistent with one another. But very often they were not, because they originated in different planning offices which were ill-informed about each others' doings and frequently adopted quite different criteria. Thus, for example, while some officials did their best to link production plans with user requirements, and others sought (often in vain) to allocate materials in quantities and types which matched the output plan, other 'compulsory' plans—e.g. costs, wages, labour productivity, profits—were based on last year's performance. Thus the costs plan was habitually determined as equal to last year's costs minus, say 3 per cent, regardless of any changes in the planned product mix or its effect on average cost statistics. Even so vital an element of the plan as gross output was more closely related to past trends than to present requirements for that enterprise's output.

Enterprises thus found themselves in a difficult position. They were forced to manoeuvre, to choose which elements of an inherently

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inconsistent plan to fulfil. It was dangerous for them to be honest about their productive potential, because, with rewards based on plan fulfilment, there was a built-in incentive to bid low, to persuade their superiors to give them an ' easy ' plan. Since, even in a so-called command economy, the top planners cannot act without proper information from below, this tendency caused serious loss of efficiency. Losses also resulted from production for plan fulfilment statistics rather than for need, and from the unintended effect of the system of rewards and penalties in discouraging innovation. Too often it paid, in terms of earning managerial bonuses, to make obsolete or inferior goods, to try to fulfil plans ' at any cost, regardless of quality, durability, reliability '.[1]

LIBERMAN'S ideas of how to combat these defects are as follows: First, enterprises must receive as few instructions as possible. They should be told how much and what kinds of things to produce, but the rest of the job of planning should be done by the enterprise itself. Even the output plan should be based on ' direct connections between producer and customer ', i.e. on commercial orders, though Liberman is somewhat vague about the role of the central planners and *Sovnarkhozy* in this respect. The enterprise would make up its own labour, wages, costs, and profit plans. For this to be consistent with rational decision-making, there would naturally have to be some clear criterion of efficiency to which managerial rewards would be related. Liberman proposes for such a criterion *profits expressed as a percentage of productive capital.* An incentive fund for the enterprise is to be derived from the profit percentage so computed. The proportion of profits allocated to this incentive fund is to be differentiated by industrial branches, and within any branch is to depend on the total capital of the enterprise and on the magnitude of the profit, so that, for example, a 10 per cent profit on a capital of 2 million rubles would (naturally) qualify for a higher reward than a similar profit on 1·5 million. In order that the incentive fund should not become too large, it is to increase less than proportionately to profits: for example, a twelvefold rise in profits would lead to a $2\frac{1}{2}$-fold increase in the incentive fund. The larger part of the increase would go to the state budget; Liberman carefully assures his critics that his plan would benefit and not harm revenues. He is also very conscious of the problem of persuading enterprises to bid high, i.e. to draft as ambitious a plan as circumstances permit and be rewarded for their ambition. To this end, he conceived an ingenious device by which the incentive fund benefits less from overfulfilling than from fulfilling a given profits plan (this follows a similar principle adopted in Czechoslovakia in 1958). Thus, suppose an enterprise devised a plan which was to yield a 10 per cent profit, but in fact the profit was 15 per cent; instead of allocating to the incentive fund the amount due to it for a 15 per cent profit, the enterprise

[1] I. Borovitsky, *Pravda*, 5 October 1962.

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would only be entitled to the amount applicable to the figure half-way between planned and actual profit, i.e. in this instance 12½ per cent. By contrast, suppose they 'bid' 15 per cent and made only 14 per cent; then (unlike the rules of contract bridge) they would be deemed to have bid and made 14 per cent. Here indeed is an encouragement to aim high. Be it noted that in Liberman's conception the 'bid' is a complete plan submitted by the enterprise, containing consistent output, technical, labour, and financial plans, related to actual contracts and delivery arrangements, and that the reward is conditional upon the fulfilment of the approved plan for output and on punctual deliveries to the customers. Consequently, as he sees it, enterprises would try to maximise net product in relation to their capital assets.

This of itself, he argues, would cause enterprises to strive for high labour productivity, and discourage the purchase of unnecessarily expensive inputs. By trying to purchase inputs as cheaply as possible, enterprises will influence the production programmes and efficiency of their suppliers, and this without any official instructions. 'The proposed scheme will free central planning from the task of detailed supervision of enterprises, from costly attempts to influence production not by economic but by administrative means. The enterprise itself knows its potential best. . . .' The underlying principle must be: 'What is in the interests of society must be in the interests of every enterprise'. He proposed that the incentive fund should be used for two purposes: to finance decentralised investments, and to pay out bonuses to management and additional bonuses to the workers.

AS must be obvious, none of this could possibly work unless there were a drastic reform of the price system. It must be made much more flexible—though Liberman did not make it very clear just how, as price-fixing would remain a central responsibility. It is also an essential part of the scheme that the rules for the incentive fund, once made, should remain unaltered for a number of years, for otherwise enterprises would lack the security necessary to adopt measures which take time to mature.

Judging from his past writings, Liberman was also conscious that his proposals, if adopted, would free the central planners from the impossible task of planning both output and inputs (and finances, and labour, and costs, etc.) of almost all enterprises. However, in the present version of his proposals he was not clear about the future role of the centre in planning output and allocation of materials. This aspect was taken further by Academician Nemchinov in *Pravda* of 21 September. He urged 'the conversion of material allocations into state trade, ending the distribution of commodities through an endlessly complex system of material "funds"'. Planning of intermediate products should cease; the state should decide only what *final* products it needed. The present system merely encouraged unnecessary output of intermediate products. He envisaged an incentive system of the Liberman type leading to

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competition between state enterprises for orders, permitting the placing of orders (many of which the state planners themselves place, e.g. for big investment projects) where production costs are lowest.

Both Liberman and Nemchinov insisted that their proposals would leave the state, i.e. the central planners and the political authorities, in command of all basic economic decisions. Major investments, the general pattern of production, prices, the essential proportions between sectors, would be decided at the centre. What was at issue was the most effective way of translating the general objectives of the planners into efficient action.

Pravda asked for a discussion of these rather far-reaching ideas. Discussion duly filled many pages of *Pravda* itself, and of *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta*, *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, and other journals. A full summary would be of the greatest interest, but cannot be attempted here. The following is a rough and necessarily inadequate outline of some reactions to the proposals.

A first category of reactions was totally hostile, on principle. This would be a fair summary of the views of such men as Zverev, the ex-minister of finance, and Plotnikov, the head of the Institute of Economics. 'The proposals of Professor Liberman would lead to utter unbalancing of the national economy. Planning is a great achievement of the October revolution. Why abandon it?'[2] Or again: 'If we refrain from planning centrally the wages fund, labour productivity, costs, profits, investments, then we abandon planning by the state of essential economic relationships, i.e. in reality national economic planning is abandoned'. Plotnikov particularly fears the effects of any increase in decentralised investments; existing defects in this field are due, in his view, to the fact that 'capital construction is insufficiently centralised'.[3] This school of thought holds that, whatever Liberman might believe, market forces would become too strong and the centre would lose effective control, the result being confusion.

A more moderate line of criticism is perhaps best represented by Gatovsky, and with him the editorial board of *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta* writing in their collective capacity. The need for major reforms is admitted, indeed stressed. A particularly important role for the profitability criterion is accepted. However, they oppose adopting this as the sole criterion, though it may perhaps serve as such in particular instances. They believe in adopting different criteria in different industries, and utter a warning against seeing in profitability a kind of panacea for all the ills of Soviet planning. Gatovsky expressed some scepticism about the possibility of doing away with administrative allocation of materials. He and those who think like him tend to play down the implications of Liberman's ideas, to confine them rather more narrowly than did their

[2] A. Zverev, *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta*, 13 October 1962.
[3] K. Plotnikov, *ibid.*, 3 November 1962, p. 38. See also *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, No. 11, 1962.

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originator to the finding of more effective success indicators for enterprises.

Some (but a definite minority) of the commentators, among them several planners and enterprise directors, were on the whole sympathetic to Liberman's general approach but had criticisms of detail, some of which criticisms were also made by outright opponents of the entire scheme. For instance, the formula proposed by Liberman for calculating the size of the incentive fund is certainly open to objections: it can happen that the fund would benefit from a lower profit percentage of a larger amount of capital, which could encourage unnecessary expansion of capital (possibly even hoarding, since working capital is included in the valuation); there are grave difficulties in the way of determining the profit norms on which the fund is to be based (if the same incentive-fund rules applied for whole industries, this would be unfair to some and unreasonably reward others, while to draw up separate profit plans for each enterprise would hardly be in the spirit of the proposals); and there may be some danger of encouraging excessively high bids and so confusing the planners. Others were worried about the possible inflationary effects of not setting limits on wage payments, still others feared that it might prove profitable to produce the wrong assortment of goods. There were also pertinent questions concerning the powers over production decisions which would remain with central planners and *sovnarkhozy*.

The discussion ranged far and wide. Liberman replied,[4] others argued, criticised him and each other. It was a most encouraging exhibition of unusually free debate, on a topic which has profound implications for the future shape of the Soviet system.

MEANWHILE Khrushchev, in his speech at the November 1962 central committee session, launched reforms of a quite different kind, in the direction of tighter centralisation and party control. Does this mean that Liberman is 'out'? Not necessarily. Khrushchev did refer to the importance which should be attached to the profit motive and the profitability criterion at enterprise level, and urged experiments to discover ways of introducing such ideas in practice. He also favoured greater powers for enterprise directors—or said he did. (He also favoured more interference with them at their own level.) Khrushchev is well aware of the overloading of the central planners with mountains of routine work. He may well be willing to listen to those who tell him of the urgency of relieving them of these burdens in the interest of the more expeditious carrying out of the party leadership's economic policies. That is, if he can be assured that these policies *will* be carried out, and that resources would not be dissipated by the operation of unplanned quasi-market forces. Meanwhile, immediate centralisation measures may have had to be speeded by the strains imposed by unbudgeted-for arms programmes.

[4] See in particular *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta*, 10 November 1962, pp. 10–11.

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But—and this is a vital but—is there not in fact something in the 'conservative' opposition to Liberman? It is easy to draw up a model in which the centre decides what is to be done and then uses its control over prices and incentives to substitute economic motivation for administrative instructions. It is not so easy to arrange such things in practice.

For example, if the central authorities decide prices, then there will often be contradictions between profitability and the desirable product mix, because bureaucratic price changes take time. The centre may find itself repeatedly closing doors after the horse has bolted. Yet it cannot go so far as to allow enterprises freedom to arrange their own prices, for then the planners would indeed lose control over economic life. The recent experience of Yugoslavia suggests that it is not easy to combine central priorities and high growth rates with a kind of market socialism.

Then there is the Czechoslovak experience in 1958–61, when they tried out a system which had some points in common with what Liberman now proposes. It ran into serious difficulties and has had to be substantially modified. Among the reasons was one which will recur again and again: there is always bound to be trouble along the line at which the centralised portion of the plan meets the decentralised plans concocted by the enterprises. To give but one example: suppose that the production programme of investment goods industries is regarded as a central responsibility, but that most enterprise investment is financed out of the new incentive fund and is therefore not part of the central plan at all. Enterprises will want to purchase machinery to make a reality of their investment projects. But how is this machinery to be made available to them, unless the plan (the *central* plan) provides that it be produced? It is not suggested that such problems are insoluble, but, within the pattern of decision-making implied by Liberman and Nemchinov, it is not too clear how they can be solved, without going further towards a free market than either of the individuals concerned would care to admit. (It is significant that the experience of Czechoslovakia and Poland is being carefully studied in Moscow.[5])

Finally, where does all this fit into the discussions on linear programming and econometrics? The answer must be that Liberman is not an alternative but a perhaps necessary supplement to the proposals of men such as Kantorovich and Novozhilov. Whatever advantages may accrue from the use of mathematical techniques at the centre, there will always be the need for micro-economic initiatives at enterprise level. It is not a coincidence that Novozhilov should have argued that his proposed system of efficiency prices would have the advantage of providing a basis for decentralisation to enterprises.

But, on present indications, the Liberman proposals as they stand will not be accepted, and, to be frank, they are hardly acceptable. It is not just that, as one of the 'conservatives' argued at a meeting where this school of thought predominated, the proposals imply 'the freeing of the

[5] See references in *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, No. 11, 1962, pp. 89, 103, 104, and an article on the same topic in No. 10 of the same journal.

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elemental functioning of the law of value [i.e. market forces] with a simultaneous weakening of central control '.[6] It is that the maintenance of centralised planning ' in essentials ', plus rapid growth and full resource utilisation, is likely to prove inconsistent with basing enterprise behaviour on the profit motive, however flexibly the authorities fix the price and incentive-fund rules. It would mean *either* that the unplanned magnitudes (wages, employment, unallocated inputs, costs, cash balances, etc.) would tend to go awry, *or* that, in an effort to keep these items under control and enforce its own priorities, the state would reimpose detailed plans on enterprises and the scheme would then collapse.

Yet some decentralisation is necessary. The search for a basis for it will continue, and some elements of Liberman's ideas are bound to figure in any effective solution of a very difficult problem.

[6] N. Spiridonova, *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, No. 11, 1962, p. 122.

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ON 'NATIONAL DEMOCRACY'

I. Its Function in Communist Policy

Richard Lowenthal

IN the declaration adopted by the Moscow Conference of 81 communist parties in December 1960, a new formula for the communist strategy in ex-colonial, underdeveloped countries made its first appearance. The communists working in these countries were told to work for the creation of 'an independent state of national democracy', and to rally the broadest possible national fronts for the achievement of that goal.

The declaration (*Pravda*, 6 December 1960) defined the new type of state as follows:

> A state that consistently defends its political and economic independence, that struggles against imperialism and its military blocs, against military bases on its territory; a state that struggles against the new forms of colonialism and the penetration of imperialist capital; a state that rejects dictatorial and despotic methods of administration; a state in which the people enjoy the broadest democratic rights and liberties (freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of demonstrations, of forming political parties and social organisations), in which they have the possibility to strive for land reform and for the implementation of other demands for democratic and social transformations and for participation in shaping public policy. The rise and consolidation of national democratic states gives them a chance to advance quickly on the road of social progress and to play an active role in the struggle of the peoples for peace, against the aggressive policy of the imperialist camp, and for the complete liquidation of the colonial yoke.

A closely similar catalogue of 'priority tasks for national rebirth' had been listed a few paragraphs before in the same declaration as capable of solution only if 'all patriotic forces of the nation join in a national, democratic United Front'. This section ran:

> Strengthening of national independence, land reforms in the interest of the peasantry, abolition of the remnants of feudalism, extirpation of the economic roots of imperialist rule, limitation and ousting of foreign monopolies from the economy, foundation and development of a national industry, raising of the standard of living of the population, democratisation of public life, an independent, peace-loving foreign policy, development of economic and cultural cooperation with the socialist countries and other friendly countries—these are the all-national, democratic tasks for the solution of which the progressive forces of the nation may and indeed do unite in the countries that have liberated themselves.

Finally, the relation of the new concept to classical Leninist doctrine is summed up in this formula:

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> The communist parties struggle actively for the consistent completion of the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, democratic revolution, for the formation of a national democratic state, and for an effective raising of the standard of living of the masses of the people.

In the course of 1961, the new formula was authoritatively interpreted and elaborated in Soviet theoretical journals, notably by B. Ponomarev and G. Gafurov from the political point of view, and by A. Arzumanyan from the economic.[1] When the draft programme of the CPSU was published at the end of July, its section on 'The National Liberation Movement' was found to centre on the same tasks to be fulfilled after the winning of political independence, tasks that were now equated with the choice of a 'non-capitalist road of development'. Again, it was laid down that 'the political basis of a national democracy is a bloc of all the progressive, patriotic forces fighting to win complete national independence and broad democracy, and to consummate the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, democratic revolution', and the communist parties were specifically instructed to struggle for this consummation and for the establishment of a state of national democracy. At the 22nd congress of the CPSU, these passages were adopted without change.

BECAUSE the document in which 'national democracy' made its first appearance was the outcome of a conference dominated by the dispute between the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties, it was perhaps natural that Western students should at first have tended to interpret the new formula in the context of that dispute—as a 'semantic compromise' between Soviet and Chinese views on strategy towards the ex-colonial, uncommitted countries.[2] Evidence of different Soviet and Chinese reactions to the introduction of the concept does indeed exist and will be examined further on. But it is contended here that the concept of 'national democracy' was devised primarily not as a reaction to the Sino-Soviet dispute, but in response to the real problems facing Soviet and communist strategy in the ex-colonial nations, and that some new strategic formula of this kind would have had to be invented by the Soviet leaders at the present stage, even if no dispute with Peking existed, because the classical communist two-stage theory of the revolution in colonial and ex-colonial countries had proved obviously inadequate to the situation in the growing number of former colonies emerging into independence; 'national democracy' represents an attempt to revise this classical theory in order to lay a foundation for a more realistic communist policy.

The classical two-stage theory was based on Stalin's intepretation of the 'Theses on the National and Colonial Revolution' propounded by

1 'O gosudarstve natsionalnoy demokratii', *Kommunist*, 1961, 8; *Politicheskoe Samoobrazovanie*, 1961, 9; 'Novy etap obshchevo krizisa kapitalizma', *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*, 1961, 2; 'Krizis kapitalizma', *Pravda*, 17 December 1961.

2 e.g. Donald Zagoria, 'Sino-Soviet friction in underdeveloped areas', *Problems of Communism*, 1961, 2.

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Lenin at the second congress of Comintern. It assumed that the subject peoples would achieve their liberation from imperialist domination and from their 'feudal', i.e. pre-capitalist domestic rulers by a revolution that would be at once national and 'bourgeois-democratic'. The 'national bourgeoisie', i.e. the patriotic and modern-minded part of the upper class of those countries, comprising in the typical communist view not only industrialists and part of the traders but also nationalist officers, bureaucrats, and intellectuals, would take part in this revolutionary movement along with the workers, the peasants, and the urban petty-bourgeois, and would normally even lead it; but because the revolution against imperialism and feudalism could only win as a movement of the popular masses, this first, national and 'bourgeois-democratic' revolution would also lead to the rise of powerful class organisations of the workers and peasants, including a battle-tried communist party. It would thus create ideal preconditions for the second revolution, in which the communist-led workers and peasants would overthrow the rule of the 'national bourgeoisie' and, with the help of the Soviet Union, inaugurate a 'non-capitalist development' (the phrase is Lenin's), leading ultimately to the construction of a 'socialist' order.

The theory was elaborated by Stalin on the occasion of the Chinese revolutionary crisis of 1924–27; and even there it broke down completely, because the 'national bourgeoisie', represented by Chiang Kai-shek, proved its ability to consolidate its power, subject the workers and peasants to its control, and suppress the communists. But as Stalin had been attacked by Trotsky for his earlier support of Chiang and had staked his authority on the correctness of his theory, he could not admit that it was wrong; he merely argued that Chiang had 'betrayed' the revolution and gone over to its imperialist-feudal enemies, and that therefore the first stage—the national and 'bourgeois-democratic' revolution—had not yet been victoriously completed either. On this basis, Mao Tse-tung, having assumed sole leadership of the Chinese Communist party in 1935, undertook a first revision of the theory in 1939[3]: he claimed that the communist party must assume sole leadership already during the first stage of the revolution, and create a 'New Democracy' that would be based on the 'classical' coalition of four classes, including the 'national bourgeoisie', but would dispense with the need for a corresponding political coalition with independent non-communist parties. Of course, once this kind of 'new democracy' had won, the transition to the second stage of the revolution would amount to no more than a change of policy by the ruling communist party—the shedding of its consideration for its erstwhile bourgeois allies—without any change in the political structure itself.

When the Chinese communists finally conquered the whole mainland in 1949, this Maoist version of the two-stage theory was at least tentatively

[3] 'The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese CP', *Selected Works*, vol. 3 (London, 1954).

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accepted by the Soviets and the international communist movement.[4] National liberation of colonial and semi-colonial countries was considered by both Moscow and Peking, in the teeth of all contrary evidence, as possible only under communist leadership, with the corollary that a number of great Asian countries that emerged into national sovereignty, beginning with India, were held to be still ruled by imperialist stooges and to be suitable objects for communist-led 'liberation movements'. Yet these attempts proved uniformly unsuccessful. Only in Vietnam, where the stubbornness of a shortsighted colonial power coincided with the presence of a strong and well-led communist party, did the latter in fact achieve leadership of a revolutionary movement for national liberation according to the Maoist prescription, and succeed in founding a communist dictatorship on that basis.

AFTER the death of Stalin, and particularly after the Geneva settlement for Indochina and the formation of Seato, the doctrinaire denial of the independence of the ex-colonial, uncommitted nations was abandoned by both Moscow and Peking: the communist powers now understood that these emerging nations were becoming a major new factor on the world scene, and that it was vital to keep them at least neutral. But the remarkably quick transition of the communist governments to the diplomatic realism of the panch shila and the Bandung conference left the communist parties of the ex-colonial countries in a kind of theoretical void, without clear guidance for their strategy.

If the new nations were really independent, they had presumably achieved national liberation without benefit of communist leadership, and the Chinese example was not universally applicable. But Stalin's older version did not seem to apply to them either, because hardly any of the new nations fitted the communist vision of a revolutionary democracy—even of one under bourgeois leadership. In fact, more and more of them were achieving independence without any kind of revolution; and those regimes which could justly be described as emerging from national revolutions tended to be led by non-communist dictators who, while gladly accepting the economic aid of the communist powers and their diplomatic support against the 'imperialists', insisted on limiting or altogether suppressing communist activity at home, and on themselves controlling any class organisations of the workers and peasants. In either case, with independence achieved and the new nationalist regimes firmly in the saddle, the communist parties were still in fairly weak positions in almost all the new countries—far too weak to attempt a frontal attack on the nationalist regimes in order to inaugurate the 'second stage'.

At the same time, some of the revolutionary nationalist leaders were setting out, without any communist prompting, to tackle further tasks of the 'bourgeois-democratic revolution' beyond the winning of national

[4] Cf. the reproduction of the corresponding passages of Liu Shao-chi's address to the Peking conference of the WFTU in *Pravda*, 4 January 1950, and the editorial repetition of its key arguments in *For a Lasting Peace*, 27 January 1950.

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sovereignty. They endeavoured to reform land tenure and to liquidate feudal or tribal positions of power; they embarked on a planned development of industry, using both communist and Western help but looking in fact for a road which, in accordance with the conditions in their countries, was neither capitalist nor communist. In doing this, some of the new nationalist regimes came into conflict with Western capitalist interests and with one or more of the major Western governments. It looked as if in these countries the national, anti-imperialist revolution was going on *after* the achievement of 'formal' independence; all that was needed was for the communists to use the opportunities of the post-colonial phase of the 'first stage' to gain the influence and organised strength which they had failed to gain in the struggle for independence.

It was, in fact, the rise of a number of such nationalist revolutionary regimes in the second half of the 1950s, and the opportunities, successes, and setbacks it brought for the communists, that prompted the renewed discussion of communist strategy from which the concept of the 'independent national democratic state' has emerged. The relevant events include the turn from President Nasser's marked pro-Soviet orientation in the pre-Suez and the immediate post-Suez period to his conflicts with the Soviets, first over their unsuccessful opposition to the union of Syria with Egypt in 1958, and then over their successful opposition to a similar union with Iraq in early 1959, the persecution of the communists in the UAR and the development of an ideology of 'Arab Socialism'; the Iraqi revolution of summer 1958, the growth of communist influence in support of Kassem's struggle against the Nasserites, and the setback of the summer of 1959; the secession of Guinea from the French community in an atmosphere of bitter conflict in September 1958, and the subsequent quick growth of Guinea's ties with the Soviet bloc; the victory of Fidel Castro's movement in Cuba at the beginning of 1959, its growing conflicts with the United States and increasing reliance on Soviet and communist support; and the development of President Sukarno's 'guided democracy' in Indonesia in steady conflict both with Dutch interests and with moderate domestic elements, leading to a general restriction of party life but to a growth of communist influence on the government.

SERIOUS communist discussion of the lessons of these events seems to have started early in 1959. One of the first public signs was an international debate on the role of the 'national bourgeoisie', held in May of that year in Leipzig, extracts from which were subsequently printed in *Problems of Peace and Socialism* (no. 8–9, 1959). The debate started from the common assumption that the national and democratic revolution—the first stage according to the classical theory—was not completed with the achievement of 'formal independence' by the ex-colonies, and also remained on the agenda of the 'semi-colonies' of Latin America; the struggle for real independence from imperialist economic control and for internal emancipation from the rule of foreign monopolies and feudal landlords by democratic and agrarian reforms

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remained the immediate task in all those countries. It followed that the classical four-class alliance, including the 'national bourgeoisie', was still needed to fulfil that task. But as the contradictions inherent in the nature of that class were leading to more pronounced waverings once independence was won and the further the national and democratic revolution proceeded, it followed that the completion of that revolution would henceforth depend increasingly on the ability of the working class, led by the communists, to rally the peasants to its side and together with them exert effective pressure on the national bourgeoisie in favour of a consistent revolutionary policy. In other words, the communists, while seeking to hold together a broad united front, including the national bourgeoisie, with a 'national democratic' programme, must begin the struggle for leadership within that front—not necessarily and indeed not normally in the sense of seeking to overthrow the governments headed by popular nationalist leaders at that stage, but in the sense of seeking to force their own policy on them.[5]

Throughout the discussion, in which no Chinese communist took part, the Soviet policy of economic aid for uncommitted governments of the 'national bourgeoisie'—including those that suppressed their own communists—was not called in question; on the contrary, the importance of close economic relations with the communist countries as a factor helping to keep the national bourgeoisie on the right path was stressed by several participants. But the new element in the discussion was not this endorsement of Soviet realism; the emphasis was rather on the point that Soviet diplomatic and economic support for the ex-colonial countries, however vital, was not in itself enough to ensure the completion of the national and democratic revolutions without the presence of skilfully led communist parties within them. Egypt had shown the dangers of communist weakness, Iraq the risks of rashness, Cuba and Indonesia seemed to indicate the gains that could be reaped with flexible tactics, while Guinea posed the problem of a revolutionary regime with a pronounced pro-Soviet orientation in a country where no communist party as yet existed.

By June 1960, the new emphasis on the communist task was clearly expressed in the resolution on the 'struggle against colonialism' adopted by the Peking session of the General Council of the WFTU. It will be recalled that this session witnessed a major Chinese communist attack on the Soviet concepts of peaceful coexistence and disarmament, and the rejection of the Chinese criticism by the large majority of delegates. No similar clash was, however, reported over the resolution that called on working class organisations in the colonial and ex-colonial countries to increase their activity in the movements for national liberation, and to

[5] By the spring of 1960, all these elements of the new strategy, including the national democratic label, were fully developed by the Indonesian communists; see the quotations from speeches and essays by their leader, D. N. Aidit, in J. M. van der Kroef, 'Lenin, Mao and Aidit', *China Quarterly*, April–June 1962, pp. 25–27. This largest and most influential communist party in any ex-colonial country thus seems to have acted as pioneer and model for the new concept.

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'assume the leading role in forming and consolidating a united national front, based on the alliance of workers and peasants and rallying all other anti-colonial forces'.[6]

The declaration of the 81 communist parties adopted six months later in Moscow, while giving a more detailed analysis of the role of the different classes in the 'national, democratic united front', is actually less explicitly emphatic on the 'leading role' of the working class: it paraphrases it by describing the working class as the most consistent force demanding the full consummation of the national, anti-imperialist, democratic revolution, and by saying that the degree in which the national bourgeoisie will join in the liberation struggle will depend largely on the strength and solidity of the alliance between the working class and the peasants. But the more cautious language used in this document intended for mass propaganda—and also in the programme of the CPSU adopted in 1961—does not express a less definite claim to leadership; that is clearly shown by Khrushchev's report on the conference, which states bluntly that 'the correct application of Marxist-Leninist theory in the liberated countries consists precisely in finding the forms which. . . will make it possible to unite all the healthy forces of the nation, and to assure the leading role of the working class within the national front in the struggle to eradicate imperialism and the remnants of feudalism and to clear the way for a movement that will ultimately lead to socialism'.[7]

With this hint that the strategic meaning of the new slogan of 'national democracy' was to open the road for the transition to 'socialism'—which in communist language is synonymous with the transition to communist party rule—in the ex-colonial countries, Khrushchev had gone beyond the text of the declaration of the 81 parties. Subsequent Soviet comment on the declaration was further to elaborate that hint. In February 1961, Professor Arzumanyan concluded an outline of the conditions needed for completing the democratic, anti-imperialist revolution in those countries by asking: 'But is that equivalent to socialism?' and replied; 'It is not yet socialism, but a transitional stage on the road to socialism. It is the road of a state of national democracy.'[8]

A few months later, Boris Ponomarev, head of the department for relations with non-governing communist parties in the central committee of the CPSU (who has since been promoted to membership of the central committee Secretariat), explained that the transitional function of the new type of state consisted in starting its country on the 'non-capitalist road of development'.[9] When the draft programme of the CPSU was published shortly afterwards, it equated the choice between the capitalist and the non-capitalist roads now facing the ex-colonial countries with the

[6] *World Trade Union Movement*, 1960, 7.

[7] *World Marxist Review*, 1961, 1. These quotations show that John Kautsky's assumption that the Soviet leaders invented 'national democracy' as a new name for the stage in which the 'national bourgeoisie' must lead (*Survey*, No. 43, p. 124) is mistaken: they invented it to mark a turn to an effort to wrest leadership within the united front from the national bourgeoisie.

[8] *Mirovaya Ekonomika*, loc. cit.

[9] *Kommunist*, 1961, 8.

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choice between capitalism and socialism. In introducing the draft at the 22nd congress, Khrushchev was still more outspoken: 'The seething underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, pursuing to the end the national-liberation, anti-imperialist revolution, will be able to carry out the transition to socialism. In the present era, practically every country, irrespective of the level of its development, can take the path leading to socialism'. And, having repeated that 'only the unification of all democratic and patriotic forces in a broad national front can lead the peoples on to this path', he summed up: 'Marxist theoretical thought, profoundly studying the objective course of development, has discovered the form in which the unification of all the healthy forces of a nation can be most successfully achieved. This form consists in the national democratic state' (*Pravda*, 19 October 1961).

WE are now in a position to see the new concept of the 'independent national democratic state' in its strategic context. First, it is the interim goal the communists propose as a common objective for a united national democratic front in ex-colonial or semi-colonial countries. It is identical with the consummation of their classical first stage of the colonial revolution—the 'national, bourgeois-democratic revolution' against imperialism and feudalism. In other words, *'national democracy' calls for a post-colonial extension of the first stage of the colonial revolution.*

Secondly, this post-colonial extension has become necessary because experience has shown that most former colonies are attaining independence without having passed through a first stage of the classical type, and therefore without having acquired the preconditions for the second, 'socialist' stage of the revolution. The struggle for 'national democracy' is to create these preconditions by breaking the new country's economic ties with the 'world system of imperialism', and creating in their place economic links with the 'socialist states', by destroying its pre-capitalist ruling class through agrarian reform, and by giving the communists the chance to organise the working class and the peasants under their leadership which they may not have had under the colonial regime. *The demand for an 'independent, national democratic state' is thus a 'transitional slogan' on the road to the second, 'socialist' stage of the revolution.*

Thirdly, because the demands summed up under this slogan still form part of the classical first stage, they call for a continuation of the classical four-class-coalition, of a broad national united front including the national bourgeoisie and the nationalist leaders representing it: 'National Democracy' is *not* a 'New Democracy' of the Chinese type, in which the communists themselves claim to represent all four classes—it is only used as a slogan where independent nationalist political forces have to be taken into account. But because these demands are at the same time intended to put the country firmly on the 'non-capitalist road of development', to create the conditions for the second, 'socialist', phase, they can be clearly

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and consistently formulated only by the communists. *The struggle for 'national democracy' is a struggle for communist leadership within the united national front*, for the extension of communist influence on the nationalist government, and the communist occupation of key positions in the political, military, and economic state machine, yet conducted wherever possible within the framework of the existing nationalist regimes —without aiming at this stage at the overthrow of popular nationalist leaders.

Finally, because in the struggle for 'national democracy' the communists are seeking to build up their influence and to win leadership of the united national front, it is accompanied by an open ideological attack on all native varieties of nationalist or populist socialism in the name of Marxism-Leninism. In campaigning for 'national democracy', the communists reject the description of the united front programme of planned industrialisation and agrarian reform by their leftwing nationalist allies as socialist, calling such a term 'demagogic' and 'premature', and seeking to reserve it for their own second-stage programme of complete nationalisation of industry and forced collectivisation of agriculture. *Adoption of the slogan of national democracy for the united national front goes with the reassertion of the dogma that, contrary to the view of the Yugoslav 'revisionists' and of many radical nationalists, the achievement of socialism in the ex-colonial countries (as in all other countries) will only be possible once state power is in the hands of a communist party.*[10]

Inasmuch as the strategy of 'national democracy' could be interpreted as a reassertion of communist political and ideological independence from the 'national bourgeoisie', and a more militant bid for communist leadership of the new nations, the Chinese communist critics of Soviet policy might have been expected to welcome it. In fact, however, the resolution of the Chinese communist central committee approving the Moscow declaration of December 1961 (*Peking Review*, No. 4, 1961), makes no mention of the new formula, and Chinese communist propaganda has not used it since. While Peking has made no direct attacks on the new concept, an authoritative article published in mid-1961 on the corresponding phase of the Chinese experience,[11] indicates its dissent by sticking to a different terminology throughout: where Soviet and international communist documents now speak of a 'national democratic front' completing the democratic phase of the revolution by means of an 'independent state of national democracy', the Chinese attribute that function to a 'people's democratic united front' and a 'people's democratic dictatorship'. Nor is the difference purely verbal: the Chinese concept, taken from Mao's theory of the 'new democratic revolution', requires the conquest of full power by the communists (though in the name of a four-class coalition)

[10] For relevant quotations cf. the article by L. Labedz in *Survey*, No. 43, pp. 5–6.
[11] Li Wei-hau, 'The Chinese People's Democratic Front: its special features', *Red Flag*, 1961, 12, reproduced in *Peking Review*, 18 August, 25 August, and 1 September 1961.

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as a condition for completing even the 'democratic' phase of the revolution; the new Soviet concept, as we have seen, implies a real if transitional sharing of power between the communists and their 'bourgeois nationalist' partners in the 'national democratic' regime.

What makes the change unacceptable to the Chinese is above all the Soviet view that in favourable conditions, both the 'national democratic' transition from bourgeois-nationalist to communist leadership of the united front and finally of the government, and the later transition from a communist-directed 'democratic' to a 'socialist' revolution, may be peaceful. In the words of Ponomarev, 'there can be no doubt that the state of national democracy offers prospects for a transition to a higher type of social order, according as the objective and subjective conditions for it are brought to maturity by the struggle of the peoples of those countries. For achieving a socialist order, revolutionary changes in one or another form are necessary. But it is not excluded that the road to a non-capitalist development will lead in some countries through the state of national democracy'. The Chinese are willing enough to admit the peacefulness of the change from the 'democratic' to the 'socialist' phase of the revolution once communist power is complete, but they deny that the original achievement of full communist power in the course of the democratic revolution—the wresting of power from the hands of the nationalists—can be peaceful: they cling to their recently restated dogma that no transition from a bourgeois-led government to a communist-led government is possible without the violent destruction of the old state machine.[12]

Closely linked to this is a second major difference which concerns the usefulness of extending the economic power of 'national democratic' governments, even when still led by bourgeois nationalists, by nationalisation measures and the development of state-owned industries. In the Soviet view as expounded by Ponomarev, these are important steps along the non-capitalist road: 'The experience of the development of states that have recently liberated themselves from the imperialist yoke shows that, as a result of the nationalisation of foreign banks and monopolies and of the creation of state-owned factories, banks, etc. on this basis, there arises a more progressive form of ownership than private ownership—the state ownership of the means of production'. He also argues that the growth of the public sector in a state of national democracy offers the 'progressive forces' an opportunity to occupy important economic positions and thus to increase their political influence. But in the Chinese view, the growth of this sector under a bourgeois government may only pave the way for 'bureaucratic capitalism which is an ally of imperialism and feudalism';[13] by this they understood the use of the economic power of the state for the accumulation of private fortunes and privileged economic positions by

[12] See particularly the comments on the publication of the fourth volume of the works of Mao Tse-tung in *People's Daily*, 6 October 1960, and *Red Flag*, 2 November 1960.
[13] Wang Chia-hsiang in *Red Flag*, 1 October 1959.

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political office-holders and their families, as happened under the Kuomintang regime—a phenomenon not unknown in other underdeveloped countries today.

BUT the main Chinese disagreement with the new—as with the old—Soviet policy for the ex-colonial countries is bound to concern the link between communist strategy within them and Soviet diplomacy towards them—the co-ordination between the diplomatic and the revolutionary planes on which Soviet relations with the non-communist world have always proceeded.

Between their turn in 1954 to the diplomatic courting of newly independent countries and the end of 1958, the Soviets had given the impression of relying for influence on them almost entirely on goodwill between governments—on the importance of their backing for the new states in all conflicts with the imperialists, the attraction of their anti-colonialist policy, the value of their offers of credit and trade, and the prestige of their own example of successful forced development without Western help. In discussing the future of the ex-colonial nations, they had presented it in terms of completing political independence by the achievement of economic independence from the 'imperialist world system' with its lop-sided division of labour, and had never tired of pointing out that the existence of their own 'socialist world system' would enable the new nations to cut their economic ties with the West and rely increasingly and in the end exclusively on communist aid and trade. The chance for the former colonies to follow a 'non-capitalist road' of development thus appeared to be due to the growing political and economic strength of the 'socialist camp', and it would improve as the relation of forces between this camp and its imperialist opponents improved.

In the discussion of communist strategy within the new nations by Soviet writers from 1959 onwards, it was increasingly emphasised that the use of these international chances, the choice of one or the other road of development by the former colonies, depended on the internal decisions of the peoples concerned. While solemnly disclaiming any intention of interfering with the free choice of the ex-colonial peoples, Soviet writers began to show an undisguised interest in the outcome of that choice. States that were, in the Soviet view, showing by their anti-imperialist orientation and their nationalisation of foreign capital assets that they were moving towards 'national democracy'—notably Cuba, Guinea, Ghana, Mali, and Indonesia—were freely praised and promised generous support. More and more frequently, the examples of the once backward republics of Soviet Central Asia and even of the Mongolian People's Republic were cited [14] as proof that even fairly primitive peoples could

[14] See, in addition to the programme and Khrushchev's speech, Kirichenko's article in *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, 1961, 11; and J. Tsedenbal, 'From Feudalism to Socialism', *World Marxist Review*, 1961, 3.

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now avoid capitalism and 'take the path leading to socialism'—provided they cut all ties to the capitalist world market and relied exclusively on Soviet bloc aid and guidance. There are indeed indications that the Soviets look on the pre-socialist Soviet Republics of Khorezm and Bokhara, founded in 1920, and on the Mongolian People's Republic, as the classical models of a 'national democratic' development carried to its logical conclusion.

At the same time, nationalist governments that showed by measures against their native communists that their internal development was tending in an 'anti-democratic' direction—notably Nasser's Egypt and later also Kassem's Iraq—were now as frankly criticised by authoritative spokesmen from Khrushchev downwards, and were warned that such 'despotic' methods, by undermining the unity of their nations, might ultimately even jeopardise their hard-won independence from imperialism. But to the new sharpness of the ideological distinction between 'progressive' and 'reactionary' regimes in the new states, there corresponds no similarly clearcut contrast between the promise of Soviet aid to the incipient 'national democracies' and its refusal to emergent 'nationalist despotisms'. On the contrary, substantial amounts of Soviet aid have continued to be granted to the latter as well—to the evident dismay of Peking.

In fact, the Soviets clearly consider that their diplomatic and economic practice towards the new countries must continue to be governed by their *actual*, diplomatic independence from the 'imperialists'—not by internal developments that might, according to communist theory, *potentially* endanger that independence. They have decided against making their loans conditional on the increase of communist influence in the recipient countries, not because they are opposed in principle to interference in their internal affairs, but because they cannot afford to impose such conditions owing to the intense competition between themselves and the West for the goodwill of these countries—just as the Western countries cannot afford to make their own aid conditional on the abandonment of military neutrality. In reply to Chinese criticism, the Soviets have defended their policy by saying that they are 'granting economic and technical assistance to the former colonies on an intergovernmental basis, rendering it to nations and not to some classes within them', claiming that the struggle there was 'not solely or chiefly' an internal class struggle, but a joint struggle against imperialism.[15]

ALTHOUGH this statement antedates the adoption of the formula of 'national democracy'—it was published in June 1960—the latter has made no difference to the policy it expresses. The promises of Soviet aid for all countries striving to consolidate their newly won independence from imperialism remain unqualified by any reference to the internal development of those countries both in the 1960 Moscow declaration

15 In an article on 'Soviet aid and its critics', in *International Affairs* (Moscow), 1960, 6

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and in the new programme of the CPSU. The reason is hinted at once again in Ponomarev's authoritative comment on the concept of national democracy: 'What matters here is not to classify all liberated countries and to say: these belong to one category, those to another. Such an approach would be schematic and harmful'. In other words, the Soviets are aware that the development of most of the new countries is still in flux, and while they seek to analyse its direction in each case, they bear in mind that it may still change. The concept of national democracy is intended as a signpost for communist strategy within the ex-colonial nations, not as a classification for the disbursement or refusal of Soviet credits.

As a strategic concept for communist parties in the ex-colonial countries, national democracy has a significant European model in the concept of 'people's democracy' as used between 1945 and 1947. Today, the word is used only for the communist states of Eastern Europe, and the programme of the CPSU describes it as 'a variety of the dictatorship of the proletariat'. But it was originally intended as a slogan for the West European democracies freshly emerging from the war and from occupation by Nazi Germany, and as a description of a state of affairs in some East European countries which, while clearly brought about by communist initiative, still seemed to fall short in important respects of a full-fledged communist party dictatorship.

'People's Democracy', as then described, was the rule of a coalition of progressive, democratic forces, and only after the success of the Prague coup of February 1948 did 'people's democracy' finally lose its value as a transitional slogan, and turn out to be 'a variety of proletarian dictatorship'—formally distinct from the Soviet system by its retention of the trappings of parliamentary government and of a sham coalition with satellite parties deprived of the last vestiges of independence, but substantially identical with it in being subject to total control by the communist party.

From what has been said, the similarity of the two strategic concepts appears too striking to be unconscious. The attempt to extend a broad movement of national liberation beyond the fact of liberation, to inspire it with more far-reaching revolutionary aims without proclaiming straight communist demands, to maintain a common front with bourgeois elements but struggle to assume its leadership, even to use examples from inside the Soviet orbit as models for countries in apparently similar situations outside it—all this the present use of 'national democracy' has in common with the original use of 'people's democracy'. But it does not follow that the prospects of the new slogan can be deduced from the results of the old—for the situation and problems of the ex-colonial nations are quite different from those of post-war Europe.

MUCH of the communist immediate economic and social programme for the under-developed countries—whether ex-colonial or not—reflects their genuine problems, even if in a doctrinaire and one-sided

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form. It is true, for instance, that in many of these countries a radical reform of land tenure is urgently needed, that none of them can achieve a harmonious and all-round economic growth without state planning of investment and a more or less pronounced growth of the public sector, and that in many cases these measures cannot be achieved without hurting the interests and therefore provoking the resistance not only of the traditional native oligarchy or upper crust, but also of some major Western business firms enjoying a privileged position inherited from the colonial or semi-colonial past. The road of national independence and development for these countries must indeed be to some extent a 'non-capitalist road', not in the sense that it would be incompatible with an important contribution by capitalist private enterprise, both domestic and foreign, but in the sense that in those countries such a contribution can be fruitful only in the framework of a national plan—that they cannot follow the road of classical *liberal* capitalism once travelled by the old industrial countries of the West.

But it is not true, as experience increasingly shows, that the developing countries have only the choice between the roads of doctrinaire liberal capitalism and doctrinaire communism—that a 'non-capitalist' road in the above, realistic sense must be a 'socialist' road in the communist sense of complete nationalisation of industry and forced collectivisation of agriculture. Nor is it true that a policy of state-controlled national development which conflicts with the interests of some important Western firms will necessarily be resisted by the Western powers, or that 'capitalist' countries like the United States are bound to refuse aid for such a policy of planned development, leaving the nationalist planners with no option but one-sided dependence on the Soviet bloc. In general, the best chance for these countries lies in choosing a road of economic development which is neither the classical capitalist nor the communist road, and a foreign policy which does not lead to one-sided dependence either on the Western or on the Soviet bloc.

Here is the fundamental flaw of the strategy of 'national democracy'. The true interests of the developing countries do not require a policy that calls for communist leadership and exclusive reliance on Soviet support, but are served best by a policy of nationalist planning and bloc-free independence. Where the nationalist leaders adopt such a policy, which they frequently describe as their own homegrown variety of socialism, the communist chances of gaining mass influence and ultimately achieving the transition to their 'second stage' revolution are correspondingly reduced: hence the growing irritation in the ideological attacks on such eclectic socialist doctrines,[16] not only in the case of Nasser but even of such erstwhile candidates for the 'national democratic' label as Sekou Touré. Whenever a non-communist leader uses the term 'socialist' to describe his own policy, he is indicating his confidence in his ability to

[16] See in particular Khrushchev's speech in Sofia of 18 May 1962 (*Pravda*, 20 May 1962).

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find his own road of development and his refusal to see his regime as a mere transition to communist rule.

To this increasingly typical situation, the strategy of 'national democracy' provides no answer.[17] It tells the communists to seek nationalist allies and to press for influence on the nationalist governments while striving to avoid premature conflict with them; but it leaves them at a loss what to do if the intended allies refuse to accept them as partners, as in Morocco and Algeria, and if the nationalist rulers will not permit communist parties, as in Egypt or even in Guinea. They may attack Nasser as a despot, but they hesitate to go to the same length in the case of Touré—and Soviet credits continue to reach both. In fact, by continuing to support uncommitted countries even if their governments show no willingness to accept communist guidance for their road of development, the Soviets tacitly admit that a third road between classical capitalism and communism is possible for those countries. But, as we have seen, the doctrine of 'National Democracy' presupposes the denial of that possibility. Soviet diplomacy towards the new countries and communist strategy within them thus appear to be based on premises that stand in flat contradiction with one another.

(This is a revised version of a paper written for the Fourth International Conference on World Politics, held in Athens in September 1962 under the auspices of the Panteios School for Political Sciences.)

[17] I am aware that the above argument applies mainly to Asia and Africa, and that the situation in Latin America is rather more favourable to the communists. Because of the long association between most of the Caudillo regimes and the economic influence of foreign (particularly US) business, Latin American revolutionary nationalists tend to see themselves as champions of a 'democratic revolution'. Moreover, while Asian and African nationalists are inclined to deny the relevance of European political ideas to their problems and to distrust communism as an 'alien' ideology, Latin American revolutionaries, owing to their different cultural heritage, incline to think about their problems in terms borrowed from the French revolution and the Marxist and syndicalist intellectuals of Latin Europe, and to accept the communists at their own valuation as the extreme 'left' of the democratic revolutionary movement. Finally, the still recent tradition of US diplomatic support for anti-democratic regimes of the conservative oligarchy, and the absence of Soviet involvement with such regimes in Latin America (in contrast to Soviet aid for, say, Afghanistan or Ethiopia), favours the communist effort to identify the struggle for national independence, economic development, and social reform with an anti-Yanqui and pro-Soviet attitude. To that extent, the case of Cuba, where 'national democracy' fulfilled its destiny more rapidly than the communists themselves expected, is symptomatic rather than accidental.

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ON 'NATIONAL DEMOCRACY'

II. Evolution of a Concept

Justus M. van der Kroef

AMONG the more controversial features of the new 1961 programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is its formulation of certain principles of 'national liberation' and revolutionary development, collectively designated as 'national democracy' and held to be generally applicable to the newly emergent nations of the world. These principles, involving primarily a class analysis in the context of a multi-stage revolutionary process, had already found their way into the 1960 Moscow statement, and today the concept of 'national democracy' is the lodestar of communist strategy from Indonesia to Morocco and from Argentina to Iran.

In keeping with the predominantly agricultural character of the economies of underdeveloped countries, the communist strategy of 'national democracy' emphasises the important role of the peasantry in the revolutionary movement. The 'alliance of the working class and the peasantry' in the new nations of the world, says the 1961 programme of the CPSU, is 'the fundamental condition' for the success of the struggle to effect 'far-reaching democratic changes' and economic and social progress. This alliance must, therefore, form 'the core of the national front', and, indeed, is basic to 'national democracy'. This clause seems but an echo of the 1960 Moscow statement, where the 'alliance of the working class and the peasantry' is described as 'the most important force' in gaining national independence, democratic change, and social reform, and also as 'the basis of a broad national front'. As regards the under-developed nations of Africa, a communist theoretician recently pointed to 'the increasingly pivotal role of the emerging working class and peasantry in the united front of the independence struggle'. In Algeria the communist programme similarly stresses the importance of the alliance; 'genuine independence' in Algeria 'will be measured by the scope of the agrarian reform'. In Guatemala the content of the contemplated revolution should not only be 'anti-imperialist' and 'democratic', but also 'agrarian', and the peasantry, along with the workers and the bourgeoisie, will be the basis of the new 'democratic' and 'patriotic' government. In Indonesia the realisation of the national development programme is held to be dependent on 'the alliance of the working class and the peasantry'.[1]

[1] *Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (New York, 1961), p. 51: 'The 1960 Moscow Statement', *China Quarterly*, Jan.–March 1961, p. 41; *World Marxist Review*, May 1962, p. 74; April 1962, pp. 68–69; July 1962, p. 78; June 1962, p. 82.

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In their efforts to enlist the peasantry, communists can draw on theoretical justifications that go to the very origin of Marxism itself. Marx and Engels not only foresaw this possibility but specifically stressed the revolutionary value of the peasantry. Thus, in 1856, Marx wrote to Engels that the future of the revolution in Germany 'will depend on the possibility to back the proletarian revolution by some second edition of the Peasants' War'. In 1875 Engels described the Russian peasants as the main socio-revolutionary force in the struggle against Tsarist despotism, and in 1892 he noted the important role which the peasantry had played in three major European 'bourgeois' revolutions: the German in the sixteenth century, the English in the seventeenth, and the French in the eighteenth. In all these bourgeois revolutions, Engels contended, the peasantry furnished the fighting force, and, usually aided by the urban proletariat, pushed the bourgeois revolution on to the bitter end.

Lenin was further to refine these concepts in the communist struggle for power. 'The agrarian question is the basis of the bourgeois revolution in Russia', he declared, 'and determines the national peculiarity of this revolution. The essence of this question is the struggle the peasantry is waging to abolish landlordism and the remnants of serfdom in the agricultural system of Russia, and consequently, also in all her social and political institutions.'[2] (Mao Tse-tung's assertion that 'the Chinese revolution is virtually the peasants' revolution' seems but an echo of this.[3]) For the completion of the necessary first step in the revolution the alliance with the peasantry, based upon explicit support for the peasant's proprietary interests, was therefore indispensable, argued Lenin, and communist strategists in the underdeveloped countries, beginning with Mao, have closely adhered to this fundamental principle. In the 'Theses on the National and Colonial Question', adopted at the second Comintern congress in 1920, all communist parties in 'those states and nationalities where a backward, mainly feudal, patriarchal, or patriarchal-agrarian regime prevails' were required to support peasant movements against 'the landowners and all feudal survivals'.

The basic Leninist peasant strategy then adopted by the international communist movement was reaffirmed by subsequent Comintern congresses. The programme of the Comintern, as accepted at the sixth congress, notes with specific reference to the 'colonial and semi-colonial countries' (e.g. China, India) and to 'dependent countries' (e.g. Argentina, Brazil) that the principal tasks in these countries are, on the one hand, 'to fight against feudalism and the pre-capitalist forms of exploitation and to develop systematically the peasant agrarian revolution', and, on the other, to carry on an anti-imperialist struggle for complete independence.

[2] V. I. Lenin, *The Agrarian Programme of Social Democracy in the First Russian Revolution 1905–1907* (Moscow, 1954), p. 343.
[3] Mao Tse-tung, *On New Democracy* (Peking, 1954), p. 54.

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SEEN against these concepts and directives of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and the Comintern, the peasant strategy of Mao Tse-tung is hardly a novelty, but it is undoubtedly true that Mao added an important dimension to the tactical utilisation of the several strata of rural society by pointing out that even the wealthier and more conservative peasants, and indeed even some of the landlords and landed gentry, can participate in the united front and in the completion of the first phase of the revolution. 'Rich peasants with democratic leanings' and 'the enlightened gentry . . . which has broken away from the landlord class' can join the 'new democratic revolution', for the united front struggling to realise this revolution is 'very broad'. Distinctions were to be made, urged Mao, 'between landlords and rich peasants, among big, middle, and small landlords, and between those landlords and rich peasants who are local tyrants and those who are not . . . we should not decide on and give the same treatment to them all'. The 'enlightened gentry' are particularly useful to the united front, because their presence in the front can help persuade the intelligentsia and also sections of the bourgeoisie to accept the revolution.[4] Mao's strategy and class analysis, particularly of the rural classes, are of particular value to the newly emerging nations of the world today, but there is in them no deviation in principle from Leninism. Leninist principles have today been found applicable by communist theoreticians, not only to the East but also to the entire underdeveloped world, which has so many socio-economic problems in common, and as such these principles are the pivotal factor in 'national democratic' revolutions. Tactical flexibility remains the rule, however. While in Indonesia, for example, party leaders utter warnings against 'phase jumping', i.e. immediate establishment of socialism without going through intermediate stages appropriate to the 'anti-colonial and anti-feudal period of transition',[5] in various parts of Africa, on the other hand, where communal and tribal ownership of land is the rule, and where the landlord problem and its feudal ramifications are said to be absent, an immediate leap into a socialist stage is considered possible, and a transition period, which makes allowance for the bourgeois proprietary interests of peasant smallholders, is seen as unnecessary.[6] In these African areas the communist slogan 'land to the peasants', common in most of the underdeveloped world as part of basic Leninist strategy, should, therefore, not be used.

Peasantry and proletariat are then the basis of the party-led united front; indeed, in areas where the proletariat is small or absent, the peasantry alone will have to be that basis, and agrarian reforms will dominate party strategy, at least in the initial stages of the revolution. But various levels of the bourgeoisie can also participate in front action;

[4] Mao Tse-tung, 'On the Question of the National Bourgeoisie and the Enlightened Gentry', pp. 207–210, and 'Speech at a Conference of Cadres in the Shansi-Suiyuan Liberated Area", pp. 227–239, respectively, in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* (Peking, 1961), vol. IV.

[5] See e.g. Sakirman in *Harian Rakjat* (Djakarta), June 9, 10, 1960.

[6] *World Marxist Review*, April 1962, p. 64; May 1962, p. 72; July 1962, p. 79.

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without bourgeois participation the basis of 'national democracy' would be considered seriously impaired, unless, of course, there is no indigenous bourgeois class in an underdeveloped country. But in the various countries of the world where 'national democratic' strategy is presently applied, not all segments of the bourgeoisie participate in the same way. For example, the distinction between petty and national bourgeoisie is more meaningful in some areas than in others, according to whether the indigenous business entrepreneurial group and its attendant professionals and intellectuals have taken significant flight or not. The distinction between, say, India and the Upper Volta in this respect could hardly be overlooked by *any* politician, communist or not. In a typical colonial condition the indigenous entrepreneurial groups, frequently severely circumscribed in their activity by the position of foreign capital and foreign commercial concerns, have more of the character of a petty bourgeoisie. Later, after the colony in question attains independence, and restrictions are placed on the scope of foreign capital while indigenous capitalist enterprise is given preferential treatment by the new national government, the petty bourgeoisie may quickly and significantly broaden and strengthen its position both financially and politically. In Indonesian communist theory, one finds the bourgeoisie divided into three segments: petty, national, and *compradore*. The first two are useful allies to proletariat and peasantry in the national democratic period—bearing in mind however their tendency to 'vacillate'; the third group consists of those indigenous entrepreneurs who act as 'fronts' for the foreign imperialist capital that remains in the country; they are the agents and middlemen in the service of that capital and hence are usually targets of the anti-imperialists' struggle in the national democratic revolution. But again, tactical flexibility should not be lost sight of; for if the Comintern in 1928 did indicate the advantage to communists of temporary alliances with 'patriarchal and feudal chiefs and rulers', and if Mao Tse-tung could include enlightened 'rich peasants' and 'feudal gentry' in the democratic front, then it can hardly come as a surprise to hear D. N. Aidit, Indonesia's Communist Party chairman, declare that in certain specific conditions even the *compradore* bourgeoisie can participate in the anti-imperialist front.[7]

In Latin America Soviet theoreticians discern yet other tactically useful differentiations. There, according to a recent analysis, a distinction should be made between *haute* and *compradore* bourgeoisie, as well as apparently between these and the national bourgeoisie.[8] The *haute* bourgeoisie consists of war profiteers and 'adventurers', closely interlocked with foreign monopolists, and as a group its members shade into the presumably somewhat less nefarious *compradores*. The national

[7] D. N. Aidit, *Pilihan Tulisan* (Djakarta, 1959), vol. 1, pp. 248–249.

[8] M. Danilevich, 'Dvizhushchie sily osvoboditelnoi borby v Latinskoi Amerike', *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnie Otnosheniya*, September 1960, pp. 90–98, and Andrew C. Janos, 'New Soviet Doctrines on Underdeveloped Areas'. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 1961, pp. 21–22.

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bourgeoisie, meanwhile, consisting of big, medium, and small entrepreneurs, seems to afford still better opportunities for collaboration with the proletariat and the peasantry, though all bourgeois groups, by definition, are prone to 'wavering'. But the inherent possibility of the participation of all levels of the bourgeoisie in realising the basic objectives of the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal 'national democratic' movement is not denied anywhere in communist theory today. For the structure of political action in 'national democracy' is the widest possible national front: in the new Soviet Communist Party textbook, *The Foundations of Marxism-Leninism*, the overthrow of 'monopoly capitalism' by 'the people' is described as being accomplished by the 'coalition of democratic forces' consisting of the working class, *all* elements among the peasants, the urban middle class, and the democratic intellectuals. The 1960 Moscow statement refers to the struggle being waged by 'all the patriotic forces' united 'in a single national democratic front' against imperialism and the remnants of feudalism, and the national bourgeoisie in the colonial and dependent countries is explicitly held to be 'objectively interested' in achieving the objectives of the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggle. But though 'progressive', it is also unstable, and its participation in the revolutionary struggle will therefore differ from country to country. The same concepts appear—virtually in the same words—in the 1961 CPSU programme also. In a recent symposium in the *World Marxist Review* on the 'national democratic' path to be followed in underdeveloped countries, it is again stressed that though the national bourgeoisie is often reactionary, certain sections of it can not only participate in the national democratic front (Argentina, Morocco), but indeed such participation is necessary (Guatemala), and the private national enterprises of the bourgeoisie should not only not be nationalised, but should be specifically protected.[9]

WHAT, then, is 'national democracy'? From what has been said its salient features can now perhaps be summarised as follows:

1. The essence of Leninism is tactical flexibility, i.e. concern for those 'complicated national conditions' that govern the actual historical and political situation in which communism struggles for power. Basic to this tactical flexibility is a dynamic view of class realignments, in which, by the very nature of the Marxian dialectic, rigid, permanent, and mutually exclusive social categorisations are anathema. Mao, referring specifically to the interdependence of landlords and peasants, bourgeoisie and proletariat, imperialism and the colonial countries, in their historical development, once put this principle as follows: 'All opposite elements are like this: Under certain conditions they are on the one

[9] See *World Marxist Review*, April 1962, pp. 62–63, 77; May 1962, p. 72; June 1962, pp. 81, 84; July 1962, p. 78.

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hand opposed to each other, and on the other hand interconnected, interpenetrated, interpermeated and interdependent'.[10] The broad alliance of various, but shifting, classes and class components in a single national or united front, directed at specific party-approved objectives, is the frame of political action in 'national democracy'.

2. To determine where the class grievances lie, and what classes or segments of classes can join—however temporarily—in the united front, to analyse, for example, the internal structure of the national bourgeoisie, should not be considered as mere playing at 'the old theoretical game of distinguishing between its different strata', but rather as a demonstrably effective part of communist strategy, deadly serious also for those who are its targets. Viewing this class analysis and its frequently changing emphasis in action, one may sometimes be prone to agree that 'the Soviet image of the national bourgeoisie has been vague, contradictory, and subject to constant modification'.[11] To the communist such an assertion is merely tautological. If one bears in mind that the national bourgeoisie, from the beginning of communist theory, has been described *by definition* as being both a useful ally *and* as wavering and inclined to compromise, and if one understands the tactical application of this principle, not just in united front policy, but particularly in terms of the dynamic aspects of Marxist-Leninist class analysis, then this very shifting and contradictory character of the Soviet image of the national bourgeoisie is not only understandable in the context of communist theory, but can also and properly be appreciated as an indispensable element of communist tactics. For a correct understanding of 'national democracy,' insight into this shifting and contradictory character of the national bourgeoisie in communist thought is indispensable.

3. 'National democracy' is Mao's 'New Democracy', but the Leninist nature of both should be always placed in the foreground. Mao's 'New Democracy' is the bourgeois-democratic revolution, as Lenin had already defined it, but occurring in a colonial or semi-colonial country, and it is, therefore, according to Mao, automatically a bourgeois-democratic revolution 'of a new type'. Bourgeois democracy is not socialism, and neither is 'new democracy' nor 'national democracy'. They are all preliminary phases of socialism, which means that at a particular historical stage the interests of many classes converge in a struggle for reform, and hence 'new democracy' as well as 'national democracy' require a different structure of political action, i.e. not the dictatorship of the proletariat but a dictatorship of 'the people'. Both accord an important role to the petty and national bourgeoisie; indeed, communists are even required under these conditions to support certain capitalist aspirations of the bourgeoisie; hence the relative preponderance of the bourgeoisie (also and in particular in defining the official national political

10 Mao Tse-tung, *On Contradictions*, op. cit. p. 47.
11 Leopold Labedz, 'Introduction', *Survey*, August 1962, p. 8.

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ideology in an underdeveloped country) in the phase of the bourgeois-democratic revolution is in strict keeping with Leninist strategy. The assertion 'that the idea of the bourgeoisie leading the proletariat towards socialism is a startling new one by all traditional communist standards'[12] is therefore misleading, to the extent that it either under-emphasises or overlooks the important strategic role of the bourgeoisie in the whole revolutionary process as described by Marx and especially by Lenin.

4. The demands of communists during this preliminary revolutionary phase must be so moderate that they coincide with the interests of other classes. As early as 1922 the fourth Comintern congress, in its 'Theses on the Eastern question', stressed the need for the proletariat to put forth only so-called 'partial' demands during the period of its temporary alliance with bourgeois-democracy (e.g. establishment of an 'independent democratic republic', abolition of feudal rights, enfranchisement of women), and in the Comintern programme adopted at the sixth congress in 1928, communist parties in the colonial and semi-colonial areas were again urged to advance only 'partial' demands (e.g. racial equality, the right of peasants and workers to organise, prohibition of child labour, etc.). A current 'national democratic' application of this old principle may be gleaned from the following exhortation of M. H. Lukman, vice-chairman of the Indonesian Communist Party: 'We must always remember the terms for attracting the moderate forces . . . we must also be able to prove our power and our arguments against imperialism and against the reactionary forces in the country with successes which can be experienced also by the moderate forces'.[13]

The strategy of 'partial demands' is designed to attract as broad a national front as possible, and the demands may vary according to the particular class or segment of a class on which the party leans at a particular stage of the revolution. Hence 'national democratic' demands are not necessarily 'socialist' demands; indeed, they might—by the unwary—even be primarily regarded as 'bourgeois' demands. However, there can never be any question of a permanent alliance with the national bourgeoisie or of a permanent accommodation of its interests. As a class the national bourgeoisie must vanish in the evolution towards socialism. In the report of the commission on the National and Colonial Questions to the second Comintern congress, Lenin proposed the use of the term 'national revolutionary' instead of 'bourgeois democratic' to designate those 'bourgeois liberation movements in the colonies' which were 'genuinely revolutionary' and therefore worthy of communist support.

Today the term 'national democracy' appears strongly to reflect this same distinction, conveying to those familiar with the recurrent use

[12] John H. Kautsky, 'Russia, China, and Nationalist Movements', *Survey*, August 1962, p. 125. Professor Kautsky, in this article, appears to be reiterating his views on the alleged novelty of the preponderant role of the bourgeoisie in the early phases of communist-approved revolutionary development, which he had already advanced earlier in connection with his theories of Mao and Neo-Maoism.

[13] *Harian Rakjat*, April 5, 1958.

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of such terms as 'national', 'revolutionary', 'independent', and 'democratic' in communist theory since Marx and Lenin the impression that 'national democracy' is somehow more revolutionary and dynamic than 'bourgeois democracy' and has a wider class basis. Mao had tried to convey the same impression with his concept of 'new democracy', which referred not to a bourgeois-democratic revolution of the old type, but to a 'new' and more 'progressive' type, that is, one that is automatically part of the world proletarian revolution. Thus the term also communicates awareness of the wavering and compromising character of the bourgeoisie, and of the necessity for communists to break through bourgeois 'betrayals' of the revolution, moving from a 'dictatorship of the people' to further socialist reform and to an eventual 'dictatorship of the proletariat'. The resolution of the Tunisian Communist Party adopted at its seventh congress in March 1962, puts this whole position as follows [14]:

> Since gaining independence the content of the state has been determined by the national bourgeoisie, and what was done was infinitely more progressive compared with the colonial and semi-feudal content of the state of the time of Protectorate. Today the need is to impart to the Tunisian state a still more advanced democratic and social content.

5. The fact is, however, that there are 'concrete' conditions in the emergent nations today, as a result of which the communist party obviously cannot, and does not, wholly determine the programme of the 'national' or 'patriotic' front. Relying on its core of proletariat and peasantry, the party must, therefore, preserve its independence of action, and its independence within the united front, as Lenin and the Comintern had counselled, and this tactic becomes a particular application of 'national democracy', namely, *political* democracy, the freedom to propagate the party's distinctive programme within the frequently authoritarian political settings of newly emergent nations. In emphasising its own freedom of action, the party thus heavily underlines the 'democracy' in 'national democracy', and makes it the channel for promoting its influence in the front and in the country at large. To the extent that the party is prevented from doing so, the national bourgeoisie can again be described as 'wavering' and 'reactionary', but in the current application of 'national democracy' strategy such accusations are still relatively rare, since most parties for the time being find sufficient room for manoeuvring. A case in point is the new Republic of Mali, with a national leadership apparently dedicated to Marxist-Leninist principles but unwilling to abandon an independent or neutralist position in international affairs.[15] 'Neutralism' is in principle anathema to communist strategy, but it need hardly be pointed out that such 'neutralism' by its very character can

[14] *World Marxist Review*, July 1962, p. 69.
[15] Kenneth W. Grundy, 'Marxism-Leninism and African Underdevelopment; the Mali Approach', *International Journal*, vol. 17 (1962), pp. 300–304.

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from time to time be beneficial to overall communist objectives. A general condemnation of neutralism would in these conditions be a tactical error, and the acceptance of an independent position in conformity with the neutralist foreign policy of a given country can, also in the context of the present Sino-Soviet conflict, sometimes be doubly advantageous.[16]

6. Thus, while the term 'national democracy', like Mao's 'new democracy' before it, may convey a more progressive revolutionary image than 'bourgeois democracy', a communist party may, and in certain conditions must, be reconciled to the prevailing influence of non-communist, but usually left-leaning, nationalist elements in the 'national democratic' front. The question of foreign policy, where 'neutralism' is virtually dogma in left bourgeois nationalist circles, particularly the intellectuals, is one reason for this. Another and perhaps even more important reason lies in the complex inter-relationship between bourgeoisie and peasantry according to communist theory. The bourgeois-democratic revolution, as Lenin had emphasised, is anti-feudal and has as its political matrix the formation of the national state. In a colonial setting such a revolution is therefore also anti-imperialist, i.e. is also against foreign capitalism, and the anti-feudal and anti-imperialist aspects of the bourgeois-democratic revolution are thus extensions of one another. This essential anti-feudal and anti-imperialist policy is not only basic to bourgeois democracy, but also to Mao's new democracy and to national democracy as well. To the extent that the bourgeois national movement is anti-feudal, communists must support it, for bourgeois capitalism is a vast improvement over feudalism, as the *Communist Manifesto* made clear. The anti-feudal aspect of the bourgeois-democratic revolution is also the connecting link with the peasants' movement, and Lenin, again, had already indicated that the awakening of the peasantry is the typical feature of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in its initial stages. Hence an accommodation of the bourgeois inclinations of the peasantry, i.e. their demand for land reform, land redistribution, and private ownership by the small peasants, is an essential feature of the communist programme in this phase of the revolution. To the extent that the national democratic front is anti-feudal, it must recognise the private proprietary demands of the peasantry (with the exceptions of

[16] A case in point is the position of the Communist Party of Indonesia, a country sensitive to any infringement upon its official independent foreign policy. The Indonesian Communist Party's political survival depends upon portraying itself as 'national' and as 'independent' of any undue foreign influence. D. N. Aidit, chairman of the party, has, therefore, repeatedly stressed that portion of the 1960 Moscow statement which declares that 'All the Marxist-Leninist parties are independent and have equal rights'. This emphasis has also been used by Aidit to assume an 'independent' position in the Sino-Soviet conflict, as *vide* the party's continuing good relations with Albania, pronouncements that the Sino-Soviet dispute is an internal affair that involves the communist camp only, the simultaneous praise for and condemnation of Stalin, and the repeated encomiums for the USSR as the acknowledged 'vanguard' of the world communist movement. See J. M. van der Kroef, 'Dilemmas of Indonesian Communism', *Pacific Affairs*, Summer 1962.

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those areas, e.g. in Africa, where land ownership is tribal), and the objective effect of communist accommodation to these demands is again to strengthen the *bourgeois* rather than the socialist character of the initial period of the national democratic phase of the revolution. The communist party cannot avoid this support of private property. But, like the accommodation of the bourgeoisie's influence, this, too, is a temporary affair. The opportunities 'democratically' accorded to the communist party in the period of national democracy must be utilised by the party in such a way that peasant ownership can be gradually transformed into an increasingly cooperative and ultimately collectivist form of production and ownership.

7. There can be no question that the dictatorship of the people and the whole dynamic of revolutionary development in the underdeveloped countries depends on the effective participation and ideological reorientation of the peasantry, and even of those 'enlightened' rich peasants and landlords who agree to the dismemberment of their lands. But as this process is obviously a slow, dangerous, and laborious one, not least because of the numerical preponderance of peasants in an underdeveloped country, the strength of the national democratic front and the effectiveness of the party in it can often best be demonstrated first by confidence-winning techniques, such as emphasising the 'imperialist' dangers that confront the country. This is the essence of the tactic of 'neo-colonialism', i.e. emphasising the threat of the continued presence of big foreign capital in a newly emergent nation and of the danger of according it new development opportunities. This means that for tactical purposes the anti-imperialist aspect of the national democratic struggle must in certain conditions be more heavily emphasised than the anti-feudal revolution, and the solution to the question of land reform held somewhat in abeyance (e.g. Indonesia). The reverse, however, is also possible (Cuba), and at no time must sight be lost of the reciprocal extension of anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism in the national democratic struggle, and of the continuing dynamic role which the communist party plays in both.

8. National democracy, like new democracy, is old wine in new bottles, and it is not the novelty of the concept which merits attention but its similarity with the tenets of traditional Marxism-Leninism. However, the adoption of national democracy in Soviet policy today should not be taken to mean merely a return to the early Comintern strategy in the colonial countries after a period in which communists presumably had little interest in national liberation movements. The assertion that 'only after Stalin's death, and after many reverses, did the Soviet Union find its way back to the position from which it had started out in 1920' is erroneous for two reasons.[17]

[17] Curt Gasteyger, 'The Soviet Union and the *Tiers Monde*', *Survey*, August 1962, p. 12. On the same page Mr Gasteyger summarises what he believes to be 'the more important communist theses on colonialism' of earlier days, apparently especially those of the Comintern. One looks in vain in this summary for a reference to the importance of the peasantry, although possibly, and from the point of view of class analysis less

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First of all, Stalin never disavowed the strategy of national liberation movements in colonial countries developed by Lenin and articulated by various Comintern directives and resolutions. His pronouncements on the tactics of communist parties in colonial and semi-colonial countries were explicitly acknowledged as authoritative strategy by Mao,[18] and are so acknowledged today, despite the destalinisation compaign in the Soviet Union, in other countries, e.g. in Indonesia.[19] Stalin remains then of direct significance for national democratic strategy. While it is true that under Stalin communist strategy became pre-occupied with the struggle against fascism, the two-camp doctrine (which allegedly provided no room for a third force and hence is said to have caused the Soviets to miss opportunities in the newly developing countries) most assuredly encompassed the national liberation movement in the colonies and the continuing strategic emphasis on it. In this connection the resolution on Dimitrov's report adopted by the seventh Comintern congress in 1935 is worth reading again. This seventh congress formulated the two camp doctrine, in which communists in the colonial and semi-colonial countries participated in the general anti-imperialist ' people's front ', which meant drawing ' the widest masses into the national liberation movement ', giving unstinted support to the liberation struggle, and taking an active part in anti-imperialist movements led by ' national reformists '. Specifically mentioning China, the resolution demands the extension of the ' Soviet movement ' in China, strengthening of the fighting power of the Red Army there, etc. Far from ignoring the colonial countries, the Stalinist two camp doctrine made the national liberation, i.e. the bourgeois-democratic, struggle in these countries part of the two camp strategy. The two camp doctrine thus rested, insofar as the colonial and semi-colonial areas were concerned, on the earlier, traditional Marxist-Leninist strategy towards underdeveloped countries, and more particularly on collaboration with the national bourgeoisie. Indeed, communists themselves have interpreted the two camp doctrine as contributing—via the principle of collaboration with the bourgeoisie—to the eventual development of ' people's democracy ' after the war, and

satisfactorily, they are perhaps included in Mr Gasteyger's reference to the ' nationalist bourgeois democratic movement '. On p. 19 of the same article one reads that the theory of national democracies ' was first publicised ' in the Moscow declaration of 1960. This raises a not altogether irrelevant question of the dating of the term. The 1960 Moscow declaration was issued in November of that year. But as early as March 1960, D. N. Aidit, chairman of the Indonesian Communist Party, who had up till then consistently referred to the ' bourgeois democratic ' revolution in Indonesia, now began referring to it as ' national and democratic in character '. *Harian Rakjat*, 18 March, 1960. I do not know whether the concept of ' national democracy ' has been used by communist parties—or perhaps even by Soviet writers—elsewhere in advance of the 1960 Moscow statement.

18 Mao Tse-tung, *On New Democracy*, *op. cit.* pp. 14–16.

19 The Indonesian party agrees with current Soviet criticism of Stalin ' in connection with the cult of the individual ', while continuing to appreciate his ' useful ' contribution to an understanding of ' the revolutions in the countries of the East '. *Strengthen National Unity and Communist Unity. Third Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Indonesia* (Djakarta, 1962), pp. 80–81.

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thus, by implication, to the realisation of 'national democracy' today.[20]

Secondly, in advocating the strategy of national democracy today, the Soviet Union is not merely returning to the tenets of 1920, but rather is affirming Leninist strategy and Comintern pronouncements as late as those of the last Comintern congress in 1935, along with the experience gathered in their application for the past forty years, with Mao's new democracy strategy, and with the experience of communist parties from Iran, during the Mossadegh era, to Cuba under Castro. 'National democracy', again, is Leninist tactical flexibility, and since Lenin the opportunities for the 'creative application' of the basic Marxist-Leninist principles have been numerous. It is this body of experience, together with the canon of Marxism-Leninism, which now confront and influence the new nations of the world.

20 Describing the 'people's front' tactics formulated at the seventh Comintern congress, William Z. Foster, *History of the Three Internationals* (New York, 1955), pp. 396–397, wrote: 'The people's front policy . . . meant that the communists could work for the creation of democratic governments within the framework of capitalism; governments very probably to be regularly elected under bourgeois democracy and with communist participation in them. Experience was to show that the people's front policy, clearly worked out at the seventh congress was, a decade later, to result in the development of new forms of the dictatorship of the proletariat (People's Democracies).'

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CONVERSATIONS WITH TROTSKY

Fritz Sternberg

I MUST first give some explanation of how I came to spend about a week with Trotsky in France in 1934.

My first major book, *Der Imperialismus*, had appeared in Berlin in 1926. This work, which had little to do with current politics, was in essence a critique both of German Social-Democracy and of the German Communist party. As opposed to the communists, it analysed the reasons why the entire working classes of England, Western Europe, and America had, for longish periods, enjoyed a rise in wages; and, as opposed to social-democratic views, it sought to indicate why, although economic crises had been diminishing in the past, we were now entering a period in which such crises must necessarily become more acute and in which growing unemployment and declining wages would produce revolutionary situations.

The book aroused widespread attention. The official press of the German and Russian Communist parties naturally repudiated it because it contradicted many of their dogmas. A large number of social-democratic papers rejected it because, with German inflation eliminated only a few years before, people were counting on a boom of long duration. Thus an analysis which sought to prove that there were more crises ahead —and crises which would far surpass their predecessors in violence and intensity—did not fit in with prevailing social-democratic policy. It did, however, win the enthusiastic approval of left-wing newspapers within the social-democratic fold and on the communist fringe.

In this way I came into contact with many groups which saw eye to eye neither with the Social-Democratic party of the day nor with the German Communist party. (I myself never belonged to either.)

In 1929 I published a shorter book, entitled *Der Imperialismus und seine Kritiker*, in which I developed certain lines of thought broached in *Imperialismus* and at the same time came to terms with some of those who had criticised my views. In 1932, by which time the Nazis had become the strongest party in Germany, a further book appeared: *Der Niedergang des deutschen Kapitalismus.*

Niedergang demonstrated that many social-democratic publications were attempting to minimise and belittle the extent of the present crisis; that the social-democrats possessed no policy adequate to cope with a crisis of such dimensions; and that the German communists, on the other hand, who were attacking the social-democrats for being ' social-fascists ', had by their policy during these years forfeited all claims upon the confidence of the workers.

Meanwhile, I had joined the recently formed SAP or Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei (Socialist Labour party). The SAP gained no political

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successes. When speaking at meetings in towns all over Germany I frequently encountered agreement with my analysis of the political situation but was told that it was wrong or, at all events, too late for a new group to found a new party. Either the social-democrats (SPD) and communists (KPD) must combine, ran the argument, or a Nazi victory would be inevitable.

I was often approached during this period by individual German Trotskyists. The Trotskyists had no political influence but they were extremely outspoken on many political matters, raised problems for discussion, and devoted particular thought to questions on which Trotsky had not as yet committed himself. I was also visited by Trotsky's son, Sedov. He revered his father, but this had not turned him into a neurotic —as so often happens with the sons of brilliant and celebrated fathers— mainly because he felt personally identified with the same cause. When Sedov first came to see me in Berlin, Trotsky had already been deported from Russia and was living at Prinkipo. I told Sedov that I should very much like to meet his father, and some time later he brought me word that Trotsky would be glad to see me.

Trotsky had gone to Denmark on a brief visit (to deliver a lecture in Copenhagen, I believe), and Sedov called several times at my Berlin flat to discuss arrangements. Nothing came of it, however. Trotsky had so much to do during this trip that the most I could hope for was a single interview lasting an hour or two. In the belief that little of positive value would be gained, I did not go. I remember Sedov's visits clearly and always noted them in my diary. It was once alleged during Stalin's many campaigns of lies against Trotsky that Sedov had been in Copenhagen at a particular hour on a particular day, making preparations for a meeting between Ribbentrop and his father. On that day and at that hour Trotsky's son was, in fact, with me in my Berlin flat.

I arranged to go to Prinkipo at a later date, but that visit did not materialise either.

Then the Nazis came to power, and in March 1933 I emigrated. Trotsky left Prinkipo and in 1934 went to France, a country which I often visited although I lived mainly in Switzerland.

THE Nazi victory and the total and unresisting collapse of the German labour movement were naturally fraught with consequences at every level. The KPD tried to lie its way out of total defeat, and there were fierce altercations among the social-democrats. Because the two major German workers' parties had failed so completely, there was a brief resurgence in the power of attraction of groups which had criticised those parties before the débâcle of 1933. This applied both to the SAP and the Trotskyists. In addition, there existed outside Germany isolated parties and groups which belonged neither to the Second nor the Third International. These included the Norwegian Labour Party, which covered the overwhelming majority of Norwegian workers, the British ILP, a Dutch group which had broken away from the erstwhile Dutch

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Social-Democratic party, Trotskyists of many nationalities, and the German SAP.

In 1934 these assorted parties and groups—I may have omitted to mention a few—held a conference in Paris at which the Trotskyists introduced a resolution calling for the founding of a new, Fourth International. I attended this conference as one of the representatives of the SAP, which, like most of the other groups, rejected the Trotskyist proposal as being utterly utopian.

Some weeks after this conference, the groups represented at it—Norwegians, English, and Dutch, as well as a representative of the SAP—went to see Trotsky separately. After discussing the matter with several Trotskyists, I decided that it would be better if I visited Trotsky alone, mainly because I was a little afraid that he would otherwise concentrate the discussion entirely on his pet project, the founding of a Fourth International.

One day I left Paris for an unknown destination. Trotsky's place of residence was kept strictly secret because of persistent threats to murder him, French communists and the extreme right-wing having bitterly opposed his being granted asylum. A young man belonging to the Trotskyist group met me at my hotel and took me to the station. It was not until my ticket was bought that I discovered where I was going. After making the long journey to the coast I was met by another young Trotskyist who took me to a hotel not far from the sea. Trotsky was not staying there, however. The young man told me what bus to catch to the house where Trotsky lived. On future occasions I was to make the trip alone.

Although Trotsky's safety had been guaranteed at Prinkipo by the permanent presence of Turkish police, his French retreat was not under police surveillance. I think his wife was living there with him, though I never saw her, and his other companions included Sedov and several young Trotskyists who performed secretarial duties. There were also two trained Alsatian watch-dogs.

On the first occasion my visit was limited to half an hour and devoted to discussing the agenda for the following day.

Trotsky's study was a large room with an unusually wide desk. After he had welcomed me we sat down facing each other across it to talk. I had never seen Trotsky before, but I should have recognised his head anywhere. He was not exactly as I had imagined him, however, being taller and broader than I expected. The day was comparatively warm, I remember, and he was wearing a cream-coloured suit.

We had scarcely exchanged a few words of greeting when he began: 'You SAP people voted against the founding of the Fourth International in Paris.'

I tried to steer him off the subject, but he insisted on knowing whether I had merely toed my party's line or was personally opposed to the creation of a Fourth International. I replied that on this point I was in

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agreement with the SAP and opposed the founding of a Fourth International at this juncture, adding that I could only explain my position by giving him a really exhaustive analysis of several problems which had only been touched on superficially during the debate on the founding of a Fourth International but which, in my opinion, had been analysed either insufficiently or not at all. Trotsky then asked:

'Do you also espouse the view that the Second and Third Internationals have failed over the German question and therefore share responsibility for the Nazi victory in Germany?'

I replied that, in my view, there was no such thing as a Second or Third International, that the Russian Bolshevik party under Stalin's leadership bore the brunt of the responsibility for the defeat of the German working class, and that the Second International had done no more than pass resolutions and show a very academic interest in the matter.

'Would you be prepared', Trotsky then asked me, 'to discuss and draft, here and now, a memorandum on the failure of the Second and Third Internationals in the German question, a failure which is decisively affecting the entire labour movement in every country?'

I replied that I should be only too happy to work out such a memorandum but felt that, since my visit was scheduled to last a bare week, it would be a pretty stiff task.

Trotsky smiled. (I have a particularly vivid recollection of this because his expression almost invariably remained grave during our discussions.) 'I should like to tell you a story from the time of the Civil War', he said. 'Not only did we have to defeat our enemy physically, but we also had to send off innumerable manifestos and despatches to the Russians and the whole of the rest of the world, which was still at war when the revolution began. We also had to draft a large number of resolutions to serve as a guide to our own party. We often sat round in a small circle in those days—not at a big comfortable table like this one, but often a small one or none at all, and not sitting in comfortable chairs but often on packing-cases or barrels. When Lenin or I detailed a comrade to draft a memorandum or a decree or an analysis of a particular situation we were often told, in the early days, that the job would take weeks. Lenin's reply was: "We haven't got weeks, only hours at the most. Everyone knows the conditions we're working under, so you can head the paper 'written on my knee'." That phrase—"written on my knee"—applied to the whole of the revolutionary period'.

'And now', Trotsky went on, 'I don't insist on your bringing the memorandum with you tomorrow but I think it should be done during your present stay, and even if you are not entirely satisfied with some of the phrasing, always remember "written on my knee".'

That concluded our first talk, though we settled a few technical details before I left. Trotsky told me that he rose early but preferred to reserve the morning for his own work. He suggested that I should spend the time working on the memorandum or thinking over the questions to be discussed in the afternoon, though preferably questions concerned with

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the memorandum. After supper we might have time for wider discussion. I said goodbye and took the bus back to the village where I was staying.

NEXT afternoon I called on Trotsky at the appointed hour. As far as I can remember, he never kept me waiting. Although he was a tireless worker he had a profound awareness of time. I had made up my mind to discuss three main themes: first, the question of the so-called workers' aristocracy; second, economic crises; and, third, the question of the Second and Third Internationals. I opened with the first.

I began with Marx's assertion that the working class was subject to a law of absolute impoverishment and that this law would be modified by manifold circumstances in the course of its realisation. Marx's formula, I submitted, had become totally inadequate. We were now living in 1934, and in the sixty or more years since Marx published *Das Kapital* no absolute impoverishment had occurred. On the contrary, the industrial centres of the world had witnessed a marked rise in wages. It was significant, I continued, that even in the later editions of *Das Kapital* Marx had omitted to give any analysis of wage developments since the eighteen-fifties.

The Bolshevik party programme prior to the First World War had carefully evaded this point. I considered that Engels' expositions of this question were both faulty and inadequate. In his first work, *The Condition of the Working Class in England*, which appeared before the *Communist Manifesto*, Engels had deduced from the impoverishment of the English working class during the third and fourth decades of the nineteenth century that there would be a socialist revolution in England. But he had assumed that certain combinations of factors which were symptomatic of the first Industrial Revolution—in particular the growth of unemployment and the creation of permanent reserves of labour—were a permanent and essential characteristic of the capitalist mode of production and could not be eliminated within that framework.

In a new introduction to this work, published after Marx's death, Engels admitted some of his earlier errors and declared that in England, a country which exploited the whole world, a workers' aristocracy had grown up. However, although sections of the English working class occasionally received a share of the profits, the vast majority of English workers was in a bad way, and the English workers' aristocracy would disappear when England lost her world-power status because English workers would then be forced down to the standards prevailing in continental Europe.

These statements I regarded as equally erroneous. Not only had English workers' wages not fallen, but English, German, and French wages—not to mention those of American workers—had risen still further.

I now came to Lenin, and Trotsky, who had been listening to me, though rather as one would to an academic lecture, assumed an unusually attentive expression. Writing thirty years after Engels, Lenin had

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embodied the same fundamental errors in his *Imperialism*. He had introduced many statistics into his book, I went on, but he omitted to give a single figure on the development of real wages in England, France, Germany, or the United States, and spoke of a workers' aristocracy whose living conditions had so much improved under imperialism that it voted for war credits in the countries involved in the World War. According to Lenin, therefore, the communist objective should be to separate the broad mass of workers, which represented the majority of the working class, from the semi-bourgeois workers' aristocracy.

Against this I argued that, although there were and had always been marked differences in workers' living standards, and that it might be valid to speak of a workers' aristocracy, such an aristocracy could grow up under conditions of declining, stable, or rising wages. It was characteristic of the decades before the World War that the wages of the whole working class had risen considerably—and not in individual years but over decades and generations. That was why Lenin's views on the imminence of revolution on a world scale were illusory and why the October Revolution had remained an isolated phenomenon.

Trotsky then put a series of concrete questions on the movement of wages, all of which I was able to answer with speed and precision because I had devoted many years to just that subject. When I quoted a number of books and smaller publications, he remarked: 'I have a lot of lost ground to make up in this field. I was familiar with most of the literature on the subject until the beginning of 1917, but I never managed to do any systematic reading after that. First of all I had to help Lenin organise the Revolution and defend it during the Civil War. Then came years of reconstruction under the most arduous conditions, then the struggle with Stalin, banishment to Siberia and deportation to Turkey. In Prinkipo my time was fully occupied with writing three large books [his autobiography and the books on the February and October Revolutions], but now I must catch up and read what has come out since 1917.'

Trotsky then asked me if I thought that revolution had ever stood a chance in Germany. He wanted to know the membership of the Spartakus Bund, and whether I had any information about it beyond what was generally known. I replied that in my native Breslau, which then had half a million inhabitants and was represented in the Reichstag by two social-democratic deputies, I had only once seen a Spartakist pamphlet even though I had been keeping my eyes open for anything that appeared. I went on to say that Rosa Luxemburg was intellectually far superior to Ebert and Scheidemann. If the German social-democratic leaders really were the representatives of a workers' aristocracy and not of the broad mass of socialists, why had the great majority of the workers supported them, and why had Luxemburg and Liebknecht not managed to rally any substantial section of the working class to their side?

We discussed the workers' aristocracy question for some days. At times I felt that if I had not convinced Trotsky I had at least given him

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food for thought, but one day, when we were discussing Russian problems, he said: 'Stalin and the Stalinists are always trying to brand me as an anti-Leninist. It's a dirty slander, of course. I had profound differences of opinion with Lenin before, during, and after the Revolution, but during the Revolution itself and in the vital Civil War years agreement always predominated between us.'

Pursuing this theme, Trotsky declared that he had no wish to present his opponents in Russia with a new weapon by adopting a stand against Lenin's views on the workers' aristocracy. Once he had made it clear that, if only for tactical reasons, he did not wish to attack Lenin's position on this question, we abandoned the subject and moved on to the question of economic crises.

I opened by saying that Marx had not dealt systematically with the problem of crises in the first volume of *Das Kapital*, and that the volumes published after his death had only touched on isolated aspects of it. Yet, if his theory of the absolute impoverishment of the worker were correct, it must follow that he had counted not only on crises but on crises of ever-increasing severity. Engels had several times stressed that Marx and he were expecting the next crisis to breed new revolutionary movements, yet this crisis had not materialised during their lifetime. I further emphasised that Lenin's celebrated article on Marx for the Encyclopedia had not explored this question any more fully; all he had done was to write of the 'crises of over-production which periodically break out in capitalist countries, at first every ten years on average and then at intervals of varying duration'.

When Trotsky asked for my assessment of the situation before the outbreak of the 1914–18 war, I replied that—paradoxical as it might sound—the situation had been marked by a relaxation of economic tension coupled with a heightening of political tension. The decades in question, I continued, were characterised by brief economic crises which represented merely a temporary check to immense overall economic growth. Workers in the industrialised countries of Europe before the World War had not only enjoyed substantial wage increases, but had formed trade union bodies which had been little affected by economic fluctuations. The conclusion I drew from this was that the spokesmen-theorists of the working class had three questions to answer:

First, why were the crises of the first half of the 19th century so severe? (They left a lifelong and indelible impression on Marx and Engels.) Second, why did crises wane rather than gain in severity from then onwards, so that the great industrial nations went to war *without* prior economic upheavals of extreme violence? Third, why was the crisis of 1929 so profound that in Germany, which was more affected by it than any other European country, it rendered possible the victory of a reactionary, counter-revolutionary movement like national-socialism?

TROTSKY next asked me about the influence of the Second and Third Internationals. I, in my turn, asked Trotsky whether the

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Second and Third Internationals had existed at all before the Nazis seized power in Germany. We agreed that until that juncture they had not, but I did not think this went far enough. The Second International had been enormously overrated in the pamphlets and books published by Lenin during and after the 1914–18 war; it was never more than a loose alliance between various European Social-Democratic parties. I was unaware of any instance where it had passed a resolution aimed against one of the national parties and compelled that national party to implement it according to the principles of international socialism. Thus it was wrong, in my opinion, to ascribe the collapse of the Second International to the vote in favour of war credits. All that collapsed were the illusions which had been cherished about the Second International in many quarters, illusions which its career before the War did nothing to substantiate.

Trotsky did not entirely agree. He believed that these illusions had been an important factor and had to be destroyed—as Lenin had destroyed them—to pave the way for a Third International.

I replied that this would be correct provided that a Third International had ever existed, but that it, too, was equally non-existent. The Russian Bolshevik party, as the repository of power in Russia, dominated the Third International so completely that this so-called International and its constituent national parties became no more than a tool in Russian hands—a process which gained increasing momentum once Stalin had cemented his control over Russia. Its influence on the German Communist party and on the German labour movement had been considerable at times but, in my view, entirely negative.

Here Trotsky interrupted me: 'You know that we are in agreement here, but I was not in Germany during the period in question and you were. Perhaps you can give me a few concrete examples of where the negative effects of Russian influence on the KPD and the German labour movement have been particularly noticeable.'

I replied that under Stalin the leadership of the KPD was being constantly remoulded according to the requirements of his own factional struggles. This meant that all the really independent minds either deserted the Communist party or were excluded from it. It also meant, in the long run, that the only people who retained power within it were Stalin's errand-boys, nothing more. Finally, it meant that the Russians were being deceived—and inevitably so—as to the true state of affairs in Germany, since the KPD leaders had to disguise the real progress of the national-socialist counter-revolution as a communist advance.

I recalled how, when I was spending two months in Russia in 1930 at the time of the Reichstag elections (in which the Nazis gained huge successes and, with more than six million votes, first became a significant force), the Russian and the German communist press painted the elections as a communist victory because the communists had gained some ground at the expense of the social-democrats. I was in Tiflis at the time, and when I spoke to some Russian communists about the German situation

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they asked me what I thought of the Communist party's victory. My comment that the Communist party had not gained any victory and that the elections amounted to an overwhelming victory for the national-socialists was greeted with startled incredulity. At the time I took it for granted that the Russian provinces were out of touch with events, but I encountered the same attitude in Moscow. When I discussed the subject with other people whom I took to be better informed, they admitted that they did not believe German communist sources could provide a genuine report because every German communist official would be afraid of losing his job.

I summed up my views by saying that, while the Second International had made no impact on developments in Germany, Stalin's policy had proved of direct assistance to national-socialism. In many circles, I told Trotsky, people were even saying that Hitler's victory would have been impossible had it not been for Stalin's policy.

Trotsky terminated the discussion with a few remarks to the effect that, although we held conflicting views on a number of not unimportant points, so much common ground existed that he believed we could agree on a memorandum dealing with the German defeat and the failure of the Second and Third Internationals. He suggested that I should now draft the document.

This I duly did during my stay, and when I submitted the draft to Trotsky there were only a few minor points to be ironed out. The memorandum analysed the mistakes of the German Social-Democratic and Communist parties from the time of the world economic crisis until the Nazis' accession to power. It also drew particular attention to the entirely negative role played in Germany by the Bolshevik party under Stalin's leadership throughout this period.

Although the memorandum was, therefore, expressly directed against the Third International, it contained no recommendation as to the founding of a Fourth International. Trotsky made repeated attempts to convince me on this point, declaring, among other things, that there would at first be only small groups in various countries which would, after the failure of the Second and Third Internationals, lay stress on the formation of a Fourth International. These small groups could not be burdened with the task of vindicating the past mistakes of the major parties and must be enabled to give an uninhibited account of them so as to lay the foundations for a rebirth of the international labour movement. Employing these and similar arguments, he tried to impress upon me not only that the creation of a Fourth International was necessary, but that preparations for it should begin in the very near future.

I questioned the validity of his reasoning, arguing that a distinction had to be drawn between two types of groups within the labour movement: that which existed in countries such as Italy and Germany, where political work could only be carried on illegally, and intellectual and political development had to be partially supported by groups of exiles; and that which existed in countries like France or England, where the

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working class was enrolled in mass organisations. I told Trotsky that I knew something of the relationship between German émigrés and proscribed groups inside Germany, and said that I did not believe their work would be made any easier if a few groups of exiles proclaimed a Fourth International. It was essential to combat Stalinism among the political groups operating illegally inside Germany, but a Fourth International was not a prerequisite of this.

Turning to the countries where the working class still had mass political parties, I said that the idea of a Fourth International struck me as utterly utopian at the present time. In England or the Scandinavian countries, for instance, the communist defeat in Germany was not regarded as having any vital connection with either of the two Internationals. I could well imagine that if the working class gained and maintained power in some country other than Russia, such a development would have an effect on the international situation, and that the country in question might well become the centre of a labour movement extending beyond its own borders—especially if it did not use clumsy Stalinist methods in a bid to gain control over the working classes of other countries. That, however, was something from which concrete conclusions could be drawn only when it had actually happened. Trotsky's views on the question diverged so sharply from my own that we never attempted to bridge this particular gulf.

IT was only natural that during our hours of daily discussion we should return repeatedly to the subject of the Soviet Union. I was anxious to glean as much information from him as possible, particularly about the October Revolution and the ensuing years. He described historic incidents just as he had experienced them, and took great pains to avoid judging them from the standpoint of world history. Indeed, he sometimes admitted that events which played a decisive part in the Revolution and the history of the world struck him, who not only witnessed but played an active part in them, as far from important at the time. To hear Trotsky describe the years during which he and Lenin were the nerve-centre of the Revolution was a momentous experience, but when we moved on to the immediate past, the years 1929–33, my faith in his judgment diminished. What began as a sneaking suspicion became a growing conviction that he saw things in a false light.

Trotsky showed me the utmost courtesy during these discussions. He hardly ever interrupted me, and then chiefly when he wanted me to explain or clarify a sentence. We conversed in German, in which he was thoroughly proficient. If he was ever at a loss for a word, which was very seldom, he supplied the deficiency with French, so he had scarcely any difficulty in understanding me and rarely asked the meaning of an individual word. The only time he cut me short in mid-sentence was when I began: 'Stalin was right, up to a point . . .' I never completed the sentence, for Trotsky growled, 'Stalin is never right!'—and I promptly

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abandoned the subject, and asked him instead for his views on developments inside Russia in the past few years.

Trotsky was incapable of systematic analysis on this point. All his views and interpretations were coloured by his certainty that the Stalinist regime was destined to collapse. I raised objections to this theory from time to time, but abandoned the struggle as soon as I realised that for Trotsky it was a question of personal survival, life or death. He was only fifty-five at this time, but we now know from entries made in his diary a year later, in 1935, that he was already suffering from spells of enforced inactivity and profound depression. He evidently believed that he had not long to live.

For Trotsky, recent events in Russia were no longer to be analysed objectively but had become components in a personal equation designed to answer the question: shall I, Trotsky, return to Russia as I did in 1905 and 1917, and shall I become the leader of a new, anti-Stalinist revolution? This personal equation underlay everything he said, even though he never, of course, expressed it in so many words. It did, however, lead him to classify all that he heard about Russia—and he had numerous sources of information—according to its bearing on the likelihood of an anti-Stalinist revolutionary upheaval within the Soviet Union. This, in turn, prompted him to see the economic and general internal condition of Russia in an increasingly gloomy light. His assessment was therefore over-subtle and one-sided, even though he could often be extremely clear-sighted and objective about past events, as one example will show.

Trotsky told me that one of the many subjects on which he and Stalin had differed was policy toward China in the crucial years 1926–27. The Chinese Communist party joined Chiang Kai-shek on his victorious march from the south of China, only to be betrayed by him once the so-called war-lords of the north had been defeated. Many communist cadres were then wiped out. While there was no doubt that the Chinese communists were taken unawares by Chiang Kai-shek's treachery, it was extremely doubtful whether it was *necessary* for them to fall into his trap.

Trotsky repeatedly stressed during our conversation that, in opposition to Stalin, he had demanded that the Russians put the Chinese communists on their guard against Chiang Kai-shek and urge them to form their own independent organisations so as to be better prepared for all eventualities once victory in the north had been won. Subsequent developments in China had proved him absolutely right, Trotsky continued. He had received numerous letters from his supporters congratulating him on his correct assessment of the Chinese situation, and many people had assured him in writing or by word of mouth that his political position vis-à-vis Stalin, whom history had so patently repudiated, would improve as a result.

Trotsky told me that he had by no means shared this optimistic view of his personal position. On the contrary, he tried to impress upon his supporters that as a consequence of events in China his position vis-à-vis

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Stalin had worsened considerably. By that time, all hope of imminent revolution in Germany had been abandoned, and now the hope of an early Chinese communist victory was dashed.

The result of the communist setback in China, for which Stalinist policy was, in Trotsky's view, partially responsible, was that Stalin's general policy enjoyed even greater acceptance among the Russian masses than before because it proceeded on the assumption that no major revolutionary movement could be looked for outside Russia in the foreseeable future, and that Russia's domestic policy must be adapted accordingly. Thus Stalin would become even more powerful in Russia, especially as the communist defeat in China meant that his policy was better attuned to the world situation than before.

What did it matter, Trotsky had asked his friends and supporters, if a few hundred or, at best, a thousand or two officials within the Bolshevik party rallied to him? What did it matter that he had demonstrated his greater ability to foresee the course of events and prescribe the appropriate course of action? Those who rallied to him would not, in any case, be very numerous. Stalin's party machine was already so powerful that anyone who defected to Trotsky would be running a personal risk, so the majority of those who regarded Stalin's Chinese policy as wrong or disastrous would still remain loyal to Stalin. The end product of this would be a Russian people which, once it had been presented with the Stalinist version and interpretation of events in China, would regard Stalin's policy as correct. The party might lose a few hundred of its members—perhaps the best of them—to the Trotskyist opposition, but on balance Stalin's position would be strengthened, and his own undermined.

I MENTION Trotsky's summing up of the Chinese question because it shows that, when speaking of the past, he was quite capable of analysing a crucial combination of circumstances objectively, even when it had operated in Stalin's favour and to his own detriment. When analysing recent developments in Russia, its present situation and immediate future, however, Trotsky went completely astray. He was guided by a single consideration: how to regain power and lead Russia once more along the path of revolution. This obsession had created a system of mental blocks which precluded any objective analysis of present-day Russia. It was also the thing that prompted him to focus all his energies on the formation of a Fourth International—which never, in fact, represented more than a very loose alliance between Trotskyists from various countries.

As our discussions proceeded, it became increasingly clear to me how greatly Trotsky underestimated his own achievements in the past and overestimated his activities while in exile. His disarming frankness on this point emerges from his diaries for the following year, in which he describes his part in the October Revolution and his preparatory work for the International:

And still I think that the work in which I am engaged now, despite

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> its extremely insufficient and fragmentary nature, is the most important work of my life—more important than 1917, more important than the period of the Civil War or any other. For the sake of clarity I would put it this way. Had I not been present in 1917 in Petersburg, the October Revolution would still have taken place—*on the condition that Lenin was present and in command*. If neither Lenin nor I had been present in Petersburg, there would have been no October Revolution: the leadership of the Bolshevik party would have prevented it from occurring—of this I have not the slightest doubt! If Lenin had not been in Petersburg, I doubt whether I could have managed to overcome the resistance of the Bolshevik leaders . . . Thus I cannot speak of the 'indispensability' of my work even in the period from 1917 to 1921. But now my work is 'indispensable' in the full sense of the word. There is no arrogance in this claim at all. The collapse of the two Internationals has posed a problem which none of the leaders of these Internationals is at all equipped to solve . . . There is now no one except me to carry out the mission of arming a new generation with the revolutionary method over the heads of the leaders of the Second and Third Internationals.

Trotsky's words scarcely need amplification. He saw his mission as the continued leadership of the permanent revolution as he understood it. For this the Third International had to be superseded, and in order to believe that this was not only possible but likely to happen within his own lifetime he had to judge all developments in Russia during the thirties on the assumption that Stalin's regime was being shaken by severe internal convulsions. Hence, no genuine discussion of the Russian situation or the question of the Fourth International was possible.

* * * *

I NEVER heard Trotsky address a meeting, but sometimes when we were alone together I caught a glimpse of the great orator, the tribune of the people, the man who could restore order to a confused situation with one brief sentence.

The house in which he was living was not guarded by police, although threatening letters were always arriving from right-wing extremists of the Action Française. As I have mentioned, he had two trained Alsatians, and he and his son and secretaries all possessed fire-arms. The weather being warm, I asked him if he went out much, but he told me that his outings were limited to the garden and that he felt his health was suffering.

When I enquired about Prinkipo, he replied: 'Oh, things were a hundred times better there. I had Turkish policemen in the house for my protection and we often went fishing—not with rods but with boats and big nets. We caught so many fish that there were not only enough for me and my family and the policemen, but plenty left over for the policemen to sell at a good price in town.' Trotsky went on to say that it was the healthy air in Prinkipo which had enhanced his capacity for

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work and enabled him to write three large books in such a comparatively short time.

'But weren't you imprisoned in Turkey?' I asked him. 'Didn't Stalin request it when he had you deported?'

'Oh yes, Stalin requested it', Trotsky answered, 'but Kemal Pasha refused to comply.'

'Why?' I asked.

'When Turkey was fighting Greece in the war I helped him with the Red Army. Fellow-soldiers don't forget such things. That was why Kemal Pasha didn't lock me up in spite of pressure from Stalin.'

It gave me a strange feeling to hear these words. There stood Trotsky beside me in his white suit and open-necked shirt. A few hours earlier we had been discussing whether, after the severe international economic crisis that had begun in 1929, another economic crisis could be expected in the near future. The same man was now telling me, almost casually, that Mustapha Kemal did not lock him up because he had once supported him militarily against the Greeks. This extraordinarily rare combination of economic and social analysis and political and military action was characteristic of his whole existence.

Trotsky had an unusually keen eye for his contemporaries' weaknesses and criticised them unmercifully. Whether he had as keen a sense of humour in earlier years I cannot say, but his gift for satirical characterisation makes it highly probable.

I should like, finally, to recall an incident which occurred shortly before my departure.

Trotsky used to feed his two Alsatians in person, mostly on raw meat and often between the end of our afternoon session and supper. We generally parted until the gong sounded for the evening meal, which it normally did at about 6.30 p.m. I usually spent the time indoors reading newspapers and periodicals. On one occasion seven o'clock came and went without the expected summons. When the clock struck seven I thought I must have missed the gong and went out into the garden. For some reason Trotsky was later than usual, and was still feeding his dogs when I emerged. As soon as they saw me they went for me, but Trotsky held them back by the scruff of their necks, saying with a smile: 'You mustn't do anything to Sternberg yet. He hasn't finished the memorandum!'

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VIEWS AND REVIEWS

THE SHOCK OF RECOGNITION

Burton Rubin

SOVIET literature has been marking the tenth anniversary of Stalin's death. Several months in advance of the actual day, it is true, and not in the way such occasions are normally remembered. But then, it has left no room for doubt that the former Master has not been forgotten.

Ever since the 20th Party congress in 1956, the 'liquidation of the cult of personality and its consequences' has been a major feature of the party's platform. Some of the purposes it has been meant to serve are honourable, and some not so honourable. For certain Soviet writers, however, it has represented a thoroughly untarnished opportunity to do a decent job of work by writing about the evils of at least one area of Soviet life—the past. They have done so, during the last seven years, in nearly perfect rhythm to the tempos set by an officially-inspired, phased destruction of the Stalin idol. A frightening literary genre has grown up in the Soviet Union during these years. It has a name—'anti-Stalin literature'—and its sole purpose, when it is honestly practised, is to recall an era of great national calamity when intellectual sycophancy and intellectual repression, assassination, and exile, and an all pervasive and constant atmosphere of fear, cowardice, and cruelty acquired the character of the normal in Soviet life. Last year the outstanding work in this genre was *Tishina* (Quietude) by Yuri Bondarev, a novel which made its impression on Soviet readers with its celebrated pages describing the 'humiliating, unnaturally naked' horror of a brutal arrest. It was equally uncompromising in its detailed description of the needless poverty and renewed terror of the post-war years. There were critics who did not like Bondarev's novel. They would have preferred to have seen its accent fall on the 'heroic reconstruction labours of the people', on 'undespairing, spirtually-tough' citizens who, despite Stalin, carried 'the party's line into practice' (V. Gusarov, 'Uspekh ili Neudacha?' *Zvezda*, No. 9, 1962). To them, Bondarev's gloomy novel yielded only a distorted perspective on the past, one that placed it outside the confines of the actual post-war life of the Soviet people.

On 28 October, *Izvestia* printed an impassioned attack on Bondarev's critics by Konstantin Paustovsky. There are only a few older writers in the Soviet Union today who have made the truthful resurrection of the past a central concern of their declining years. Ilya Erenburg is one of them. Konstantin Paustovsky is another. In the great debates that have been shaking the Soviet literary world ever since the first steps in destalinisation were taken, he has been among the most energetic defenders of writers who have come forward with new revelations. One

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recalls his extraordinary speech in defence of Dudintsev's *Not by Bread Alone*. That was in 1956, and the characterisation of the Drozdovs he set before a meeting of the Moscow Writers Union—those 'deputy ministers, very high-placed administrative officials, and other very exalted personages' whom he excoriated as 'cynics, obscurantists, and anti-Semites', a degenerate breed of informers, moral assassins, and just plain murderers who had destroyed the country's most remarkable men and who continued to 'weigh heavy upon the country'—that characterisation was too explosive to be allowed broad public currency. *Literaturnaya Gazeta* published Paustovsky's speech in a denatured, truncated version. His attack on Bondarev's critics does not ostensibly aim at the 'exalted personages' of his Dudintsev speech, but it is reminiscent of it in its plain language and in the harsh, uninhibited anger he directs at other kindred elements in Soviet life, so much so that its appearance in *Izvestia* was an occasion for special attention.

> There are still people who try to impart to what happened during the time of the 'cult' an innocent colouring, almost an aspect of national well-being. Every attempt to justify the 'cult' is—before those who perished and before the most elementary notion of human conscience—in and of itself, a monstrosity.
>
> And meanwhile, it is still possible to hear it said that it is time to put an end to the 'foolish talk' alleging that the cult of personality hindered the development of our literature.
>
> All right, then, let's agree. All right, it didn't hinder its development. That is, if you don't take into account such 'foolishness' as the merciless, completely unjustified annihilation of numerous absolutely innocent people from every walk of life, and, particularly, from literature. If people forget so quickly and gracelessly about the past, then they have to be reminded of it.
>
> . . . they accuse Bondarev of having left outside the confines of the novel the life of the people, who, despite everything, built, created, struggled. . . .
>
> But, nevertheless, one has to ask: did what took place during the cult of personality, and which is described in Bondarev's novel, did it have any relation to the life of the people, or did it not?
>
> It did. A heavy and fearful relation. From where, then, does the falsehood creep out that the life of the people remains outside the confines of Bondarev's novel?

There was something about the appearance in *Izvestia* of so intemperate an indictment of so common a variety of native hypocrisy that made one wonder. Besides, at that very moment the Soviet press was giving out other equally sharp signals which made it clear that something extremely interesting was being initiated, something that forcefully stirred speculation: was a new storm about to break over the heads of the so-called Stalinists? On 21 October, one week before Paustovsky's article appeared in *Izvestia*, *Pravda* published Evgeny Evtushenko's latest addition to the growing collection of literary sensations that has been bursting from his

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pen in recent years. 'Stalin's Heirs' is haunted by phantoms, the phantoms of men nostalgic for the bad old days; even Stalin, we read, lies grey and sullen-faced in his coffin only feigning death, waiting for an opportunity to rise and reach out for all those who are undoing his work. And Evtushenko appeals to his government: 'double, and triple the guard at his grave so that Stalin will not arise, and with Stalin—the past.'

NOW, in retrospect, we can see that Paustovsky's article and Evtushenko's poem represented the initial movements of a broad new wave of anti-Stalin literature which, in the short space of time since their appearance, has been steadily flooding the pages of Soviet literary newspapers and magazines. A high point was reached with the publication in the November *Novy Mir* of a remarkable story by a hitherto unknown Soviet writer. In 'One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich', Alexander Solzhenitsyn, who himself had lived through eight years of imprisonment behind the barbed-wire of a Soviet concentration camp, had written an unprecedented work of Soviet fiction, a thoroughly shattering account of prison life in one of the recently defunct 'special camps' of the Siberian North. Solzhenitsyn's story is remarkable on several counts, and in order the better to appreciate it, it is necessary to examine some other recent works which have risen out of the same national agony.

Boris Ruchev is a minor Russian poet who has been a Soviet writer long enough to have been a delegate to the first Congress of Soviet Writers in 1934. In the late thirties he was arrested and sent to a camp in Kolyma. There, in the autumn of 1941, he was trapped in a forest fire in the taiga and suffered near-fatal burns. The war with Germany was on, and—Ruchev states in a prefatory note to a recently published poem—like most of his fellow prisoners, his only thought was how to get to the front (*Literatura I Zhizn*, 25 November 1962). In the hospital, recovering from his burns, he began to write poetry again, after the four-year interruption which began with his arrest. He has entitled the poems he wrote during the war years, 'Poems About Distant Battles'; the one in *Literatura I Zhizn* was written in 1942. It describes the poet's imagined return home from prison after the war. He finds that all his former friends have died defending their homeland. Their voices rise to him from their graves and reproach him for having escaped death; and he, the poet, reproaches himself as well. The final lines are:

Forgive me my wife, forgive me my friends,
By a distant shore I curse my fate,
That I live in bitter separation from the war,
That I am not in the first ranks marching into battle,
And people do not know
of my valour.

Apart from its human significance—there were such remarkable men as Ruchev, who, despite the unmotherly way it had treated them, preserved a flaming love for their motherland—the poem is illustrative

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of a powerful assertion being made by the recent literature about the camps and the people who suffered in them: namely, that these people were almost to a man fervent patriots and communists, exemplary in their natural virtues and their high-minded dedication to the ideals of the 'true' Leninist party. There is a readily identifiable fictional character pattern evolving in this literature. The virtues of Stalin's victims are portrayed with a disconcerting extravagance; a patent effort at literary idealisation is taking place.

Ruchev's only concern was to help his country defeat the German invaders. The same point is made about some other Kolyma prisoners in *Samorokok* (The Nugget), a short story miniature by Georgy Shelest (*Izvestia*, 6 November 1962). It portrays a group of four prisoners, all of them communists, who out of devotion to the party, decide, at a staggering personal cost to themselves, to make their contribution to the war effort by surrendering a gold nugget they have found to the camp authorities. The leading spirit in this self-sacrificing enterprise, Dushenov, is held in great esteem by his fellow-prisoners and is surrounded in the story by an aura of moral purity in the creation of which Shelest goes so far as to describe him as possessing the eyes of an old-ikon Christ. In *Dobraya Pamyat* (Good Memories), a story by V. Gerasimova, the heroine returns from a long exile to the town in which she had once been a leading party official, and is remembered by the people she encounters with such a degree of adulation as to make her a kind of local saint (*Pravda*, 11 November 1962).

Such examples could be multiplied; in all of them we recognise the devices of hagiography. And, indeed, it is not a martyrology of Stalin's victims which Soviet writers have been creating, but a hagiography. They had difficulty in conceiving human character in its full, complex, and contradictory moral ambiguousness. It is not their fault, but rather the reflection of the conditions under which they have to write. But it is not solely on esthetic grounds that the literary idealisation of Stalin's victims is offensive. For the central purpose these hagiographical extravagances serve is to draw a sharp divide between the party and the Georgian tyrant who ruled it for so many years. Not only does the 'true' party, in the person of its idealised and martyred representatives, emerge in the recent anti-Stalin literature as the expression of the nation's finest spirit; it also appears as the chief victim of Stalin's crimes. And if the party was the chief victim of Stalin's crimes, how could anyone imagine that it was in any way responsible for them?

There are still other grounds for taking offence at this literature. No one can object to the portrayal of unjustly imprisoned men who preserve in its fullest measure their love of country—although there must have been many in the camps who worked and froze and starved and finally learned not to care about the fate of their country; the latter are understandable, if not especially admirable. But what of those who learned to express their faith in the ideals of the Revolution by beginning to

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ask fundamental questions about the nature of their country's political system? Unfortunately, it is still too much to ask of Soviet literature that it honour these other victims of Stalin, and write about their moral character and ideas.

IN contrast to such failures of integrity, 'One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich' represents a really important breakthrough to the truth about the past. Solzhenitsyn has not only boldly opened one of the past's formerly secreted chapters. He has also executed a radical, and honourable, shift of emphasis from the one that had become standard in the recent literature about Stalin's victims. Ivan Denisovich Shukhov, the hero of his tale, was an ordinary Russian soldier, and prior to that a simple kolkhoznik, before he was sentenced to his three-thousand, six-hundred and fifty-three days in the Siberian cold. Neither he, nor the men who share his fate and his barracks, can claim any of the more lofty distinctions of their equally martyred literary predecessors. They have only their precariously maintained dignity as human beings, a dignity based mainly on their stubborn refusal to be brought to their knees—to become 'jackals' who beg, or '*stukachi*' who inform—despite the ferocity of a camp regime calculated to do just that. Estonians, Latvians, Russian soldiers, sons of kulaks, sixteen-year-old boys—these are the inhabitants of the nether world Solzhenitsyn describes. They are not idealised representatives of the self-proclaimed elite of the Soviet people. They *are* the Soviet people—Ivan Shukhov, a barely literate Russian peasant, is the Soviet Common Man, and it is to Solzhenitsyn's credit that he has announced the truth that it was Shukhov, and nobody else, who was Stalin's chief victim.

Solzhenitsyn has written a clean story, clean of the usual 'ideological content' of Soviet literature. His characters are generally too preoccupied with subduing the hunger pangs in their stomachs and with worrying about how to keep from freezing to be able to give much thought to other matters. But what reflection there is in this story of the world of ideas, amazes us. Shukhov—a man who prays in difficult moments—is an entirely new kind of positive hero for Soviet literature. We are amazed by Solzhenitsyn's sympathetic treatment of Aleshka, the Baptist, and by his asking why a meek man like that had to be put into this hell just because he insists on practising his queer religion: the question has still not lost its point in the Soviet Union. We are startled by the old intellectual who complains about Eisenstein's film, *Ivan the Terrible*, calling it 'a mockery of three generations of the Russian intelligentsia'.—Someone objects: 'But they wouldn't have allowed any other interpretation through.'—'Ah,' the old man replies, 'they wouldn't have allowed any other?! Then don't tell me he's a genius. Say that he is a toady, that he carried out a swine's orders. Geniuses don't tailor their interpretations to the tastes of tyrants.' How much is left of the Soviet arts and of Soviet artists, after this? Finally, what are we to make of a

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Soviet literary hero for whom the Soviet authorities are a thing so distant that his only natural way of referring to them is 'they'; and who, when another prisoner teases him about the source of the laws that govern the sun's movements, reveals something besides his simplicity by wondering: 'Is it possible that the sun also is subject to their decrees?'

Solzhenitsyn has brought us a long way from the literature we have been examining, and a long way towards the truth about the people in the camps and about the Soviet people in general.

His reviewers have noted that he does not pile on horrors, his story has not the character of a cry of pain. There are no beatings and no torture scenes in it, no exclamations of indignation by the author. The absolutely shattering impact of this story is produced precisely by its matter-of-fact presentation of the every-day reality of camp life. We learn that Shukhov received his ten-year sentence as a spy because for two days at the beginning of the war he had been a prisoner of the Germans; Solzhenitsyn notes that there were at least five such 'spies' in each of the camp's numerous work brigades. The injustice Shukhov suffered was mild compared to that of the deaf Senka Klevshin, who had escaped from Buchenwald three times, was recaptured by the Germans as many times, tortured by them, hung by his hands, and then sentenced to a life of captivity in a Soviet camp—also for having been a prisoner of the Germans. The information about Shukhov and Klevshin is presented without particular emphasis; it is simply given. And it is with such plain, uncoloured facts that Solzhenitsyn sounds the depths of Stalin's prison world.

'One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich' has a peculiar power, contained by the detached, business-like narrative manner that comes from the concentration of its energy on the most meticulously minute description of the details of getting through the single day of prison life, from reveille to lights-out. In places it strikes one as being almost a kind of manual, a book of instructions on how to survive hunger and cold, and the sadistic ferocity of the camp guards—the three elements against which Shukhov and his mates must wage their daily battle in order, literally, to live another day. Solzhenitsyn explains why a prisoner in an Arctic camp must be sure never to let his boots get wet, and how useful a crust of bread is to a hungry prisoner as an instrument for absorbing the last drop of sustenance from his bowl of kasha.

Hunger and cold! Their presence is felt on every page of the story. '. . . if someone doesn't finish his gruel and moves his bowl away, then sometimes, like vultures, several grab for it at the same time.' And like vultures, the prisoners must defend every morsel of their beggarly ration against the ever ingenious, sometimes brazen, sometimes pitiable designs of men whose tormenting hunger will drive them as soon to beg as it will to steal. There is an intolerable moment in the story when Solzhenitsyn is describing how Shukhov manages to trick the camp cook into giving his brigade two extra bowls of oatmeal and then waits in a

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state of agonised anticipation and paranoid mistrustfulness, demeaned to the condition of a greedy animal, to see whether his brigade chief, who decides such matters, will give him one of them. Solzhenitsyn surrenders himself entirely to Shukhov's hunger and it becomes something palpable, inescapable, demonic, a figure as large as Ivan Denisovich himself. A barracks-mate receives a parcel from home and treats Shukhov, whose prisoner's diet is meat-free, to a piece of sausage. '. . . a piece of sausage in his mouth! Get it with your teeth! Your teeth! The fragrance of meat! And meat juices, real meat juices. Now it's gone, there, into your stomach. And that's the end of the sausage.'

THERE is no point in going on with an account of the cruelties Solzhenitsyn quietly describes. They were known to the world and to the Soviet people before he wrote about them, though rarely have they been given the power to inspire horror which he gives them. Never before, however, have the Soviet people been told these things in print, and for this reason the publication of 'One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich' was received as an event of major literary and political significance, both inside and out of the Soviet Union.

Alexander Tvardovsky, who as the editor of *Novy Mir* wrote an introductory note to Solzhenitsyn's story, greeted it as 'one more example of the fact that there are no longer any areas or events of reality which in our time are excluded from the sphere of Soviet artists'. This, to put it generously, was a bit of wishful thinking. Soviet writers have been permitted to write a new chapter about the past, and no doubt will be permitted still others; but the whole book of Soviet reality, past and present, is not likely to be written so long as its contents represent a threat to the powers that regulate the reading matter of Soviet citizens. And anyone who is acquainted with the 'underground' literature that has been making its way out of the Soviet Union in recent years, or with the views of representative Soviet intellectuals, especially young ones, has encountered a radical temperament that leaves none of the abuses of Soviet society, not only the officially disapproved ones, uncriticised, and that *does* constitute a threat to the established powers. Soviet writers cannot yet say everything they might like to say about the reality of their society, and, as we have seen, even the current burst of truth-telling about the past has been, for the most part, disappointing.

Solzhenitsyn seemed to promise something better, and Tvardovsky's words reflected a genuine excitement. There was reason to be excited. Grigory Baklanov, one of Solzhenitsyn's reviewers, and himself a novelist, said that the story had established a new level of conversation with the Soviet reader, that henceforth it would no longer be possible to write Soviet fiction in the same way as before. Baklanov may have overstated the case on this point; but he could rightly say of Solzhenitsyn something that can be said of very few Soviet writers: 'The author will not have to

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justify any self-compromises by telling his acquaintances: "You understand, I wanted to say more, but they wouldn't have printed it anyway!"' (*Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 22 November 1962). There were other events which made what was happening look unusually promising. The ban on publication was being lifted from many formerly suppressed anti-Stalin works. Leonid Leonov's play *Metel* (The Snow Storm), written in 1940, and another by Nikolai Pogodin, *Chernye Ptitsy* (Birds of Darkness) were to be staged in Moscow for the first time. Soviet poets began to empty their desks of the poems they had had to keep under wraps until then. Boris Slutsky read one such poem, 'We all walked under God'—he had written it in 1955—to an appreciative audience at the mammoth 'poetry evening' held on 30 October at Moscow's Luzhniki Sports Stadium. Another poem, not in the category of formerly suppressed works, but written more recently, made an even greater impression upon the audience that evening. Robert Rozhdestvensky's 'Rodina' (Motherland) also took issue with the evils of the past, but the main force of its lines is directed against contemporary targets.

And don't dare try
to persuade us stealthily,
adopting enigmatic poses:
'It's too early for you,
lads,
to understand
all that. . . .'
Early?
Better early
than late! . . .
We will no longer say:
someone
is thinking
for us!
We've found out
what that
ends with!

This was the voice of the young writers whose every effort to achieve artistic and intellectual independence, to locate the crippling ailments of Soviet society and Soviet art, has been met by desperate resistance from men like the critics of Bondarev's novel, men whom Evtushenko would number among 'Stalin's heirs'.

Still another development which seemed to suggest that Solzhenitsyn's story and the wave of literature on whose crest it came held a truly broad promise was a sharp turn of fortune for the very writers Rozhdestvensky had attacked. In the middle of November it was announced that the triweekly newspaper, *Literatura I Zhizn*, the press organ of the RSFSR Writers Union and the haven of Soviet literary reaction, would cease publication on 1 January 1963. It was not without its own drama that

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this newspaper, which for years had stood for a tolerant and evasive approach to the grim truths of the past, found itself during those weeks in November in a position where it had to do forced penance, as it were, and give over its final pages to works which told those truths. The literary 'Stalinists' had suffered a severe defeat; an obstacle had been cleared not only from the path of literary revelations, but from the path of literary innovations as well, and the outlook had become much brighter for the renewal which liberal writers, young and old, have been demanding.

BEHIND all this was the party. It was widely reported then, and has recently been officially confirmed, that a number of the recent anti-Stalin works, including Solzhenitsyn's story, were read and approved for publication by the highest party authorities. (The confirmation was given by Ilychev, *Pravda*, 22 December 1962.)[1] But the writers who commented on this literature in the Soviet press did not need to wait for official confirmation to know that the controls of such literary floodgates as the one which had just been thrown open are not manned by themselves. They thanked the party for once again demonstrating how decisively it repudiates the crimes of the past. Their expressions of gratitude are instructive. Konstantin Simonov, in a review in *Izvestia* (18 November 1962) of Solzhenitsyn's story, made a brief excursion from his summary of its contents into another matter:

> And—to digress for a moment from literature and turn to politics—I think it will not be superfluous to remember here that there are people among us with a boundless love for their people and a boundless belief in its moral strength and beauty who found in themselves the determination to speak fearlessly about that fearful past, and that this was bitterly resisted by men who did not love their people and did not believe in its moral strength.

With this recollection of Khrushchev's struggle with the 'anti-party group', Simonov turns Solzhenitsyn's story into an occasion to honour Khrushchev and the party he leads. One finds in the critical writings on the new anti-Stalin literature a kindred assertion to the one made in much of that literature itself. The party is exonerated from responsibility for the crimes of the past, all of which are blamed solely upon Stalin, and its sponsorship of such works as Solzhenitsyn's is taken as an earnest of its innocence.

It would be wrong to regard Simonov's praise of Khrushchev as mere sycophancy. There is, after all, much to be grateful for to Khrushchev. However unsavoury his past, his present ambitions have led him to take

[1] There is still doubt about the part Khrushchev played in this affair. He is reported to have claimed, in a secret speech, delivered to the final plenary session of the central committee on 23 November, that he, personally, had authorised the publication of 'One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich' in an uncensored text. Moreover, he claimed to have done so over the opposition of other party leaders who wanted various sections cut. Ilychev had nothing to say about this.

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a course which will not be without effect on the moral temper of Soviet society, and also, inevitably, on the future limits of the party's rule. Khrushchev's words at the 22nd party congress are being recalled:

> It is our duty to carry out a meticulous and many-sided analysis of such affairs as were connected with the abuse of power. Time will pass, we will die—we are all mortal—but while we are working we can and must clear up many things and tell the truth to the party and the nation . . . this must be done so that such phenomena will never be repeated in the future.

Solzhenitsyn's reviewers welcome his story as one that will make the repetition of the crimes of the past impossible. Amend this to read 'less likely', and probability does seem to be on the side of their being right. For the character of the Soviet people is now being forged in a crucible of revulsion against what was done to them, and, this is also important, against what they allowed to be done to themselves. Baklanov names among the circumstances that helped Stalin commit his crimes the fact that 'we ourselves believed, persuaded ourselves to believe not obvious facts, not ourselves, but him. He knows, he is wise; if he is doing such a thing, it means there is some higher reason for it. . . . To make such blind faith impossible in the future, to exterminate in our souls the remnants of what was lodged in them by the cult of personality is not an easy or a quick task. And here an enormous role must be played by our literature, a literature which tells the people the truth.' The final significance for Baklanov of the 20th and 22nd party congresses is that 'people have changed, they have become accustomed to trusting their feelings and their reason. . . .'

The post-20th congress atmosphere has bred, especially among the young, a sharp distrust of dogma and authority, a fierce desire to judge for themselves, to 'honestly and fearlessly think over everything we have lived through and by which we now live. . . . We don't want to say to ourselves anymore: "Stop! You can't go any further! That's taboo!"' (I. Iverev, *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 1 November 1962.) They have

found out
what that
ends with!

Relative security from the arbitrary violence of the once ubiquitous blue-capped political police; the growth of an independent-minded intellectual youth—these are important developments, and Khrushchev deserves gratitude for them. But he has not given his people large enough grounds for the overflowing gratitude writers like Simonov obligatorily express to him. Unfortunately, despite his wishes to the contrary, Rozhdesvensky must still say: 'someone is thinking for us'. Khrushchev himself has recently given a very convincing demonstration of this fact.

A NUMBER of Western correspondents mistakenly interpreted the recent unfreezing of a single area of artistic territory as the

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beginning of a new cultural thaw. However, one should not be too severe with them. The atmosphere in Moscow at the end of November seems to have been such that normally cautious Russians themselves made a serious miscalculation. It is clear that the directors of the Moscow division of the Union of Artists had decided that the time was ripe not merely for a modest advance of the claims of non-realistic art to exist in the Soviet Union, but for a forceful demonstration of its right to exist. They turned the exhibition commemorating the thirtieth anniversary of their organisation into just such a demonstration, one in which conventional socialist-realist paintings were deliberately lost in the shadows of a variety of unorthodox canvases covering almost the whole gamut of modern 'isms'. Khrushchev's visit to that exhibition on 1 December, and his reaction to it, has ended all talk of a thaw. Instead, it has given rise to gloomy thoughts about a new cultural crackdown. The character and particulars of the artistic purification campaign that followed upon Khrushchev's angry denunciation of the bold artistic heresies he found at the exhibition is too large a subject to go into here. So far it has been directed almost exclusively against non-conformity in music and art; but certain alarming notes have been sounded about 'apolitical and formalistic' tendencies among writers. However, it is too early to say what the consequences will be for literature.

One of the ugliest elements in the whole affair was pointed out in a letter to Khrushchev by a group of unnamed Soviet writers and artists. They complained of one consequence of the campaign which, they said, they were sure Khrushchev did not desire: the artists 'of the very tendency which alone flourished in Stalin's time, depriving others of the possibility of working and even of living', were once again raising their voices in the name of suppression and uniformity.[2] This, indeed, is what has been happening, and it is not only discredited painters who have been writing in the Soviet press with new accents of authority: it has been several years since the Soviet press has shown the world so dispiriting a display of toadyism by writers and artists who have been thanking the party for its 'solicitude' for them, and demanding that it carry this solicitude even further by making its controls over cultural life so airtight as to completely smother renegade formalists now and in the future. At the same time the oppressive dogmas of *partiinost* and *narodnost*, of which we had not heard so much during the past year, are being powerfully reasserted by the party itself. In these circumstances, the literary men of the *Literatura I Zhizn* persuasion, who only yesterday suffered a hope-inspiring defeat, will now find reason to feel

[2] Ilychev quoted excerpts from this extraordinary letter in his speech on 17 December at a meeting of party and government leaders with representatives from the Soviet arts (*Pravda*, 22 December 1962).

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emboldened. The literary scene at the moment is still unclear, but one thing can be said with certainty. If the party once again, as it did in 1957, gives its support to these writers and critics, then this will wipe out gains made by Soviet writers during the last four years which are at least as important as, if not more important than the newly acquired extension of literary objectivity about the past.

INTERPRETING NEO-REALISM

Eugene Kamenka

MR A. S. BOGOMOLOV, a specialist in the history of Western philosophy lecturing in the University of Moscow, is one of the ablest of the young, Soviet-trained philosophers in this field. Still in his thirties, he gained the degree of Candidate of Philosophical Sciences in 1958, with a thesis on 'The Theory of "Creative" Evolution in Contemporary Anglo-American Philosophy' submitted to Moscow University. Both his larger work, *The Idea of Development in Bourgeois Philosophy of the 19th and 20th centuries*, and the eight lectures on the philosophy of Anglo-American neo-realism under review,* have just been published by Moscow University Press; his shorter articles and reviews in academic journals and collections have shown his chief interest to lie in neo-realism, Spencer, Russell, Whitehead, and Alexander, and in the philosophy of the American 'materialist' Roy Wood Sellars, whose article 'Three Levels of Materialism', with a comment by Bogomolov, was published in *Voprosy Filosofii* (No. 8, 1962).

Mr Bogomolov's writings are of special interest to the Sovietologist because they are the work of one of the ablest of the new generation of professional university philosophers, entirely reared and trained in the Soviet Union, and gaining most of their philosophical education in the relatively relaxed and professional atmosphere of the post-Stalinist era. One may bring out the difference in type by constrasting Mr Bogomolov with another—far older—Soviet philosopher, highly thought of by Western Sovietologists, the Georgian K. S. Bakradze. Professor Bakradze studied under Husserl in Germany in the 1920s; his chief interest lies in the development of the Kantian and Hegelian traditions in Germany and in the relationship between Aristotelian and Hegelian logic; his often impressive armoury of philosophical scholarship comes largely from German sources and bears no organic relation to the conventional quotations from Lenin to be found in his introductions and endings. Mr Bogomolov's 'knowledge by acquaintance' with other countries and other philosophical traditions, on the other hand, is limited to recent organised philosophical visits to Warsaw and Hungary; significantly he is attracted by the technical, professional tradition of Anglo-American philosophy and not by the *Lebensphilosophie* of the

* A. S. Bogomolov, **Filosofiya anglo-amerikanskovo neorealizma** (Moscow University Press, 1962), 88 pp.

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continent. Marxism, to him, is not a set of political slogans, but a *philosophy*, the philosophy in which he was educated; because he is at once philosophically able and philosophically and politically orthodox, he is above all concerned to work out a genuinely Marxist critique of contemporary bourgeois philosophy, to create an organic and pervasive relationship between his own dialectical materialism and his critique of Anglo-American work. Thus, in his review of Bakradze's (1960) work, *Essays in the History of Modern and Contemporary Bourgeois Philosophy, Part I*, published in *Voprosy Filosofii* (No. 6, 1962), Mr Bogomolov criticises Bakradze for investigating the social character of philosophical theories in a manner that fails to relate such investigation to a general methodological and intellectual spirit, but merely makes mechanical connections with the philosopher's known social views. This, Bogomolov argues, is a common fault of Soviet philosophers: thus some historians of philosophy 'declare that existentialism is the "philosophy of the intelligentsia" and neo-positivism "the philosophy of the scientists"—a blunder that can only be explained by their confusing the "social address" of a philosophical teaching with its objective class content in general'.

All this sounds very promising indeed, and it would be exciting if Mr Bogomolov—who seems likely to go far in the official hierarchy of Soviet university philosophers—displayed signs of doing for a Marxist theory of philosophy what E. B. Pashukanis did for a Marxist theory of law. But in the event, his writings fall far short of his goal, and display—such is the irony of criticism—precisely those virtues for which one would praise Professor Bakradze: i.e., the virtues of serious philosophical interest in and genuine philosophical understanding of the Western philosophers dealt with. There is no shortage of eminent philosophers in Germany, Italy, and France with a much fuller grasp of the Anglo-American philosophical tradition than Mr Bogomolov's.

The Philosophy of Anglo-American Neo-Realism, it is true, is not a major work: it is based on a course of lectures which the author delivered in the University of Moscow in the academic year 1959–60, as part of the normal course on bourgeois philosophy in the epoch of imperialism, and has been published with a special eye to the instruction of the University's external students. The lectures begin with George Moore's *Refutation of Idealism* and the American New Realist *Programme and Platform of Six Realists*; they pass on to consider neo-realism in the philosophy of Russell, Alexander's *Space, Time and Deity*, and Whitehead's philosophy of process; and they end with a brief chapter on Smuts' development of holism. The exposition of the philosophical views considered—especially of the problems of internal versus external relations, of the relation of knower and known, of Alexander's conception of Space-Time and Whitehead's dichotomy of 'events' and 'objects'—is serious, fair, and professional. Students are referred to a reasonable sample of the original works, and Mr Bogomolov himself has obviously read them thoroughly, besides making good use of the Schilpp volumes in the Library of Living Philosophers and of Professor John Passmore's excellent *A Hundred Years of Philosophy*. Nevertheless, Mr Bogomolov simply does not succeed in his main aim of bringing out the fatal defects of neo-realism in a way that would

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once again vindicate the 'materialist approach to philosophy'; neither is he at all convincing in his subsidiary and in some ways far more perfunctory attempt to link the content of neo-realist philosophy with the social needs and attitudes of the bourgeoisie 'in the epoch of imperialism'.

This is not to say that he does not land some short but telling blows. He correctly points to the tensions between the New Realists' pluralism and their neutral monism; he notes and exploits the difficulties in which these realists landed themselves by wanting to argue for the objective existence (subsistence) of errors and illusions; he is able to bring out their difficulties in dealing with universals and their constant tendency towards a Humean agnosticism—'as to what reality is', the New Realist E. B. Holt once said, 'I take no great interest'. Neither does Mr Bogomolov have much difficulty in pointing to Whitehead's difficulties in relating particulars and universals, events and objects, or to the fideism in Alexander's theory of emergent evolution. His general theme is that Anglo-American neo-realism is a reaction against the fact that idealism had become too far divorced from science; but neo-realism is not materialism: it is an eclectic mixture of materialism and idealism, an attempt to save some of the central tenets of idealism by creating a pseudo-scientific philosophy with certain materialist strains. The epistemology of neo-realism (the only field in which neo-realists even claimed to reject idealism) Mr Bogomolov finds consistently tainted with subjective idealism; the cosmology of neo-realism, especially the work of Whitehead and Alexander, seems to him basically objective-idealist in its content.

Now in all this there is a certain degree of truth. The failure of the New Realist movement in the twentieth century has been largely due to its incomplete emancipation from the assumptions of the classical British empiricists, especially from the belief in pure particulars. A number of idealist critics have been able to show tellingly (as Brand Blanchard does in *The Nature of Thought* and Errol E. Harris in *Nature, Mind and Modern Science*) how the New Realists and their followers have repeated the basic views and the instabilities of the original British empiricists and have failed to surmount their difficulties: the best parts of Mr Bogomolov's criticisms are of the same type. But these criticisms are not brought out, but only obscured, by treating the issue as comprising the confused set of issues between 'materialism' and 'idealism'—few Western readers, at least, are likely to finish Mr Bogomolov's book with any clear conception of what idealism really is and how we are to distinguish subjective from objective idealism. If we must have labels, then it would be far more helpful, I should argue, to adopt the late Professor John Anderson's distinction between empiricism as the belief in a single way of being (rather than knowing), and rationalism as the belief in two or more ways of being, in ideals or atoms, in forms or subsistents, in anything above or below the proposition. If he had seen it in these terms, Mr Bogomolov might have been able to make his criticism far sharper.

Other defects in the lectures can scarcely be remedied without abandoning Marxist dogma. Marxist dogma—especially the belief in

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essential as opposed to adventitious connections—prevents Mr Bogomolov from accepting wholeheartedly the realist view of relations as external; Marxist dogma also prevents him (for all his 'materialism') from admitting that we know events directly, and forces him to repeat the usual inanities about reality being 'reflected' in consciousness. He even suggests that it is a serious defect (!) of new realism that it rejects the doctrine of reflections. Occasionally—but only occasionally—Mr Bogomolov slips into techniques reminiscent of cruder Soviet writings; thus he makes a spurious attempt to show that Perry only refined pragmatism because he continued to praise William James, and that Smuts modelled his philosophy of holism on the empire-building of Cecil Rhodes.

POSITIONS OF STRENGTH

A.R.

THIS BOOK* TRACES the history of the post-war American attitude towards negotiations with the Russians from Acheson to Kennedy. It attacks the concept of negotiation from strength, particularly in the Dulles interpretation, as a complete failure. It argues that, whereas up to 1952 or 1953 such a policy was possible because of American nuclear superiority, it lost its meaning as the Western military posture *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union became relatively weaker. It is convincingly written and contains some shrewd descriptions of the American political scene and of the motivation of foreign policy. There is, for instance, a fascinating account of the manner in which Mr Dulles managed to dominate American politics by the force of his personality but also by skilful manoeuvre and even, where necessary (as in the case of McCarthy), by outright cajolery. The assessment of the CND movement in Britain is particularly sober and astute. The book as a whole is fashionably pessimistic. Nonetheless, in its main premise, it is almost completely wrong.

There is nothing inherently reprehensible in seeking to negotiate from strength. No statesman in his right mind would negotiate from weakness if he could help it. The Russians above all recognise this fact and act upon it. The abrupt cessation by the USSR of the moratorium on atomic tests in 1961, and her refusal to give up the advantages of secrecy in the context of control of disarmament, are cases in point, and Miss Bell is somewhat disingenuous in not making this abundantly clear. Occasionally she admits that the Russians do recognise its validity—e.g., in the casual reference on p. 100 that 'the USSR like other powers has a range of diplomatic objectives and will logically choose its immediate one in the light of its bargaining position for the time being'.

In the main, however, she prefers to throw most of the blame for the lack of success of post-war negotiations with the USSR on to the West.

* Coral Bell, **Negotiation from Strength**: A Study in the Politics of Power. London, Chatto and Windus, 1962. 21s.

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This involves some curious tailoring of the facts. Thus the cold reception in the West of Stalin's 'hints at a peace conference in May 1948 and again in 1949', and the absence of 'any eagerness for serious bargaining in such low-level negotiations as did take place' (p. 26), are implicitly condemned without so much as a reference to the communist take-over in Czechoslovakia in February 1948 and the Berlin blockade of 1948–49. The author finds it 'a trifle surprising' that the communist attack in Korea was accepted by the USA as 'the beginning of a new phase in Soviet policy, a phase in which the USSR was showing itself willing to take the risk of open hostilities, possibly in Europe as well as elsewhere' (p. 41). But this is precisely what may well have happened if the Americans had not shown that they had the will to meet the challenge. Another more recent and even more graphic instance was, of course, Cuba.

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the author would have had to revise her opinions in the light of the Cuban crisis. Here was convincing evidence both of the Soviet desire to negotiate from strength (if the building of the missile bases had been successfully concluded), and of the American will to act in defence of her vital interests. As it is, the book abounds in expressions of apparent hopelessness as regards the West's prospects. On p. 31, for instance, in listing the possible results of the power struggle between America and Russia, the possibility of a Russian defeat without war is not mentioned (though the defeat of the West is). The omission is perhaps academic but it is also symptomatic. Likewise on p. 211 we read that 'it is obvious enough that time has proved militarily to be against the West', on p. 212 that 'the deteriorating fortunes of the West in the balance of power might be retrieved . . . through the dissension between Russia and China', and on the same page, that 'the American aspiration to negotiate from strength came to nothing because the compounded pluralism of decision-making in an alliance of democracies vitiated the effort at strength'. The author, in fact, comes dangerously, if perhaps unwittingly, close to accepting the communist view of the internal weaknesses of the West and of its inevitable defeat.

The West does not, of course, stand today in a worse posture *vis-à-vis* the East than it did ten years ago. Militarily, perhaps, the race is a much closer thing, with the USA and the USSR in a state of virtual nuclear parity in terms of the ability to deal annihilating destruction on each other. But economically, politically, and socially, the West as a whole continues to make significant progress—quite as spectacular as anything in the East, which in any case has revealed its own set of special complications and weaknesses.

Taken to its logical conclusion, the book's argument that negotiation from strength has allegedly failed over the past ten years would mean that the West ought to have negotiated a settlement with Russia as a first priority, whether circumstances were propitious or not—which is another way of saying that the Western cause is not worthwhile. As illustration, one wonders what would have happened if the West had opened negotiations over Korea in the summer of 1950 rather than a year later, when it could negotiate from strength—the strength of having successfully defended the territorial integrity of South Korea.

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The trouble with Miss Bell's thesis is that she has not understood (or has not cared to understand) what was meant by 'strength' in the American concept. In essence it meant (a) making clear to the Russians what were considered to be the vital interests of the West so that the possibility of war by miscalculation was reduced, and (b) having the means and the will to defend those interests actively if need be. Given the probing and messianic nature of communism, some such statement appears to be vital if the West's position is not to be subjected to continual attempts at erosion. The evidence is that when the Russians know where the West stands on a particular issue they will be very careful not to push any point of dispute to the brink of war; and the same applies vice versa (e.g. over Hungary). Given the present facts of international life, it is difficult to see how either the USA or the USSR *can* negotiate with each other except from strength. It is perhaps not without significance that, for all their bitter attacks on his 'policy of strength' through the years, the Russians found a good word to say for Mr Dulles when he died.

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